Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled in a case involving an individual, Faron Alan Starr, who was arrested and denied his request to call a family member to get an attorney. Starr was suspected of an assault and stealing two firearms. After his arrest, he was taken to a police station where he initially equivocated about speaking to the police without an attorney. However, he later requested to call his father to obtain a lawyer, which was refused by the police officer. The officer proceeded to question Starr about his actions and whereabouts of the stolen firearms.Starr was charged with multiple offenses, and he subsequently filed a motion to suppress his statements and any evidence derived from them, asserting violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court granted the motion, finding a violation of Starr's rights under Iowa Code section 804.20, which mandates that an arrested person be allowed to call and consult a family member or an attorney without unnecessary delay upon arrival at the place of detention.The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that while public safety concerns could potentially justify a delay in honoring an arrested person's rights under Iowa Code section 804.20, the circumstances of this case did not warrant such a delay. The court noted that the police did not address the issue of the missing firearms until nearly two hours after Starr was taken into custody for questioning at the police station. Therefore, the delay in permitting Starr to call a family member was deemed unnecessary. View "State of Iowa v. Starr" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the appellant, Lafayette Deshawn Upshaw, was convicted of crimes associated with two separate incidents occurring on the same day: a gas station robbery and a home invasion. Following exhaustion of state court remedies, Upshaw sought habeas relief in federal court, upon which the district court granted relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of the Batson rule.The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on trial counsel's failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses. The Batson rule violation claim was derived from the State’s use of peremptory challenges to strike six Black jurors. The Warden appealed the district court's decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.The court found that the trial counsel's failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses and to request an adjournment to rectify the situation was unreasonable and prejudicial to Upshaw, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also found that the State's failure to provide race-neutral reasons for striking certain jurors, coupled with the trial court's failure to properly evaluate the State's justifications, constituted a violation of the Batson rule. The court held that even a single racially motivated peremptory strike requires relief. The court concluded that both of these errors entitled Upshaw to habeas relief. View "Upshaw v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed a lower court's decision dismissing Floyd Sagely's claim that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-103, which prohibits a person who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution from owning or possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional. Sagely was involuntarily committed to a mental health treatment facility in 2010, and in 2019, was charged with a misdemeanor for possessing a firearm in his car due to his previous commitment.Sagely argued that the statute violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the precedent set by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. He contended that the law treated felons and persons involuntarily committed to a mental health facility differently, as felons could petition to have their gun rights reinstated, while those who were involuntarily committed could not.The Supreme Court of Arkansas found that Sagely's equal protection claim failed because he could not demonstrate that he and persons convicted of a felony offense were similarly situated. The court stated that civil litigants like Sagely are not similarly situated to criminal defendants for equal-protection purposes. The court further held that the statute is presumptively constitutional under Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Sagely's complaint. View "SAGELY v. HUTCHINSON" on Justia Law

In the case of James McDougal v. State of Delaware, McDougal was convicted of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. His convictions and sentence followed the Superior Court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from him during a street encounter with police officers. According to the State, the police had reasonable suspicion that McDougal was loitering, which justified his initial detention. A subsequent pat-down search revealed a concealed firearm. McDougal appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed and vacated the lower court’s judgment. The court found that the officers' suspicion of loitering was not reasonable and did not justify even a limited investigative seizure. The court also stated that the citizen is not required to answer the officer’s questions during a consensual encounter, and his refusal to answer cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Applying these principles, the court concluded that the detention of McDougal and the consequent nonconsensual search of his person was unlawful. The court held that the Superior Court erred when it denied McDougal's motion to suppress. View "McDougal v. State" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity. View "Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut" on Justia Law

This case pertains to Jeremiah Paul, a parolee, who was convicted of possession of a firearm due to his prior violent conviction, after police officers discovered a firearm in his vehicle. The discovery occurred after the officers asked him about his parole status during an encounter, which he contends was an unlawful detention that led to the discovery of the firearm. Paul argued that the evidence of the firearm should have been suppressed as it was only discovered following his unlawful detention.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, disagreed with the trial court's ruling that the initial encounter between Paul and the police officers was consensual. The appellate court highlighted several factors such as the positioning of the police officers, their use of flashlights on Paul, the fact that Paul was engaged in a phone conversation when the officers approached, and the opening of the vehicle's door, which would have led a reasonable person to believe that they were not free to leave. This, they concluded, constituted an unlawful detention.Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling stating the initial encounter was consensual. The court held that Paul's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm, which was discovered as a result of the unlawful detention, should have been granted. The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to grant Paul's motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm. View "People v. Paul" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lawrence Weber, who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Weber's driving privileges were suspended for 180 days by a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer following his refusal to take a chemical breath test after his arrest. Weber argued that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, which he claimed invalidated the authority of the North Dakota Department of Transportation to revoke his driving privileges.On February 26, 2023, Weber was arrested after an onsite screening test showed a blood alcohol content of .152 percent. Following his arrest, when asked to take a chemical breath test, Weber invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and requested an attorney. Despite being given access to his phone to contact his attorney, Weber made a call to an individual who refused to help him contact his attorney. Weber did not attempt to make further calls or ask for additional time to contact his attorney.The hearing officer found that Weber refused to take the chemical breath test and had a reasonable opportunity to call an attorney. The officer's findings were upheld by the district court. Weber appealed the decision, maintaining that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Weber was provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and his right to counsel was satisfied. Weber's claim that he was denied the opportunity to contact an attorney was not supported by the evidence. The court found that the hearing officer's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and her conclusion that Weber was not deprived of his right to consult counsel was in accordance with the law. View "Weber v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

In 2002, Michael David Carruth was convicted and sentenced to death for four counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, first-degree burglary, and first-degree robbery in Alabama. Carruth appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, which raised six main issues. These included allegations of ineffective trial counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial, and ineffective appellate counsel for failing to notify him of further available appellate proceedings and to argue that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Carruth also argued that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury and due process of law due to premature jury deliberations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined all the issues and affirmed the district court's denial of Carruth's habeas corpus petition. The circuit court determined that Carruth's claims did not survive deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, as the state court's adjudications were not contrary to federal law, nor did they involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also held that Carruth's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was procedurally barred because it was not properly raised and preserved at the state level. The circuit court concluded that the nature of the crimes and the strength of the evidence against Carruth outweighed any potential mitigating evidence that may have been presented. View "Michael David Carruth v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Charles O’Neill, appealed the judgment of the district court. O’Neill was charged with sexually exploiting a minor and receiving or distributing child pornography. He pleaded guilty to both charges but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home and a barn he owned. The evidence included large numbers of photographs of nude and partially nude minor boys on O’Neill’s phone and iPad, and a computer, camcorder, camera, digital storage devices, miscellaneous clothing, and a vibrator found in the barn.The district court found that although the affidavits from the police officers used to obtain search warrants contained false statements and lacked probable cause, the officers had not knowingly or recklessly misled the issuing magistrate, and their reliance on the warrants was objectively reasonable under the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon.On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that none of the exceptions to the good-faith exception applied. The court found that the officers' errors in the affidavits were negligent rather than reckless, the affidavits weren't "bare bones" as they contained more than conclusory claims and were far from devoid of factual support, and the warrants weren't facially deficient. The court noted that the officers' reliance on the search warrants was objectively reasonable, and therefore the fruits of their searches shouldn't be suppressed. The court also noted that even if it shared the dissenting judge's view on the officers' state of mind, it would likely conclude that the district court's denial of the suppression motion was proper because the remaining content of the affidavit would likely establish probable cause. View "United States v. O'Neill" on Justia Law