Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Frederick Marsalia Rosenau was convicted of felony murder and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act in connection with the shooting death of Quincy Suggs. Suggs was shot and killed on September 16, 2014. Rosenau, along with co-defendants Lavarr Pierce, Khadijah Jenkins, and Julius Lofton, was charged with multiple offenses, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, arson, and gang-related activities. Lofton pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and testified against the others. Rosenau, Pierce, and Jenkins were tried together, and the jury found Rosenau guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and a gang act violation. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony murder and an additional 15 years for the gang act violation.Rosenau filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his gang act conviction, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor commented on his silence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not retaining a gang expert and for not objecting to certain testimony.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Rosenau's gang act conviction. The court held that the trial evidence established the existence of a criminal street gang, Rosenau's association with the gang, and that the aggravated assault of Suggs was intended to further the gang's interests. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rosenau's motion for mistrial, as the curative instruction given to the jury was sufficient. Lastly, the court concluded that Rosenau's trial counsel was not ineffective, as the decisions made were reasonable trial strategies. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Rosenau's convictions. View "Rosenau v. State" on Justia Law

Charles Warner was convicted in federal district court in New Mexico for being a felon in possession of a firearm and dealing in firearms without a license. Warner appealed his conviction on four grounds: he argued that he was not prohibited from owning firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), that his suppression challenge regarding evidence seized at his house was improperly denied, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of dealing in firearms without a license, and that the number of firearms in his possession was improperly counted.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Warner's pre-trial motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge and his motion to suppress evidence seized from his computers. At trial, Warner testified that he knew he was a convicted felon but did not know he was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law. The jury convicted Warner on both counts. At sentencing, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for possessing between 25 and 99 firearms, based on expert testimony, and sentenced Warner to 33 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Warner is a "prohibited person" under § 922(g) because he has two prior state-law felony convictions for which he could have been sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment and has not had all of his civil rights restored. The court also rejected Warner's constitutional challenge to § 922(g), holding that it is foreclosed by recent Tenth Circuit precedent. The court found that any alleged error in the denial of Warner's suppression motion was harmless because none of the evidence Warner sought to suppress was used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Warner of dealing in firearms without a license and affirmed the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for possessing between 25 and 99 firearms. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Warner's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Warner" on Justia Law

Abelardo Rodriguez-Arvizu was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol agents on November 18, 2019, for a suspected immigration violation. During processing, an outstanding arrest warrant related to his involvement in a marijuana "rip crew" was discovered. He was subsequently arrested by FBI agents, who did not inform him of the specific charges. During the ride to the FBI office, Rodriguez-Arvizu made incriminating statements. At the FBI office, he was read his Miranda rights, and he made further statements after waiving his rights.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Rodriguez-Arvizu's motion to suppress his statements. The court found that although the FBI agents violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(3)(A) by not informing him of the charges, suppression was not warranted. The court also found no violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, as he did not unambiguously invoke this right. Additionally, the court determined that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel despite not knowing the specific charges. Finally, the court ruled that his confession was within the safe harbor period of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and did not violate the McNabb-Mallory rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that suppression was not warranted for the Rule 4(c)(3)(A) violation, as the agents' conduct was not sufficiently deliberate or culpable. The court also agreed that Rodriguez-Arvizu did not unambiguously invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right. The court further held that the safe harbor period began with his FBI arrest, making his confession admissible. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ-ARVIZU" on Justia Law

In 2001, Morris Mullins, then seventeen, killed a seventy-eight-year-old widow, Amy Davis, in her home. He was charged as an adult with rape and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge and not seeking the death penalty. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). At sentencing, the court considered evidence of Mullins's dysfunctional upbringing and psychological evaluations but ultimately imposed a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentence.Mullins later challenged his sentence as unconstitutional, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In 2013, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory JLWOP for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied his motion in 2016, and Mullins's appeal was delayed until 2020 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether Mullins's JLWOP sentence was constitutional. The court held that the sentencing judge's comments suggested ambiguity about Mullins's capacity for change, which undermined confidence in the appropriateness of the JLWOP sentence. The court vacated Mullins's sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need to consider Mullins's youth and potential for rehabilitation in light of Miller and its progeny. The court did not find the sentencing statute unconstitutionally vague or the JLWOP categorically unconstitutional but required a more thorough consideration of Mullins's youth and potential for change. View "State v. Mullins" on Justia Law

David Wood was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 1992 for the brutal murders of six females in 1987. The victims were found buried near El Paso, and evidence indicated that Wood had sexually assaulted them before killing them. Wood's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). Over the years, Wood pursued extensive litigation in state and federal courts, including multiple motions for post-conviction DNA testing under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court granted some of his motions, but the results did not exonerate him. Subsequent motions were denied, and the CCA affirmed these denials, concluding that Wood had engaged in a pattern of piecemeal litigation and delay.Wood then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging that the CCA's construction of Chapter 64 violated his procedural due process rights. He claimed that the CCA's consistent denial of DNA testing rendered the state-created testing right illusory and that the CCA's interpretation of the statute's unreasonable-delay provision was novel and unforeseeable. The district court dismissed Wood's complaint and denied his motion to stay his execution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Wood lacked standing for his first claim because a favorable ruling would not substantially likely lead to DNA testing. For his second claim, the court found it meritless, as the CCA's interpretation of the unreasonable-delay provision was neither novel nor unforeseeable. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order and judgment and denied Wood's renewed motion to stay his execution. View "Wood v. Patton" on Justia Law

In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford based on forensic evidence and witness testimonies. Robert Thurman, a forensic serologist, testified that a hair found at the crime scene was similar to Hardin’s hair. After over two decades in prison, DNA testing revealed that the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading a state court to vacate their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he failed to disclose observation notes that suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s hair sample, violating his obligations under Brady v. Maryland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense for Hardin’s Brady claim but granted summary judgment on other claims. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Thurman should have recognized the exculpatory value of his notes and that the notes were material to Hardin’s defense. The court also held that Thurman could not invoke qualified immunity because Hardin’s Brady rights were clearly established before 1992.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Thurman’s arguments that the notes were not exculpatory or material, as these were mixed questions of law and fact. However, the court rejected Thurman’s argument that the law in the mid-1990s did not clearly establish that Brady’s duty of disclosure applied to forensic scientists, affirming that such duties were clearly established and applicable to Thurman. View "Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry was convicted of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute the same. The case centers on the use of a stationary pole camera by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to monitor the exterior of Harry's business, Action Audio, for approximately 50 days without a warrant. The camera captured footage of the business's exterior, parking lot, and occasionally the interior when the garage door was open. Harry was arrested after investigators found narcotics and firearms at Action Audio and his residence.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied Harry's motion to suppress the pole-camera evidence, which was introduced at trial. The jury convicted Harry, and the district court sentenced him to ten years for the fentanyl- and cocaine-related charges, including conspiracy, and five years for the marijuana charge, to run concurrently. The court also denied Harry's request for safety-valve relief from the mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of the stationary pole camera did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, as Harry did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the publicly visible areas of his business. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Harry safety-valve relief, as he failed to prove that the firearms found were not connected to his drug-trafficking activities. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Harry" on Justia Law

Triston Harris Steinman was stopped by Nevada State Trooper William Boyer for speeding. During the stop, Boyer observed an ammunition box in Steinman's car and learned that Steinman had a felony conviction. Boyer asked Steinman to exit the vehicle and sit in the patrol car while he ran a criminal history check. Steinman admitted to having ammunition but denied having firearms. Boyer eventually seized the car and obtained a search warrant, leading to the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and other contraband.The District Court for the District of Nevada suppressed the evidence, ruling that Boyer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion and lacked probable cause to seize the vehicle. The court also found the search warrant overbroad and invalid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Boyer did not unlawfully prolong the stop, as his actions were within the scope of the traffic stop's mission and did not measurably extend its duration. The court also found that Boyer had reasonable suspicion of an independent offense after learning of Steinman's felony conviction. Additionally, the court ruled that Boyer had probable cause to seize the vehicle based on evidence of federal and state law violations. The court concluded that the search of the vehicle was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, despite the overbroad warrant. Thus, the suppression of the evidence was reversed. View "USA V. STEINMAN" on Justia Law

Yathomas Riley was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of his wife, Dr. Lisa Marie Riley, in the presence of their infant son. The crimes occurred on June 14 and July 9, 2015. Riley was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Riley was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison without parole, along with additional consecutive and concurrent prison terms for other charges.Riley filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine if Riley knowingly and voluntarily chose to represent himself on appeal. The trial court confirmed this, and the case was resubmitted to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Riley's claims, including the trial court's decision to allow the lead investigator to remain in the courtroom, the presentation of allegedly false evidence, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the investigator to stay, as he was the State's chief investigative agent. Riley's claims about false evidence and perjured testimony were either not preserved for appeal or lacked supporting evidence. The court also found that Riley failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced his defense.Riley's claim that his trial counsel conceded guilt in violation of McCoy v. Louisiana was also rejected. The court concluded that counsel did not concede guilt but rather argued alternative theories to support acquittal, which did not violate Riley's Sixth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Riley's convictions and sentences. View "RILEY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Elijah Jackson, a Black man, was charged with carrying a loaded firearm after police found a handgun during a search of the car he was driving. Jackson filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, arguing that the police stopped and searched his car due to racial bias. The superior court denied his motion, stating that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie violation under the Racial Justice Act.The superior court found that the police officers were conducting a saturation patrol in a high-crime area and stopped Jackson for having illegally tinted windows. The officers observed Jackson and his brother, who were wearing clothing associated with gang members, and conducted a traffic stop. During the stop, the officers found a baseball bat in the car and, after a search, discovered an unregistered loaded firearm. Jackson argued that the stop and search were racially motivated, supported by statistical evidence showing racial disparities in traffic stops and searches by the San Diego Police Department (SDPD).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that Jackson had produced facts that, if true, established a substantial likelihood of a violation of the Racial Justice Act. The court noted the statistical evidence showing racial disparities in SDPD's traffic stops and searches, as well as Jackson's and his brother's repeated stops for the same tinted windows without receiving citations. The court also considered the officers' focus on Jackson's and his brother's appearance and the neighborhood they were in, which suggested implicit bias.The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to grant an evidentiary hearing to consider Jackson's motion under the Racial Justice Act. The court emphasized the importance of addressing implicit bias in the criminal justice system and ensuring that race does not play a role in seeking or obtaining convictions. View "Jackson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law