Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jeremy Young was convicted by a jury of possessing an unregistered firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was also convicted by a separate jury of assaulting a federal officer. Young received a total sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. He appealed, challenging the Government’s use of peremptory strikes against Native American venirepersons, the district court’s decision to admit certain evidence as res gestae, and the sufficiency of the evidence at both trials.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Young’s Batson challenges, finding the Government’s reasons for striking the Native American jurors to be legitimate and race-neutral. The court also admitted excerpts of Young’s recorded interview with Agent Kumley, where Young discussed his plans to transport methamphetamine, as relevant res gestae evidence. The jury found Young guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court’s Batson analysis, noting that the Government provided race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors and that Young failed to demonstrate pretext. The court also upheld the admission of the recorded interview, agreeing that it provided relevant context for Young’s possession of the shotgun. Finally, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Young’s convictions, as the jury reasonably found that Young had both actual and constructive possession of the firearm and that he intentionally assaulted Sergeant Antoine. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Sharmarke Warsame was convicted of two felony counts of identity theft, two misdemeanor counts of theft, and one misdemeanor count of criminal use of a financial card for using stolen credit cards to purchase Target gift cards. The convictions were vacated on direct appeal, and the State dismissed the felony charges after remand. Warsame served 564 days in prison for the vacated and dismissed felony convictions. He then filed a statutory action for wrongful conviction and imprisonment seeking damages, attorney fees, costs, a certificate of innocence, and expungement of all associated convictions.The Johnson District Court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that it needed to hear testimony and make findings concerning the alleged facts under which Warsame was convicted. A bench trial followed, and the district court ultimately ruled against Warsame, holding that he had failed to prove his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.Warsame appealed directly to the Kansas Supreme Court, arguing that the district court incorrectly concluded that he committed felony identity theft against the alleged victims as charged and instructed to the jury. The State cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment, arguing that the actual innocence required under the wrongful conviction statute concerns the statutory elements of the charged crime, not the specific facts alleged in the filings or trial.The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with the State, holding that the crime of conviction is defined by statute and is not limited to the specific facts of the charging document. To receive compensation, Warsame was required to prove actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence under the statutory elements of the charged crime. Warsame failed to meet this burden, as he admitted facts sufficient to prove he intended to defraud some party to receive a benefit. The court affirmed the denial of Warsame's claim. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Warsame " on Justia Law

Jonathan Peoples pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to one year of incarceration plus one year of mandatory supervised release. He received credit for time served, effectively completing his incarceration term. However, due to Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) policies, he was detained at Cook County Jail for four additional days until he could be transferred to IDOC for processing and release.Peoples filed a Section 1983 claim against Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, alleging that his detention beyond his sentence violated his constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendments applied to Peoples's claim and that he failed to present a triable Eighth Amendment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to Peoples's post-conviction detention. Instead, the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits incarceration beyond the end of a sentence without penological justification, was applicable. The court found that the Cook County Sheriff's Office had a penological justification for detaining Peoples until IDOC could process him, as required by Illinois law and the court's commitment order.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Peoples failed to establish that the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference, a necessary element for an Eighth Amendment violation. Consequently, without a constitutional injury, Peoples's Section 1983 claim could not succeed. View "Peoples v Cook County" on Justia Law

The defendant, Aquil Qadir Lawson, was convicted of murder after shooting Madison Rose Weiss while she was in her car. Lawson, who is Black, argued that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were influenced by implicit racial bias, violating the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He claimed that the court's decisions emphasized his criminality while minimizing the victim's, who was white. Specifically, Lawson contended that the exclusion of evidence regarding Weiss's illegal activities and the inclusion of his Instagram posts and fraud activities demonstrated racial bias.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury found Lawson guilty of second-degree murder and the firearm allegation true. The court excluded evidence of Weiss's involvement in sex work, vaccination card fraud, and other illegal activities, deeming them irrelevant to the case. The court also excluded evidence of a gun found near the crime scene, as it was not connected to the shooting. Conversely, the court admitted Lawson's Instagram posts, which contained statements related to the shooting, and evidence of his involvement in fraud, which was used to impeach his credibility.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were based on relevance and did not demonstrate implicit racial bias under the Racial Justice Act's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The appellate court found that the trial court's decisions were ordinary evidentiary rulings and that Lawson failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rulings were motivated by racial bias or animus. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "P. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Angelo Jackson was identified as a suspect in a double murder in Montgomery County, Maryland, based on information from law enforcement officers. Detective Michael Carin used this information to obtain an arrest warrant for Jackson. After Jackson's arrest, Carin continued the investigation and found exculpatory evidence, including DNA and cellphone records, which led to the charges being dropped and Jackson's release after 65 days of detention.Jackson filed a lawsuit against Carin, alleging that Carin's affidavit for the arrest warrant and his grand jury testimony were deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. Jackson claimed that if the commissioner and grand jury had been presented with truthful evidence, they would not have found probable cause for his arrest and indictment.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of Carin, finding that even with disputed material removed, the affidavit still provided probable cause for Jackson's arrest. The court also found that Carin was protected by qualified immunity on Jackson's federal claims and dismissed Jackson's gross negligence claim under Maryland law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that Carin did not violate legal standards in his investigation and was shielded by qualified immunity. The court also found that Carin's actions were reasonable and based on information he received from other officers, and that Jackson failed to meet the burden of proving that Carin's statements were false, made with reckless disregard for the truth, or material to the probable cause determination. View "Jackson v. Carin" on Justia Law

Brian Smith was charged with simple assault and second-degree child molestation in 2015 for an incident at a Newport Polo event where he allegedly touched two children inappropriately. He was found guilty of simple assault and sentenced to two years in prison. While this case was pending, Smith was charged with second-degree child molestation in 2015 after his niece reported that he had sexually assaulted her in 2004. Smith pled nolo contendere and was sentenced to ten years, with two years to serve. In 2016, Smith faced additional charges of second-degree child molestation involving three other victims. He pled nolo contendere to two counts and was sentenced to ten years, with six years to serve.The Sex Offender Board of Review classified Smith as a level III sex offender, indicating a high risk to reoffend. Smith objected to this classification and sought review in the Superior Court. The Superior Court magistrate affirmed the board’s classification after considering various risk-assessment tools, police narratives, and Smith’s criminal history. Smith appealed the magistrate’s decision to a Superior Court justice, who also affirmed the classification, concluding that the magistrate had not erred in his decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court found that Smith’s procedural due process rights were not violated, as he was given ample opportunity to challenge the board’s findings. The Court also determined that the state had established a prima facie case for the level III classification using validated risk-assessment tools and other relevant evidence. Smith’s arguments regarding the improper consideration of his nolo contendere pleas and the board’s use of unsubstantiated information were rejected. The Court concluded that the board had used reasonable means to collect information and that the state’s interest in protecting the community justified the classification. View "Rhode Island Department of Attorney General v. Smith" on Justia Law

Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life. In 2024, Valdez filed another petition for resentencing, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection.The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Since Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, it was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10).The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and to enter a new order denying the petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2018, Joshua Chiazor Ezeka was convicted by a Hennepin County jury of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree attempted murder, and second-degree assault for killing Birdell Beeks while shooting at a rival gang member. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for the murder, and additional consecutive sentences for the other charges. On direct appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing on the attempted murder charge due to an excessive sentence.After resentencing, Ezeka filed a petition for postconviction relief in 2022, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. The district court concluded that even if the facts alleged in the petition were proven, Ezeka was not entitled to relief. The court also found that most of his claims were procedurally barred as they were known or should have been known at the time of his direct appeal.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the new evidence presented by Ezeka, including reports of general discriminatory practices by the Minneapolis Police Department and the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, did not meet the legal standard for newly discovered evidence as it did not directly pertain to his case and would not have changed the trial's outcome. The court also found that the alleged failure to disclose this evidence did not constitute a Brady violation as it was not material to the case.Additionally, the court rejected Ezeka’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, concluding that his trial counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and that there was no prejudice resulting from the alleged deficiencies. The court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying the petition for postconviction relief. View "Ezeka vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

George Peterson was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for illegal firearm transactions at his business, PDW Solutions, LLC, which he operated from his home. The ATF conducted undercover operations where Peterson sold firearms without reporting the transactions as required. Based on this, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Peterson's home and business. During the search, agents found an unregistered firearm suppressor in Peterson's bedroom-closet safe. Peterson was indicted for possession of an unregistered suppressor.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Peterson's pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Peterson argued that the National Firearms Act's (NFA) registration requirement for suppressors violated his Second Amendment rights and that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that suppressors are not "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment, as they are accessories and not weapons themselves. Therefore, the NFA's registration requirement does not violate the Second Amendment. Additionally, the court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, as the officers reasonably relied on the warrant issued by the magistrate judge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Peterson's motions to dismiss and suppress. View "USA v. Peterson" on Justia Law