Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Breion Woodson was convicted in Wisconsin state court on charges of firearm and drug possession and sentenced to 19 years in prison. During sentencing, the government presented a video from social media showing men with guns and drugs, which the judge used to assess Woodson's character and danger to the community. Woodson argued that he was misidentified in the video, but the judge denied his motion for a new sentencing hearing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, stating Woodson failed to prove he was not the man in the video.Woodson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, introducing booking photos from the time of his sentencing that suggested he was not the man in the video. However, the district court ruled it could not consider the photos since they were not presented in state court and denied his petition, finding the state appellate court's decision reasonable based on the evidence it had.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court found that Woodson's claim was not procedurally defaulted and that the actual innocence exception did not apply to his case. The court also ruled that it could not consider the new evidence (booking photos) under AEDPA's strict limitations. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Woodson's habeas petition. View "Woodson v Mlodzik" on Justia Law

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David Paul Planchard was convicted by a jury of stalking Debra Doe and violating a protective order. Planchard and Doe had a relationship from 1997 to 2000 and had a son together in 2006. Despite a restraining order issued in 2020, Planchard continued to harass Doe through public Facebook posts from 2016 to 2023. These posts included threats, derogatory comments, and references to Doe's past trauma. Planchard also showed up at Doe's house in May 2023, violating the protective order.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Planchard guilty of stalking and violating a protective order. The jury determined that Planchard's actions, including his Facebook posts and visit to Doe's house, constituted a credible threat and harassment. The court sentenced him to five years for stalking and a stayed term of six months for violating the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Planchard argued that his Facebook posts did not constitute direct contact and thus could not be considered harassment under the stalking statute. The court disagreed, citing precedent that indirect threats and harassment through third parties or public posts can still meet the statutory requirements for stalking. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, noting that the posts were intended to harass and threaten Doe, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would see them.The court also addressed Planchard's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no merit in his arguments. The court concluded that the Facebook posts were relevant and admissible, and that any failure to object by his counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Planchard" on Justia Law

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Christopher Kee was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian country following an altercation with his then-girlfriend, Candace Chinchillas, in April 2020. The couple had a tumultuous relationship marked by excessive drinking and mutual accusations of abuse. Kee claimed that the stabbing incident was an act of self-defense, while Chinchillas described it as a violent attack. Kee was acquitted of three other counts of assault, which had more corroborative evidence, but was convicted on Count 2, which relied heavily on the conflicting testimonies of Kee and Chinchillas.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over Kee's trial. Kee did not object during the trial to the prosecution's use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach his testimony. After being convicted and sentenced, Kee filed a timely appeal, arguing that his due process rights were violated under Doyle v. Ohio, which prohibits the use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed Kee's appeal. The court agreed with Kee that the prosecution's repeated references to his post-Miranda silence constituted a clear violation of Doyle. The court applied the plain error review standard, which requires showing that the error was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court found that the Doyle violation affected Kee's substantial rights because the case hinged on the credibility of Kee and Chinchillas, and the improper impeachment could have influenced the jury's verdict.The Tenth Circuit vacated Kee's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Kee" on Justia Law

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In the early morning of October 23, 2013, Colleen Ritzer, a Danvers High School math teacher, was found dead in the woods outside the high school. She had been raped, strangled, and stabbed. The defendant, a fourteen-year-old student in her class, was convicted by a Superior Court jury of first-degree murder, aggravated rape, and armed robbery. The primary issue at trial was whether the defendant lacked criminal responsibility due to mental illness.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge impeded his ability to present his defense. He raised several issues: the exclusion of expert testimony on brain scans, limitations on expert testimony regarding his statements, improper cross-examination of defense experts, forced disclosure of psychological test data, the use of suppressed statements by the Commonwealth's expert, the denial of a jury instruction on adolescent brain development, insufficient evidence for the aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions, the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, improper prosecutorial conduct in closing arguments, the denial of a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, and the proportionality of his sentence under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that the exclusion of the brain scan evidence was within the judge's discretion due to its limited probative value and potential for unfair prejudice. The limitations on expert testimony were also upheld, since the defendant was able to present sufficient evidence of his mental state. The court found no abuse of discretion in the cross-examination of defense experts or the disclosure of psychological test data. The use of the suppressed statements by the Commonwealth's expert did not warrant exclusion of the testimony. The court also found no error in the denial of the jury instruction on adolescent brain development, the sufficiency of the evidence for the aggravated rape and armed robbery convictions, the denial of the motion to suppress, or the prosecutor's closing arguments. The court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue and that his sentence was not disproportionate under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Chism" on Justia Law

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A neighbor called the Fort Worth Police Department at 2:25 a.m. on October 12, 2019, to report that Atatiana Jefferson's front door was open, which was unusual. Officer Aaron Dean and another officer responded, arriving at 2:28 a.m. and 2:29 a.m., respectively. Following protocol, they parked out of view and did not use emergency lights or sirens. They conducted a perimeter sweep of the house, using flashlights to look for signs of a break-in. Jefferson, who was home with her nephew, noticed someone outside and approached the window. Dean, without announcing himself as an officer, commanded Jefferson to show her hands and then fired a shot, killing her.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Dean's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and stayed discovery. Dean appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the excessive force claim, holding that Dean's use of deadly force without warning was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. However, the court reversed the district court's judgment on the unreasonable search claim, finding that Dean was performing a community caretaking function and that there was no clearly established law indicating his actions were unreasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Bakutis v. Dean" on Justia Law

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In 1997, Justin Sneed murdered Barry Van Treese at an Oklahoma hotel managed by Richard Glossip. Sneed claimed Glossip orchestrated the murder to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip denied involvement but was convicted and sentenced to death based on Sneed's testimony. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned the initial conviction due to ineffective defense counsel but upheld a second conviction despite inconsistencies in Sneed's testimony and new evidence suggesting prosecutorial misconduct.The OCCA initially reversed Glossip's conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel but affirmed his second conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Sneed's testimony. Glossip's subsequent habeas petitions were unsuccessful. An independent investigation commissioned by Oklahoma legislators raised doubts about the conviction, revealing prosecutorial misconduct, including the destruction of evidence and false portrayal of Sneed. The State disclosed previously withheld documents, including evidence of Sneed's bipolar disorder and false testimony about his lithium prescription.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case, focusing on whether the prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony under Napue v. Illinois. The Court found that the prosecution knowingly allowed Sneed to falsely testify about his lithium prescription and failed to correct it. This false testimony was material, as Sneed's credibility was crucial to Glossip's conviction. The Court held that the prosecution's failure to correct the false testimony violated Glossip's due process rights, warranting a new trial. The judgment of the OCCA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Glossip v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

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Jeremy Young was convicted by a jury of possessing an unregistered firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was also convicted by a separate jury of assaulting a federal officer. Young received a total sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. He appealed, challenging the Government’s use of peremptory strikes against Native American venirepersons, the district court’s decision to admit certain evidence as res gestae, and the sufficiency of the evidence at both trials.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Young’s Batson challenges, finding the Government’s reasons for striking the Native American jurors to be legitimate and race-neutral. The court also admitted excerpts of Young’s recorded interview with Agent Kumley, where Young discussed his plans to transport methamphetamine, as relevant res gestae evidence. The jury found Young guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court’s Batson analysis, noting that the Government provided race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors and that Young failed to demonstrate pretext. The court also upheld the admission of the recorded interview, agreeing that it provided relevant context for Young’s possession of the shotgun. Finally, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Young’s convictions, as the jury reasonably found that Young had both actual and constructive possession of the firearm and that he intentionally assaulted Sergeant Antoine. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

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Sharmarke Warsame was convicted of two felony counts of identity theft, two misdemeanor counts of theft, and one misdemeanor count of criminal use of a financial card for using stolen credit cards to purchase Target gift cards. The convictions were vacated on direct appeal, and the State dismissed the felony charges after remand. Warsame served 564 days in prison for the vacated and dismissed felony convictions. He then filed a statutory action for wrongful conviction and imprisonment seeking damages, attorney fees, costs, a certificate of innocence, and expungement of all associated convictions.The Johnson District Court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that it needed to hear testimony and make findings concerning the alleged facts under which Warsame was convicted. A bench trial followed, and the district court ultimately ruled against Warsame, holding that he had failed to prove his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.Warsame appealed directly to the Kansas Supreme Court, arguing that the district court incorrectly concluded that he committed felony identity theft against the alleged victims as charged and instructed to the jury. The State cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment, arguing that the actual innocence required under the wrongful conviction statute concerns the statutory elements of the charged crime, not the specific facts alleged in the filings or trial.The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the State, holding that the crime of conviction is defined by statute and is not limited to the specific facts of the charging document. To receive compensation, Warsame was required to prove actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence under the statutory elements of the charged crime. Warsame failed to meet this burden, as he admitted facts sufficient to prove he intended to defraud some party to receive a benefit. The court affirmed the denial of Warsame's claim. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Warsame " on Justia Law

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Jonathan Peoples pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one year of incarceration plus one year of mandatory supervised release. He received credit for time served, effectively completing his incarceration term. However, due to Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) policies, he was detained at Cook County Jail for four additional days until he could be transferred to IDOC for processing and release.Peoples filed a Section 1983 claim against Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, alleging that his detention beyond his sentence violated his constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendments applied to Peoples's claim and that he failed to present a triable Eighth Amendment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to Peoples's post-conviction detention. Instead, the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits incarceration beyond the end of a sentence without penological justification, was applicable. The court found that the Cook County Sheriff's Office had a penological justification for detaining Peoples until IDOC could process him, as required by Illinois law and the court's commitment order.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Peoples failed to establish that the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference, a necessary element for an Eighth Amendment violation. Consequently, without a constitutional injury, Peoples's Section 1983 claim could not succeed. View "Peoples v Cook County" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Aquil Qadir Lawson, was convicted of murder after shooting Madison Rose Weiss while she was in her car. Lawson, who is Black, argued that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were influenced by implicit racial bias, violating the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He claimed that the court's decisions emphasized his criminality while minimizing the victim's, who was white. Specifically, Lawson contended that the exclusion of evidence regarding Weiss's illegal activities and the inclusion of his Instagram posts and fraud activities demonstrated racial bias.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury found Lawson guilty of second-degree murder and the firearm allegation true. The court excluded evidence of Weiss's involvement in sex work, vaccination card fraud, and other illegal activities, deeming them irrelevant to the case. The court also excluded evidence of a gun found near the crime scene, as it was not connected to the shooting. Conversely, the court admitted Lawson's Instagram posts, which contained statements related to the shooting, and evidence of his involvement in fraud, which was used to impeach his credibility.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were based on relevance and did not demonstrate implicit racial bias under the Racial Justice Act's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The appellate court found that the trial court's decisions were ordinary evidentiary rulings and that Lawson failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rulings were motivated by racial bias or animus. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "P. v. Lawson" on Justia Law