Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to four theft-related charges, holding that Defendant's written plea agreement with the State, which both he and his attorney signed, unambiguously waived his right to appeal his sentence.In exchange for a more lenient sentence, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to four theft-related charges and waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and sentenced him to four years for burglary and thirty months for theft, ordering the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeals with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court could not nullify Defendant's appeal waiver through direct appeal based on the claim that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, but Defendant could still seek relief through post-conviction proceedings. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact. View "Perez v. Simpson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Sheriff of Tift County, Gene Scarbrough, in this action brought by Sherrie McBrayer for the wrongful death of her husband, James McBrayer (“the decedent”). The Court of Appeals held that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer’s complaint did not show that the decedent’s death, which occurred while he was restrained in the back seat of a patrol car, arose from the sheriff’s deputies’ “use” of the patrol car “as a vehicle,” which, under Court of Appeals case law construing OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2, was a prerequisite for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the “negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted that McBrayer’s complaint did not allege “that the car was running; that any deputy was seated in the car; that any deputy was poised to start the car or transport the decedent to any location;” or that the deputies were otherwise “actively” using the patrol car “as a vehicle. McBrayer thereafter timely petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the meaning of the word “use” in the phrase “use of a covered motor vehicle” by reading into OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 the words “actively” and “as a vehicle.” Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McBrayer, et al. v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law

Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned. View "Whitaker v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's due process rights by conducting a hearing under Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), in Defendant's absence after he refused to attend the hearing.Defendant, who was serving three consecutive life sentences at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was charged with interference with a peace officer. Before the scheduled trial date, the State moved to require Defendant to be restrained during trial. The district court conducted an Asch hearing without Defendant and decided to impose restraints at trial. Defendant was convicted of one count of felony interference with a peace officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived any right he had to be present at the Asch hearing by knowingly and voluntarily failing to appear at the hearing due to circumstances within his control. View "Castellanos v. State" on Justia Law

In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to seventy years in Montana State Prison for deliberate homicide, a felony, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance when he advised Defendant and the court that mitigated deliberate homicide was not a lesser-included offense of deliberate homicide was more appropriate for postconviction relief; and (2) the district court did not err when it concluded that the State's offer of proof provided sufficient evidence to accept Defendant's Alford plea. View "State v. Bristow" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of rape, one count of aggravated assault, and two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his multiple claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in not withholding from jury deliberations a video exhibit of Defendant's police interview; (2) Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial and a new trial arising out of a child witness's breakdown on the witness stand. View "State v. Centeno" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder and sentencing him to forty years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as concerning the prosecutor's effort to conceal the State's involvement in Defendant's transfer proceedings, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion to neutralize any error; (2) the circuit court acted within its discretion to denying Defendant's motion for mistrial; (3) viewed in their entirety, the instructions given to the jury correctly stated the applicable law; (4) the exercise of the circuit court's discretion did not contravene Defendant's right to present a complete defense; and (5) Defendant's sentence could not be described as grossly disproportionate to his crime. View "State v. Black Cloud" on Justia Law