Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the case of the State of North Carolina v. Russell William Tucker, the defendant argued that his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death should be overturned due to alleged discrimination in jury selection. He asserted that newly discovered evidence, a continuing legal education handout and a statistical study, supported his claim of purposeful discrimination. However, the defendant had failed to raise a Batson claim (a claim of discrimination in jury selection) during his original trial or in previous post-conviction proceedings. The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the defendant’s claim was procedurally barred and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.The defendant killed a security guard and shot two police officers in 1994. He was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. During jury selection, the defendant raised objections to the State’s peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors. The trial court found that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and the defendant did not raise a Batson claim on direct appeal or in previous post-conviction proceedings.In this appeal, the defendant argued that the handout and study constituted newly discovered evidence that would support a Batson claim. The defense argued that these materials showed a pattern of racial discrimination in jury selection in North Carolina. However, the Court held that the defendant's claim was procedurally barred because he could have raised a Batson claim during his original trial or in previous post-conviction proceedings but failed to do so. The Court also found that the handout and study did not constitute newly discovered evidence and did not show that the defendant was prejudiced by the alleged discrimination. Therefore, the Court concluded that the defendant’s Batson claim was procedurally barred and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "State v. Tucker" on Justia Law

In an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Erma Wilson sought to overturn the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas which dismissed her federal civil rights suit against Midland County, Texas, and individuals Ralph Petty and Albert Schorre. Wilson was convicted of cocaine possession 22 years prior and she maintained her innocence, claiming that the cocaine found was not hers. The case revolved around her claim that she was denied due process since the assistant district attorney in her case, Ralph Petty, was also moonlighting as a law clerk for the judge presiding over her trial. Wilson was sentenced to eight years of community supervision which derailed her dream of becoming a nurse.Upon review, the Fifth Circuit held that Wilson's claim is barred by the "favorable termination" rule from Heck v. Humphrey. The rule states that a convicted party cannot seek § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment without first showing that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal or otherwise declared invalid. The court noted that Petty’s dual role indeed constituted a conflict of interest that violated Wilson's constitutional right to a fair trial. However, under the court's precedent, noncustodial plaintiffs, such as Wilson, must meet the favorable-termination requirement, even if it’s practically impossible for them to do so. The court found that it was bound by prior circuit precedent and could only affirm the lower court's decision. The court noted that only the en banc court or the United States Supreme Court could deliver a different result. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "Wilson v. Midland County" on Justia Law

Shiheem Amos appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm, which was found after he was stopped by police officers who suspected him of being involved in a disturbance reported at a nearby location. Amos argued that he was seized without reasonable suspicion, and therefore the firearm should not have been admissible in court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Amos was not seized until after he attempted to flee from the police officers, and at that point, the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize him based on his attempt to flee. Thus, the firearm was admissible, and the motion to suppress was correctly denied.Amos also challenged his 62-month sentence, which included an enhancement for a previous state court conviction that was classified as a crime of violence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court records did not specify which subsection of the Pennsylvania aggravated assault statute Amos had been convicted under, but the government argued that all possible subsections qualified as a crime of violence. However, the Third Circuit held that one of the subsections, which can be violated by a failure to act, does not meet the definition of a crime of violence because it does not require the use of violent force. Therefore, the court vacated Amos's sentence and remanded for resentencing without the crime of violence enhancement. View "USA v. Amos" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined an appeal by John Lee Ralston, who was charged with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm after a search of his residence. The search was conducted under a warrant that was primarily issued based on criminal activity suspected of another person, Colton Varty, who was believed to be residing on the same piece of property but in a different residence. Ralston argued the warrant did not establish probable cause that evidence would be located inside his house.The district court had denied Ralston’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his residence, ruling that even though the warrant lacked probable cause, the officers acted in good faith, relying on the Leon good-faith exception. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court's decision.The Court of Appeals held that the Leon good-faith exception did not apply in this case. The court found that the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in evidence connecting Ralston and his residence to the suspected criminal activity of Varty that no reasonable officer would have relied upon a warrant that was issued based on it. The Court of Appeals concluded that without evidence that Varty had access to Ralston’s residence or facts pointing to a fair probability that Ralston’s residence contained stolen property or was being used to fence stolen property, the Leon good-faith exception could not apply. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court with directions to vacate Ralston’s guilty plea and grant his motion to suppress. View "United States v. Ralston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the conviction of Eric Berry, who was found guilty of first-degree burglary, first-degree sexual assault, two counts of fourth-degree assault, first-degree fleeing or evading, and resisting arrest. The court rejected Berry's appeal that his right to a speedy trial was violated, arguing that delays in his trial were due to valid reasons such as Berry's own actions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and personal reasons of his attorneys. The court also denied Berry's argument that the trial court erred in not giving an intoxication defense instruction, stating that while Berry was intoxicated during the incident, he clearly knew what he was doing and acted deliberately. The court further dismissed Berry's claim that his former testimony from a domestic violence hearing should have been allowed, as the Commonwealth did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him during that hearing. Additionally, the court found no error in the joinder of the April and December incidents for the trial, as Berry failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the record. Lastly, the court rejected Berry's claim for cumulative error, as they found no error in the other arguments presented. View "BERRY V. COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the defendant, Joshua Hart, and his girlfriend, Brittany Smith, entered the home of an elderly couple, Thomas Harty and his wife, Joanna Fisher, intending to steal their car and money. The couple ended up fatally attacking both Harty and Fisher, and then fled the state in the victims' vehicle. Hart was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder, and he appealed on several grounds.Hart argued that his confession to law enforcement was involuntary and should have been suppressed, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed. The court found that Hart's confession was voluntary based on the circumstances of the interrogation, his experience with the criminal justice system, and his own actions and statements during the interrogation.Hart also argued that the trial should have been moved to another venue due to pretrial publicity. The court disagreed, stating that the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the pretrial publicity caused either presumptive or actual prejudice. The court found that less than 20% of potential jurors were excused due to pretrial publicity, and the judge took extensive steps to protect Hart's right to a fair trial.Hart further contended that a statement made by the deceased victim, Fisher, to her nurse, which was relayed to the jury through the nurse's testimony, should have been excluded from evidence as it was hearsay and violated his right to confront witnesses. The court determined that Fisher's statements were non-testimonial and thus did not violate the confrontation clause. The court also found that even if Fisher's statements were admitted in error, there was no prejudice because the Commonwealth presented other compelling evidence of the facts relayed in Fisher's statements.Finally, Hart argued that his sentences of life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel or unusual punishment because he was under 25 years old at the time of the crimes. The court rejected this argument, finding no reason to extend the prohibition of life sentences without parole for juveniles to individuals under the age of 25.Accordingly, the court affirmed Hart's convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Hart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas heard an appeal from Michael Jenkins, who was challenging the denial of his pro se petition for a writ of "mandamus/prohibition" by the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Jenkins, who was convicted of first-degree sexual assault in 2018 and sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment, claimed that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) and its record keeper had incorrectly deemed him ineligible for parole. He argued that the application of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b), which disqualifies for parole a sex offender previously convicted of a violent felony, was an ex post facto violation as it was based on his 1981 convictions for armed robbery and home invasion in Illinois - offenses that occurred before the enactment of the cited statute.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that there was no ex post facto violation in the ADC’s application of the statute to Jenkins's parole eligibility. The court pointed out that the statute was enacted in 2001 and eliminates parole eligibility for persons who committed a felony sex offense after August 13, 2001, and had been previously convicted of a violent felony offense or any felony sex offense. Jenkins was convicted of a sexual assault committed in 2016, and his previous violent offenses committed in Illinois before the act's enactment were valid grounds for the application of section 16-93-609(b)(2). Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of Jenkins's petition for a writ and also denied his motion for the appointment of counsel. View "JENKINS v. DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, Elvin Torres-Estrada, brought claims against several Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens, alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court dismissed his complaint, arguing that some of his claims were not filed within the required time frame and that the FTCA's discretionary function exception stripped the court of jurisdiction over his other claims. Torres-Estrada appealed the dismissal, arguing that his claims are timely, the discretionary function exception does not apply, and even if it does, it does not cover the alleged misconduct of the FBI.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the discretionary function exception. The court explained that this exception does not serve as a bar to FTCA tort claims that plausibly allege constitutional violations. In addition, at least two of Torres-Estrada's claims could be subject to the "continuing violation" doctrine, which means the district court erred in dismissing his claims as untimely without considering this doctrine. Given that new facts have emerged throughout the litigation, the court granted Torres-Estrada leave to amend his complaint. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The background facts of the case are that Torres-Estrada was detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, pending prosecution for drug and money laundering offenses. During this time, he was investigated by the FBI as a potential suspect in the murder of a correctional officer at the MDC. Torres-Estrada alleges that the FBI violated his rights through various actions, including the use of informants to elicit incriminating statements about the murder, subjecting him to invasive body searches, and maintaining records falsely linking him to the murder. View "Torres-Estrada v. Cases" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the court examined a claim brought by an inmate, Jeffrey Hout. Hout, who was convicted in 2010 of kidnapping and murder, accused Governor Michael Dunleavy of failing to provide him with proof of various bonds, oaths, and licenses, and alleged that certain people involved in his criminal trial had practiced law without valid licenses. He also filed a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Financing Statement seeking to secure a purported debt of $250 million in gold dollars owed to him by Governor Dunleavy and the State of Alaska. The superior court dismissed the lawsuit because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, prompting Hout to appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court highlighted that Hout's claims were consistent with the expressed belief system of a group known as “sovereign citizens” and stated that courts across the country have universally rejected these types of claims. The court noted that their jurisdiction to decide the case was derived from Alaska citizens who have provided “consent of the governed” by ratifying the Alaska Constitution. The court rejected Hout's argument that Alaska’s laws do not apply to him unless he provides personal consent to be governed by those laws.On the merits, the court found Hout's fraud claim to be without merit. The primary allegation underpinning Hout’s fraud claim was that Governor Dunleavy was legally obligated to provide him with proof of oaths, licenses, and bonds. The court held that there was no legal basis for this claim. The court also dismissed Hout’s civil rights claim seeking release from prison on the ground that certain officials who participated in his criminal trial were practicing law without valid licenses. The court explained that the proper vehicle for Hout’s claim seeking release from prison would be an application for post-conviction relief. Since Hout had already applied once for post-conviction relief, any subsequent application would be dismissed. View "Jeffrey Hout v. State of Alaska, Office of the Governor" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the second federal habeas corpus petition by Jaime Dean Charboneau, who sought to overturn his conviction for the 1984 shooting death of his ex-wife in Idaho. Charboneau alleged that Idaho officials violated their obligations under Brady v. Maryland by encouraging his ex-wife's daughter, Tira, to provide false statements and testimony regarding her mother’s death and to dispose of potentially exculpatory evidence. In support of these allegations, Charboneau relied on a letter written by Tira in 1989. However, the court held that Charboneau failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing actual innocence as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) for consideration of second or successive federal habeas petitions. The court held that, even if the letter was genuine, the statements in the letter, viewed in light of all the evidence, were not sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted Charboneau of first-degree murder. The court concluded that Charboneau’s new materials did not suffice to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his petition without reaching the merits of his Brady claim. View "CHARBONEAU V. DAVIS" on Justia Law