Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jones was convicted of robbery in Indiana, Kentucky, and federal courts. Jones’s Kentucky plea deal agreed to a commencement date for Jones’s accrual of time-served credits, not when officers actually took Jones into custody, as would ordinarily be the case, but on an earlier date. The sentencing court failed to adopt the plea agreement and ordered the Department of Corrections to calculate Jones’s time-served credit in accordance with “this judgment,” which made no mention of the negotiated agreement, and “the law.” The court did not provide Jones the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Jones did not appeal or seek correction of his sentence. Jones unsuccessfully asked prison administrators to honor the plea agreement’s time-served provision; doing so would have violated the judgment of conviction. Jones asked the sentencing court for clarification. The court ratified the administrators’ calculations. Jones did not appeal. The court subsequently instructed that Jones be given credit in accordance with the agreement. Jones was then released.Jones filed suit, alleging that Kentucky prison administrators violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their alleged deliberate indifference to the prospect of incarcerating him beyond the length of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the defendants’ qualified immunity motions. The defendants—state corrections officials—neither caused nor contributed to Jones’s over-incarceration nor could they unilaterally remedy the matter, which was dictated by court orders. View "Jones v. Bottom" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Petitioner to ten to twenty-five years' imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual assault, holding that the circuit court's failure to explicitly discuss the mandatory mitigating circumstances listed in W. Va. Code 61-11-23(c) before ordering the final sentence was not prejudicial.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the circuit court failed to consider the "mitigating circumstances" set forth in section 61-11-23(c) and that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Petitioner's substantial rights were not affected by the circuit court's failure to acknowledge and consider the statutory mitigating circumstances; and (2) Petitioner's argument that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate due to his age and mental capacity was unavailing. View "State v. Hall" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motions to dismiss the underlying lawsuit seeking money damages pursuant Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for alleged unconstitutional searches and seizures, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs claimed three Bivens causes of action for money damages related to the searches and seizures. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that the claims arose within a new Bivens context and that special factors counseled toward denying relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims arose in a new factual scenario of Bivens and involved special factors. View "Quinones-Pimentel v. Cannon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the district court did not err in ruling that res judicata barred Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.Defendant was convicted of second-degree abuse of a minor and soliciting a minor to engage in sexual relations and sentenced to twenty years as to the sexual abuse conviction and to four to five years on the solicitation conviction, to be served consecutively. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the acts underlying his conviction were one continuous act and that his consecutive sentences violated double jeopardy protections. The district court denied relief ruling that res judicata barred the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a motion to correct an illegal sentence can be subject to res judicata; and (2) the interests of res judictata in finality and avoiding repetitive litigation were served in this case. View "Peterson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and three of its officials regarding computation of Plaintiff's tentative mandatory release date (TRD), holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, an inmate, filed an action for declaratory judgment alleging that DCS was responsible for actions infringing on her constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by concluding that her TRD was consistent with Nebraska statutes and case law. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-911 for Plaintiff's claims against DCS. View "Williams v. Frakes" on Justia Law

During his booking at Kenton County Detention Center, Grote could not complete paperwork while standing nor be photographed due to his agitated state. By the time he was examined by LPN Brand, Grote was constantly shaking and twitching and was covered in sweat. With officers, Grote denied that he had taken any substances but told Brand that he had taken a half gram of methamphetamine. Grote’s oxygen level was 89 percent; he was hyperventilating. Brand was unable to take any other vital signs. Brand does not recall communicating to anyone her assessment that Grote was detoxing. Deputies conducted sporadic checks on Grote in his cell before an inmate reported that Grote was unconscious and foaming at the mouth. Grote suffered multiple cardiac arrests and did not regain neurological function before dying. A doctor testified that Grote’s overdose would have been obvious to a layperson and that the situation required urgent medical care. Grote had a blood methamphetamine concentration 14 times higher than “the lowest reported lethal dose.”The KCDC defendants testified received no training on recognizing signs of an overdose or detox and could not call 911 immediately in the event of an inmate overdose, but instead were to notify shift managers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of a section 1983 suit. A jury could find that the medical provider was deliberately indifferent to Grote’s need for medical attention, but not that the deputies acted unconstitutionally. View "Grote v. Kenton County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

After being stopped for a broken headlight, Akima was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated based on his performance on a three-part field sobriety exam and a preliminary breathalyzer test. Arresting Officer Peca determined that he failed the assessments but had both administered the field sobriety tests improperly and misread the breathalyzer. Akima blew a blood alcohol content of 0.02, well below the legal limit of 0.08; Peca read the result as 0.22 and arrested him, causing Akima, a Japanese citizen, to lose his work visa and be deported. A blood test confirmed the Officer’s error. Akima sued, alleging constitutional violations. Peca moved to dismiss, citing qualified immunity.The district court permitted Akima’s constitutional claims to proceed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officer Peca lacked probable cause to believe Akima’s license was not in his immediate possession or that he was intoxicated. A reasonable jury could find that while driving without any apparent difficulty, Akima was stopped for a broken headlight; perhaps due to evident communication barriers, Akima took the atypical step of exiting his vehicle. Akima acknowledged he had been drinking “just a little bit,” registered 0.02 on a breathalyzer, exhibited a temperate and responsive demeanor, and maintained steady speech and gait. He completed three field sobriety tests. View "Akima v. Peca" on Justia Law

James picked up Herald and Hickerson in a silver car. Driving around, the men got high and plotted to rob the Contreras home. At a gas station, Hickerson picked up black ski masks. Herald went home. Hours later, two armed, masked men invaded the Contreras home and shot Adrian five times, killing him. Adrian’s brothers returned fire, hitting Hickerson. The other intruder escaped in a silver car. Around 4 a.m. that day, James arrived at his friends’ house in a silver car, telling them he had attempted a robbery with Hickerson and that Hickerson had been shot. James later told Herald that he “left Johnny” and had thrown his gun in a lake. Police found a black ski mask two blocks from the Contreras house, with James’s DNA on it.James was convicted of felony murder, home invasion, assault, and firearm offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Herald’s testimony was supported by “the location of the weapon” and that a “weapon” found near the crime scene had James’s DNA on it. No evidence supported those findings. Police never found the second intruder’s gun and did not find James's DNA on any weapons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of James’s federal habeas petition. Even serious errors do not warrant habeas relief by themselves. Petitioners need to show a violation of the Constitution or federal law. James has not. View "James v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of capital murder and his sentence of life imprisonment without parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err by denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence from the traffic stop because law enforcement had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm; (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence from his detention and arrest because the same facts that provided reasonable suspicion for the initial stop provided reasonable suspicion for his pat-down and arrest; and (3) did not err by permitting the State to introduce videos containing statements made by law enforcement officers. View "Bishop v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that the Arkansas Racing Commission's (ARC) decision to award the Pope County casino license to Cherokee Nation Business, LLC (CNB) and Legends Resort and Casino, LLC (Legends) was a "legal nullity, void and of no effect," holding that there was no error.Gulfside Casino Partnership sought a declaratory judgment that the ARC's actions in awarding the license to CNB and Legends were unconstitutional, constituted and ultra vires act, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gulfside, ruling that the ARC acted ultra vires, in violation of amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ARC acted ultra vires in issuing the license to CNB. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law