Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

L.H. pled no contest to first-degree murder and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility by the juvenile court. The court set his maximum term of confinement to 25 years to life or until he turns 25, whichever comes first, and applied 734 days of precommitment credits to this term. L.H. appealed, arguing that the court incorrectly applied Welfare and Institutions Code section 875 in setting his maximum term of confinement beyond his 25th birthday and erred in applying his precommitment credits against a theoretical maximum term of 25 years. He also claimed that equal protection principles require his precommitment credits to be applied against a term that does not exceed his 25th birthday.The juvenile court adjudged L.H. a ward of the court and committed him to Briones Youth Academy, Secure Pathway. The court determined that L.H.'s remaining custody time was 22 years and 361 days after applying the precommitment credits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court correctly applied section 875 in setting the maximum term of confinement. The court interpreted section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(A) as providing a separate cap on the length of a ward’s physical confinement, independent of the maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court. The court also held that the juvenile court did not err in applying L.H.'s precommitment credits against the maximum term of confinement of 25 years, as required by section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C). The court found no equal protection violation, as the application of precommitment credits was consistent with the statutory requirements.The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s disposition order. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

Randy Erickson, an inmate at Gogebic County Jail, Michigan, was involved in an incident with Deputy Sheriff Scott Voit. Erickson, who was serving a sentence for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, had an altercation with Voit after making a disrespectful comment. Voit responded by canceling Erickson's family visit, which led Erickson to act out by hitting and kicking the cell door. Voit then handcuffed Erickson and took him to a holding cell, where he threw Erickson to the ground and kneed him in the back. Erickson later sought medical attention for injuries including a fractured rib and back contusions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Voit's motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Voit used excessive force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. However, the court also found that there was no evidence to suggest that Voit deliberately disregarded Erickson's medical needs, as there was no indication that Voit knew of Erickson's injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that a reasonable jury could find that Voit used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as the force used was disproportionate to the threat posed by Erickson, who was handcuffed and compliant. The court held that Voit was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because the law clearly established that malicious and sadistic use of force violated the Eighth Amendment.However, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court regarding the claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs. The court found no evidence that Voit knew of Erickson's injuries or that Erickson requested medical care from Voit. Therefore, the court held that Voit did not act with deliberate indifference to Erickson's medical needs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Erickson v. Gogebic County" on Justia Law

A Texas state jury convicted Jesus Jaime Jimenez of organized crime involving violent robbery, and he was sentenced to 50 years in prison. Jimenez filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming his conviction was tainted by judicial bias due to the trial judge's relationship with the district attorney, who had misappropriated funds to pay for the judge's travel expenses.Jimenez first appealed his conviction through the Texas court system, where the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) refused his petition for discretionary review. He then filed a state habeas corpus application, which was remanded by the TCCA to the trial court for findings on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady violations, and judicial bias. The trial court rejected his claims, and the TCCA denied relief without a written order. Jimenez subsequently filed a federal habeas petition, which was initially denied as time-barred. However, the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (COA), vacated the district court's decision, and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the district court again denied the petition as time-barred, but the Fifth Circuit found Jimenez entitled to equitable tolling and remanded for consideration on the merits. The district court ultimately denied relief on the merits, and Jimenez appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Jimenez's habeas relief. The court held that the state court's adjudication of Jimenez's judicial-bias claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The court found that the trial judge's actions, while inappropriate, did not demonstrate actual or presumptive bias against Jimenez. The Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's motion to expand the COA to include his ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims, concluding that the district court's resolution of these claims was not debatable among jurists of reason. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied habeas relief. View "Jimenez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Tyler Venema, an inmate with a history of mental illness and suicide attempts, committed suicide by asphyxiation with a plastic bag while in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at Woodland Center Correctional Facility (WCC). Venema's estate filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jodi DeAngelo, the warden of WCC, alleging that her failure to train and supervise corrections officers led to Venema's death, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The estate claimed that DeAngelo knew about the risk posed by plastic bags and the officers' failure to remove them from at-risk inmates' cells.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied DeAngelo's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, finding that the estate's allegations were sufficient to establish that DeAngelo implicitly authorized or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates. DeAngelo appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the estate plausibly alleged that DeAngelo knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates by failing to train and supervise them properly. The court also found a causal connection between DeAngelo's actions and Venema's death, as her failure to enforce policies against providing plastic bags to at-risk inmates could reasonably be expected to result in harm. The court concluded that Venema's Eighth Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of the violation, and thus, DeAngelo was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Venema v. West" on Justia Law

Dennis Christopher Howard sued Spotsylvania County Sheriff Roger L. Harris and Deputy David Setlock for injuries from a self-inflicted gunshot wound while detained in a law enforcement vehicle. Howard claimed Harris was responsible for Setlock’s actions, which he argued constituted gross negligence. The incident began when Howard, a convicted felon, was found with a suicide note and missing shotgun. After being detained and searched, Howard maneuvered his handcuffs, accessed a handgun left in the vehicle, and shot himself.The Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that Howard’s gross negligence claim failed as a matter of law and that the defense of illegality barred his claims. The court found that Setlock’s actions did not amount to gross negligence and that Howard’s injuries resulted from his illegal act of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Howard had stated a viable gross negligence claim and that his claim was not barred by the illegality defense. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Howard’s mental state and whether it negated the mens rea required for the illegal possession of a firearm.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that Howard’s claim was barred by the defense of illegality. The court held that Howard’s violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, was a proximate cause of his injuries. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for the defendants, finding that Howard’s allegation of an “unsound mind” did not negate the strict liability offense of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. View "Harris v. Howard" on Justia Law

John A. Poole was convicted in 2002 of first-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was 18 years old at the time of the crime and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. Poole filed multiple motions for relief from judgment, which were denied.Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, which addressed mandatory life sentences for juveniles, Poole sought relief again. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if Poole was entitled to relief under the state constitution's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, as extended to 18-year-olds in People v. Parks. The Court of Appeals held that Parks applied retroactively and vacated Poole's sentence, remanding for resentencing.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed whether Parks should apply retroactively to cases where the period for direct review had expired. The court held that Parks, which extended Miller's protections to 18-year-olds under the Michigan Constitution, announced a substantive rule and should be applied retroactively. The court overruled the state retroactivity analysis in People v. Carp to the extent it survived Montgomery. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to vacate Poole's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing under MCL 769.25a. View "People Of Michigan v. Poole" on Justia Law

Kalel Martínez-Bristol was indicted on June 24, 2021, for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and for possession of a machinegun. At the time, he was on federal supervised release for a 2011 drug conspiracy conviction. He pled guilty to the felon-in-possession charge on September 9, 2022. The presentence report identified the firearm as a pistol with a machinegun conversion device. Martínez did not object to the report. On February 6, 2023, he was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction.The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico also addressed the supervised release violation. The government argued it was a Grade A violation due to the machinegun, while Martínez argued for a Grade B violation. The court initially granted a continuance for further evidence. At the continued hearing, the government presented evidence that the firearm was a machinegun, which Martínez did not cross-examine. The court determined it was a Grade A violation and sentenced Martínez to 15 months' imprisonment, consecutive to his other sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Martínez waived any appeal regarding his felon-in-possession conviction and sentence by not briefing those issues. He argued that his due process and confrontation rights were violated in the revocation hearing, but the court found no error. The court noted that Martínez had the evidence months before the hearing and did not object. The court affirmed the judgments, finding the government's evidence sufficient to establish the firearm as a machinegun. View "United States v. Martinez-Bristol" on Justia Law

Robert Arthur McIntosh, a Black man, sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus in superior court, raising claims under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA). He alleged that the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged gang and firearm enhancements more frequently against Black individuals and imposed longer sentences on them compared to similarly situated individuals of other races. McIntosh supported his claims with statistical data and reports. The trial court denied his request for counsel, stating he had not made the prima facie showing required for an order to show cause (OSC).The trial court ruled that section 1473(e) of the Penal Code required a prima facie showing of a violation for the appointment of counsel and issuance of an OSC. McIntosh then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court issued an OSC limited to whether McIntosh was entitled to appointed counsel under section 1473(e).The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that section 1473(e) imposes a duty on trial courts to assess the adequacy of the factual allegations in the habeas petition to determine if an indigent petitioner is entitled to appointed counsel, independent of the prima facie showing required for an OSC. The court found that the trial court erred by conflating these two inquiries. The appellate court exercised its discretion to construe McIntosh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate and issued a writ directing the trial court to conduct the required inquiry to determine if McIntosh is entitled to appointed counsel. View "McIntosh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

On October 21, 2021, Officers Nicholas Stevens and Jason Purkapile of the Sioux Falls Police Department stopped a vehicle with an inoperable brake light. The driver, Lee Martin Holy, provided a North Dakota driver’s license but no proof of insurance. Officer Stevens returned to his patrol car to run routine checks and issue a warning ticket. Meanwhile, Officer Purkapile engaged in conversation with Holy’s grandfather, the passenger, and initiated a warrant check on him. When Officer Stevens returned to Holy’s vehicle, he asked about contraband and requested to search the car. Holy admitted to having marijuana and a medical cannabis card. A subsequent search revealed a methamphetamine pipe and methamphetamine, leading to Holy’s arrest.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County denied Holy’s motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the stop was not unreasonably extended by the interdiction questions. The court found that the duration of the stop was not unduly prolonged and that the warrant check on Holy’s grandfather was still pending when Holy admitted to possessing marijuana. Holy was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia based on stipulated facts and was sentenced to supervised probation and court costs.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the interdiction questions did not extend the length of the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the mission, as the warrant check on the passenger was still pending. The court did not address whether a routine warrant check for a passenger is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, leaving that determination for another case. View "State v. Holy" on Justia Law

Texas Game Warden Dustin Delgado arrested Joshua McClain for driving while intoxicated after observing his truck swerve and conducting field sobriety tests. McClain later sued Delgado for false arrest. The district court denied Delgado qualified immunity. However, because McClain did not carry his burden to show Delgado violated his constitutional rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. Delgado moved for summary judgment on both the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion for the malicious prosecution claim but denied it for the false arrest claim. Delgado appealed the denial of qualified immunity for the false arrest claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Delgado had reasonable suspicion to stop McClain based on his swerving and probable cause to arrest him after observing clues of intoxication during field sobriety tests. The court found that McClain did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Delgado's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of Delgado's motion for summary judgment, granting Delgado qualified immunity. View "McClain v. Delgado" on Justia Law