Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Brown injured his knee when he fell at his former prison. He received medical care and was placed on “special needs,” which included being assigned a lower bunk, a wheelchair, and crutches. Weeks later, Brown was transferred. Over the first few months, he spent time in segregation. Brown repeatedly asked several times for medical care but received none. He was later moved to a shared cell where his cellmate, who was disabled, slept in the lower bunk. While climbing to his top bunk, Brown fell. Afterward, Brown saw a doctor who said that Brown needed surgery but that the prison would not provide it. Brown then asked the prison’s “special needs committee” to provide him “accommodations,” and he “filed an ADA reasonable accommodation request.” He also alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed, in part. Brown alleged a viable failure-to-accommodate claim, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Brown’s complaint did not need to identify any particular legal theory, nor did it need to allege all legal elements of a particular claim. Brown’s alleged knee injury renders him disabled under the ADA and he alleged failure to accommodate his disability. No rule of law required Brown to identify a particular accommodation in his complaint. The ADA “does not create a remedy for medical malpractice” but Brown’s claim is not about allegedly substandard medical care. View "Brown v. Fofana" on Justia Law

Hill and Combs kidnapped 12-year-old Fife, beat Fife, raped him in multiple ways, strangled him, bit his genitals, sodomized him, and burned him. Fife’s father found him in a field. Fife died days later. Several witnesses testified that Hill was around the crime scene. The state introduced Hill’s confession that he had watched Combs beat and rape Fife. There was physical evidence. One witness testified that Hill had raped her in the same wooded area and another testified that Hill had raped her multiple times. Hill was sentenced to death in 1986. Ohio courts rejected Hill’s appeal and state habeas petition.Hill’s 1996 federal habeas petition challenged the denial of expert assistance on bitemark evidence. While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Atkins.” On remand, the state court determined that Hill was not intellectually disabled; his death sentence stood. Following a remand by the Supreme Court and various Sixth Circuit decisions, Hill sought a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence,” a report from the American Board of Forensic Odontology that suggested using bitemarks to identify a specific individual might not be reliable. Ohio courts held that there was “no probability” that a new trial would lead to a “different outcome” because the state had proffered so much other evidence of guilt.Hill’s second federal habeas petition argued that the state trial court violated his due process rights by not properly conducting a materiality review of the bitemark evidence. The Sixth Circuit characterized Hill’s petition as “second or successive,” so Hill was required to meet the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). Under Hill's interpretation, "Hmost convictions involving forensic evidence would never be final." View "In re: Hill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified Defendant's convictions for two counts of first degree murder and two counts of use of a firearm to commit a felony, holding that the record was insufficient to address certain claims, and there was otherwise no merit to his arguments on direct appeal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there was no plain error in the admission of evidence regarding a prior shooting; (2) there was no plain error in the prosecution's remarks; (3) the record was insufficient to address several of Defendant's numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and there was no merit to Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (4) the sentencing order must be modified to reflect a sentence of life imprisonment for each of Defendant's convictions for first degree murder. View "State v. Mabior" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' return-of-property motion and Appellants' request to quash and unseal search warrants, holding that Nevada's return-of-property statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.085, allows a property owner to seek the return of privileged materials that were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant even when the government has an ongoing investigation.Appellants moved under section 179.085 for the return of the various documents and electronic devices seized at Appellants' business establishments on the basis that the property contained privileged materials. Appellant also sought to quash and unseal the warrants. The district court denied the motion, determining that it was not unreasonable for LVMPD to retain the property during an ongoing investigation and that the search protocol proposed by LVMPD was a reasonable resolution of the privilege issue. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Appellants' request to quash and unseal the warrants; (2) erred when it denied Appellants' return-of-property motion without giving Appellants an opportunity to demonstrate privilege; and (3) erred by adopting LVMPD's proposed search protocol. View "In re Search Warrants re Seizure of Documents" on Justia Law

In the midst of a group contacted by officers for smoking cannabis on the street, 16-year-old T.F.-G. witnessed first one and then another of his companions be restrained, searched, and made to sit on the curb as the officers worked their way through the group. T.F.-G. ran. Chased, tackled, and punched, he was arrested for resisting or delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code 148(a)). In a search incident to that arrest, the police found a loaded handgun in his pocket, which T.F.-G. was not licensed to carry.The court of appeal affirmed his convictions. The totality of the circumstances, establishing the existence of probable cause for his arrest for resisting or delaying a peace officer—the asserted basis for the eventual search that revealed his possession of a loaded handgun in public–indicated that a reasonable person in T.F.-G.’s position would have understood he was not free to leave. The court also rejected a Second Amendment facial challenge to the prohibition on the unlicensed public carrying of loaded firearms. Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” decision, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional. View "In re T.F.-G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal that a Department of Insurance regulation prohibiting bail bond agents from entering into agreements with jail inmates to be notified when individuals have recently been arrested and thus may be in need of bail bond services was facially invalid under the First Amendment, holding that the court of appeal erred in holding that the regulation was unconstitutional on its face.In declaring the regulation constitutionally invalid the court of appeal concluded that the regulation imposed burdens on the free speech rights of bail bond agents that were not adequately justified by the State's interests in deterring abusive bail solicitation practices. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the regulation burdened a protected speech right, that intermediate scrutiny applied, and that the regulation passed constitutional muster. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of one count of possession of synthetic drugs, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered from his backpack.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the warrantless search of his backpack violated the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and section ten of the state constitution. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the search of Defendant's backpack was lawful as a search incident to his lawful arrest. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the underlying search was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the search was a lawful search incident to Defendant's arrest. View "Commonwealth v. Bembury" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress items seized during a traffic stop, holding that the government was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.Defendant was stopped by a New Hampshire police officer for failing to use a turn signal on a road that narrowed from two lanes to one lane. After the officer discovered that Defendant had outstanding arrest warrants the officer arrested Defendant and seized a bag from him containing narcotics. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that New Hampshire law did not require use of a turn signal at the merge point on the roadway at issue. The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to rely on a yield sign in the roadway to govern the factual situation he was encountering; and (2) it was not a reasonable mistake of law for the officer to believe that a turn signal was required at the merge point. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Appellant's conviction for willfully violating 18 U.S.C. 922(n) - the federal prohibition on the receipt of a firearm by someone "under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" - and vacated Appellant's sentence, holding that an instructional error and the application of a "trafficking of firearms" enhancement were in error.Appellant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(n) and 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A), the federal prohibition on "dealing in firearms" without a license. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the "willfully" element of the section 922(n) offense; (2) remand was required for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's claim of actual conflict of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and (3) the trial court erred in applying the "trafficking" enhancement, and the error was not harmless. View "United States v. Daniells" on Justia Law

Cichocki called the police to report that her 15-year-old daughter, G.C., had been sexually assaulted by Garcia days earlier at a resort where the families were vacationing. Cichocki told Detective Posewitz that G.C. had reported that, while G.C. and the other children were in the pool, Garcia purposely touched her breasts and “down there.” Both families stayed at the resort until the next afternoon. Cichocki suggested that G.C. could not remember all the details of the incident and had expressed fear that the video would contradict her report. Posewitz interviewed G.C., who described the incidents. Surveillance footage of the pool area was poor quality and inconclusive. Although the area was crowded, there were apparently no witnesses. ADA Spoentgen drafted a criminal complaint, which ADA Hoffman reviewed. It did not refer to the surveillance footage or Cichoki's statements. The Court Commissioner found probable cause for Garcia’s arrest. The court found probable cause to proceed to trial. After Hoffman’s opening statement, the judge declared a mistrial because Hoffman mentioned that G.C. had a learning disability, which had not been disclosed to the defense.Garcia sued Posewitz, Hoffman, and Spoentgen under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. No reasonable jury could find that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the information omitted from the complaint would have negated probable cause. G.C.’s and Cichocki’s accounts were largely consistent; the defendants lacked any indication that either had a motive to lie. View "Garcia v. Posewitz" on Justia Law