Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void. View "State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant on federal drug- and gun-related charges, holding that the district court erred by failing to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to law enforcement because the government failed to satisfy its burden to show that Defendant validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute those drugs; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement immediately following his arrest, arguing that the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant understood his Miranda rights and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived them. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to show that Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and this error was not harmless. View "United States v. Donald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed his conviction, by jury, of the attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder and fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly. It acquitted Appellant of a second count of attempted murder on the same victim. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison plus a 20-year enhancement term for the firearm use and a concurrent term of 27 months on the evading conviction. Appellant contends that numerous evidentiary, procedural, and instructional errors occurred at his trial. Further, the court noted that a primary issue is the contention that the prosecutor violated the RJA, section 745 and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at the sentencing hearing.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the Legislature acted within its law-making authority when it declared in the RJA that the use of racially discriminatory language in a criminal trial constitutes a miscarriage of justice, that the prosecutor violated the statute when she referred to Appellant’s complexion and “ambiguous ethnic presentation” as reasons to doubt his credibility, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to bring this statutory violation to the attention of the trial court at the earliest possible opportunity. The court found that because Appellant’s trial counsel failed to raise the violation at the sentencing hearing, the trial court has not yet had the opportunity to exercise its discretion to select which of the enumerated remedies it would impose. Consequently, the court remanded the matter to the trial court so it may exercise its discretion in this regard. View "P. v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Lumar caused a disturbance at a Chicago clinic. Called to the scene, police discovered that Lumar was wanted on an arrest warrant and took him into custody. About 19 hours later he committed suicide. His estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 argued that Lumar should have been released without a bond hearing, and, had he been released swiftly, Lumar would not have killed himself.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. While the warrant set bond at an amount Lumar could have posted, it had been issued in Lee County, so a local order required a local bond hearing. Even if the order is inconsistent with state law, in denying arrestees the right to waive local bond hearings, a violation of state law does not permit an award under section 1983. Federal law does not prohibit presenting the arrestee to a local judge, within a reasonable time not to exceed 48 hours. The time Lumar spent in custody, including six hours in a hospital to address breathing problems, and the discovery of 12 rocks of crack cocaine in his cell and ensuing return to the Police Department, was reasonable under the standard set by the Supreme Court. Lumar was screened for suicide risk shortly after his arrest and again at the hospital. Illinois law offers a remedy for suicide during custody only if the jailers do something that makes suicide foreseeable. View "Alcorn v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2016, Schumaker pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. Schumaker had 14 prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary, involving separate structures, occurring on 13 different dates. In 2017, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony and did not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) predicate offense. The district court sentenced Schumaker to 54 months’ imprisonment in 2020. While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that Tennessee aggravated burglary qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. Schumaker then argued that his prior offenses “did not occur on separate occasions” under ACCA. The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument after considering the charging documents.On remand, Schumaker cited the Supreme Court’s 2022 grant of certiorari in “Wooden” and unsuccessfully argued that, in conducting the occasions-different inquiry, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibited the court from relying on the dates and locations of the aggravated-burglary offenses found in the judgments associated with those convictions because the dates and locations are non-elemental facts that the government had to prove to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The limited remand required the district court to sentence Schumaker under the ACCA. Circuit precedent bars Schumaker’s argument that the non-elemental facts in Shepard documents must be charged in an indictment and found by a jury before a court may rely on those facts in the occasions-different inquiry. View "United States v. Schumaker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of rape, three counts of first-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual indecency with a child and sentencing him to two terms of life imprisonment, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting testimony of a certain witness under the pedophile exception to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's first argument was not preserved for appellate review; (2) Defendant's argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial was not preserved; and (3) the circuit court did not err in excluding evidence of the victims' prior sexual conduct pursuant to the rape-shield statute set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-42-101(c). View "Wilder v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder and his sentence to life in prison, holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the murder of his ex-wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. As his sole point on appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support Defendant's capital murder conviction, and there was no error with respect to the jury's rejection of Defendant's affirmative defense argument. View "Wofford v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which allows a court to grant relief from a judgment under certain circumstances, holding that Defendant's challenge to his conviction could have been brought in a petition for post-conviction relief.Defendant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Defendant did not file a direct appeal and did not challenge his conviction under Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) but later filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 60(b)(6) was not the appropriate vehicle for Defendant to bring his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCRA applied to Defendant's request to set aside his conviction based on his trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest. View "State v. Ogden" on Justia Law