Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In September 8, 2018, Michael Holmes attended a public fair in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, to test a new camera lens. While taking photos, Holmes was approached by Deputy Sheriff Corbett Reddoch, who asked for his identification. Holmes questioned the request, leading to a physical altercation where Reddoch arrested Holmes, claiming he was taking pictures of children. Holmes was charged only with resisting arrest.Holmes filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law. The jury found in favor of Holmes on his Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim but granted qualified immunity to Reddoch for the investigatory stop. The jury also found for Holmes on state-law claims of battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Reddoch's post-verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Reddoch's motions, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Reddoch did not have probable cause to arrest Holmes. The court also found that Reddoch forfeited his qualified immunity defense for the false arrest claim by not raising it in his Rule 50 motion. Additionally, the court held that the jury's verdicts on the investigatory stop and arrest were not inconsistent, as they involved different legal standards. The court also upheld the jury's award of punitive damages, finding that Reddoch's actions demonstrated reckless or callous indifference to Holmes's constitutional rights. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Holmes v. Reddoch" on Justia Law

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition. View "Lumumba v. Kiser" on Justia Law

Kyle J. Rodney was convicted in Nevada state court of multiple charges, including burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, and battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The convictions stemmed from an incident where Rodney and an accomplice attacked and severely injured Ralph Monko after Monko won a significant amount of money at a casino. Monko's injuries were severe, including head trauma and long-term physical and cognitive impairments.Rodney's convictions were affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court. He then filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was denied without the appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. A second post-conviction petition was also denied on procedural grounds. Rodney subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims. The federal district court found these claims procedurally defaulted. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded for the district court to determine if the procedural default could be excused under Martinez v. Ryan, which allows for such an excuse if the IAC claims are substantial.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada, on remand, initially allowed new evidence and discovery but later ruled that it could not consider new evidence due to the Supreme Court's decision in Shinn v. Ramirez. The district court concluded that Rodney's IAC claims were not substantial based on the state-court record alone and denied relief.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Rodney did not fail to develop the state-court record within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) and that the district court erred in limiting its analysis to the state-court record. However, the Ninth Circuit found that even considering the new evidence, Rodney's IAC claims were not substantial. The court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Rodney's trial or sentencing would have been different but for counsel's alleged errors. Thus, the procedural default of Rodney's claims could not be excused, and the denial of his habeas petition was affirmed. View "RODNEY V. GARRETT" on Justia Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

In 2015, Eddie Williams was prosecuted in Pennsylvania for crimes related to a dispute over illegal drug profits, resulting in one death and one serious injury. Williams, along with Rick Cannon and Akeita Harden, was implicated in the incident. Cannon pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including homicide, and Williams was tried jointly with Harden. During the trial, the judge read Cannon's Criminal Information, which included charges naming Williams as a co-conspirator, to the jury. Williams was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional years.Williams filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition in 2017, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to object to the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information. The PCRA court denied the petition, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeal. Williams then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted relief, finding a violation of the Confrontation Clause and ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information, which included testimonial statements implicating Williams, violated the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reading, which prejudiced Williams's defense. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to grant habeas relief, concluding that the errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. The case was remanded for the District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. View "Williams v. District Attorney Lebanon County" on Justia Law

In 2007, Mohamed Musaid was arrested for the murder of a relative and confessed to the crime. However, his trial was delayed for over eight years due to repeated findings of incompetence to stand trial, attributed to his long history of mental illness. Musaid was found incompetent on ten occasions and competent on five, with his competency dependent on his compliance with antipsychotic medication. Each time he was found competent and transferred to Rikers Island, he would refuse medication and regress to incompetence.The trial court eventually allowed Musaid's trial to proceed nearly ten months after a final finding of competency, without re-evaluating his mental state. During the trial, Musaid exhibited erratic behavior, raising questions about his competency. Despite this, the trial court did not conduct a further inquiry into his mental state. Musaid was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life for second-degree murder and five years for criminal possession of a weapon.Musaid appealed, arguing that the trial court's failure to reassess his competency before trial violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating there was no indication that Musaid was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. Musaid then sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's failure to conduct a minimal inquiry into Musaid's competency just before trial was objectively unreasonable, given his history of mental illness and the time elapsed since the last competency evaluation. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, allowing the state courts to determine whether it is possible to reconstruct Musaid's competency at the time of trial based on evidence proximate to the trial. View "Musaid v. Kirkpatrick" on Justia Law

Joshua Allen Baldwin was arrested by Officer Daniel Beasley on July 22, 2021, at Lucky Lil’s Casino in Anaconda, Montana, for allegedly violating his pre-release conditions by being in a casino. Beasley confirmed with dispatch that Baldwin was under court conditions prohibiting him from being in such establishments. After Baldwin was arrested, officers observed suspicious items in his car, including a butane refill bottle, burnt pliers, and a Ziploc baggie with a white crystalline substance. A subsequent search of Baldwin’s car, conducted after obtaining a warrant, revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.The Third Judicial District Court, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, denied Baldwin’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, ruling that the arrest was lawful. Baldwin then pleaded guilty to felony drug possession while reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The misdemeanor charge for drug paraphernalia was dismissed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Beasley did not have probable cause to arrest Baldwin for contempt of court based on the alleged violation of pre-release conditions. The court determined that pre-release conditions do not constitute an independent mandate of the court under Montana law, and thus, Baldwin’s arrest was unlawful. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search of Baldwin’s car, which was conducted as a result of the unlawful arrest, should have been suppressed. The court found no applicable exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such as good faith or independent source exceptions, and concluded that the evidence was directly tied to the unlawful arrest. View "State v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

In 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of the murder of Hae Min Lee and sentenced to life in prison plus 30 years. In 2022, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City moved to vacate Syed’s conviction, citing new evidence and alleged Brady violations. Young Lee, the victim’s brother, was given less than one business day’s notice of the vacatur hearing, which he attended remotely. The court granted the motion to vacate and ordered the State to either retry Syed or enter a nolle prosequi (nol pros) within 30 days. The State later entered a nol pros, effectively dismissing the charges against Syed.Young Lee appealed the vacatur order, arguing that his rights as a victim’s representative were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the circuit court’s order, reinstated Syed’s convictions, and remanded for a new hearing, holding that the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal and that Lee had the right to reasonable notice and to attend the hearing in person.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that the entry of the nol pros did not moot Lee’s appeal. The court ruled that a victim has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing under CP § 11-403, which includes hearings where the alteration of a sentence is considered. The court also held that Lee’s rights were violated due to insufficient notice and the inability to attend the hearing in person. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings, starting from the point immediately after the State’s Attorney filed the motion to vacate. View "Syed v. Lee" on Justia Law

In 1987, Michael Hill was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Hill maintained that the murders were committed by Michael McCray, whose statements to the police incriminated both himself and Hill. McCray did not testify at trial, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, but his statements were admitted under the hearsay rule. Decades later, Hill discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose a promise not to prosecute McCray for his involvement in the case. Hill filed a habeas corpus petition alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois.The trial court dismissed Hill’s claims, finding he failed to establish a prima facie case. The court concluded that the evidence against Hill was overwhelming and that the failure to disclose the non-prosecution agreement did not undermine confidence in the verdict. The court also found that Hill did not plead that false evidence was presented to the jury, as required under Napue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that Hill established a prima facie case for both Brady and Napue violations. The court noted that McCray’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was misleading and that the prosecution’s suppression of the non-prosecution agreement allowed McCray to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, leading to the admission of his statements without cross-examination. The court concluded that the suppressed evidence was material and could have affected the jury’s verdict. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the trial court to issue an order to show cause. View "In re Hill" on Justia Law

Michael Harvel, a county official, was convicted by a jury for sexually assaulting seven women he supervised, violating their constitutional rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. Harvel appealed, raising issues about the timeliness of the charges, the indictment's sufficiency, and the admission of certain evidence.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially handled the case. Harvel argued that the most serious charges were not brought within the five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). However, the court found that these charges were "punishable by death" under 18 U.S.C. § 3281, thus not subject to the five-year limit. Harvel also claimed that the introduction of "other crimes" evidence violated the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court allowed this evidence, finding it relevant and not overly prejudicial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, holding that the charges were timely under § 3281 because the crimes included kidnapping and aggravated sexual abuse, which are punishable by death under § 242. The court also rejected Harvel's due process challenge to Rule 413, which allows the admission of other sexual assaults to show propensity, and found no abuse of discretion in the district court's Rule 403 balancing. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of Harvel's motion for a mistrial, concluding that the district court's limiting instructions were sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice from the inadmissible testimony.In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Harvel's convictions and the 204-month sentence, finding no merit in his arguments regarding the statute of limitations, the indictment's sufficiency, or the evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Harvel" on Justia Law