Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Consumer Law
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AB 2571, as later amended by AB 160, is codified at Section 22949.80 of the California Business and Professions Code. The statute mandates that “[a] firearm industry member shall not advertise, market, or arrange for placement of an advertising or marketing communication offering or promoting any firearm-related product in a manner that is designed, intended, or reasonably appears to be attractive to minors.” Junior Sports Magazines Inc. publishes Junior Shooters, a youth-oriented magazine focused on firearm-related activities and products. According to Junior Sports Magazines, its ability to publish Junior Shooters depends on advertising revenue. Junior Sports Magazines ceased distributing the magazine in California and has placed warnings on its website deterring California minors from accessing its content. Shortly after California enacted AB 2571, Junior Sports Magazines challenged its constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Junior Sports Magazines also moved to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of Section 22949.80. The district court denied the injunction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial. The panel first concluded that because California permits minors under supervision to possess and use firearms for hunting and other lawful activities, Section 22949.80 facially regulates speech that concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Next, the panel held that section 22949.80 does not directly and materially advance California’s substantial interests in reducing gun violence and the unlawful use of firearms by minors. Finally, the panel held that section 22949.80 was more extensive than necessary because it swept in truthful ads about lawful use of firearms for adults and minors alike. View "JUNIOR SPORTS MAGAZINES INC., ET AL V. ROB BONTA, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Three men joined in a shootout, but only Rogers was convicted of murdering a bystander caught in their crossfire. At his trial, Rogers’s attorney did not object while the trial judge admonished a trial witness (Singleton) about perjury after that witness gave testimony favorable to Rogers. The attorney offered no arguments when Singleton changed his testimony and did not cross-examine Singleton about the change. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Counsel’s failure to object to the trial judge’s admonishment, conduct he “did not think” was problematic, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under “Strickland” as did counsel’s later failure to cross-examine Singleton regarding his changed testimony. Counsel characterized Singleton as “a liar, trying to help his buddy out,” whose testimony would not be “determinative of the outcome of this case,” but Singleton was the only witness to ever claim Rogers shot first—the ultimate issue in the case. Had Rogers’s counsel objected to the trial judge’s admonishment of Singleton and cross-examined Singleton about his changed testimony, “a reasonable probability” exists that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Without Singleton’s testimony against Rogers, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was negligible. View "Rogers v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court on interlocutory appeal denying Defendants' remand for a jury in this argument over the requirement that civil enforcement actions brought by the attorney general "shall be by equitable proceedings," holding that the requirement was enforceable and did not violate the jury right preserved by Iowa Const. art. I, 9.The attorney general commenced this action alleging that Defendants had violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Iowa Code 714.16, and the Older Iowans Act (OIA), Iowa Code 714.16A, by engaging in false and deceptive conduct and unfair practices in the "sale and advertisement of stem cell and exosome therapy in Iowa." Defendants answered and demanded a jury, but the attorney general moved to strike the jury demand because subsection 714.16(7) requires that civil actions "shall be by equitable proceedings." The district court granted the motion to strike, and Defendants applied for interlocutory review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in striking Defendants' jury demand. View "State ex rel., Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Louisiana passed the Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act (the “Act”) to “protect consumers from misleading and false labeling of food products that are edible by humans.” The Act bars, among other things, the intentional “misbranding or misrepresenting of any food product as an agricultural product” through several different labeling practices. Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. (d/b/a Tofurky), markets and sells its products in Louisiana. Tofurky believes it operates under a constant threat of enforcement. Tofurky sued Louisiana’s Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court sided with Tofurky. It held that Tofurky had standing to challenge the Act and that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on Tofurky’s right to free speech. The State appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that nothing in the statute’s language requires the State to enforce its punitive provisions on a company that sells its products in a way that just so happens to confuse a consumer. The State’s construction limits the Act’s scope to representations by companies that actually intend consumers to be misled about whether a product is an “agricultural product” when it is not. This interpretation is not contradictory to the Act, and the court thus accepted it for the present purposes of evaluating Tofurky’s facial challenge. The district court erred in ignoring the State’s limiting construction and in implementing its own interpretation of the Act. View "Turtle Island Foods v. Strain" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against TrustedID, Inc. under South Carolina’s Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act (the “Act”), S.C. Code Ann. Section 37-20-180. The district court held that Plaintiff alleged an Article III injury in fact but failed to state a claim under the Act. Plaintiff agrees with the district court’s decision on standing but appeals its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court where it originated. The court conceded that it is odd that TrustedID failed to comply with the five-digit SSN cutoff, which doesn’t appear to be unique to South Carolina’s Act. But federal courts can’t entertain a case without a concrete injury in fact. The court offered no opinion about whether the alleged facts state a claim under the Act. Absent Article III jurisdiction, that’s a question for Plaintiff to take up in state court. View "Brady O'Leary v. TrustedID, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for aggravated murder and his sentence of death, holding that, while error occurred in this case in the form of repetitive crime scene photos, the prosecutor's misstatements, and sentencing opinion errors, none of the errors resulted in prejudicial error.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the aggravated murders of his four-year-old daughter, C.D., and her mother, Nicole Duckson, with accompanying death-penalty specifications. The court sentenced Defendant according to the jury's recommendation of a sentence of death for the aggravated murder of C.D. The court then sentenced Defendant to life without parole for the aggravated murder of Nicole. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded the case, holding (1) Defendant received a fair trial, and none of the errors in this case, when considered either individually or cumulatively, resulted in prejudicial error; (2) the overwhelming evidence established Defendant's guilt; and (3) the case must be remanded for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entering confirming the September 14, 2019 judgment entry and the September 16, 2019 entry to the sentence that was imposed at the sentencing hearing. View "State v. Garrett" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff initiated action against Experian Information Solutions (“Experian”), alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681 (“FCRA”). The district court found that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a jury question on damages.   Plaintiff contends that a genuine dispute of material fact exists on damages because she provided evidence of financial and emotional harm. The court explained that to maintain a claim for negligent violation of the FCRA, a plaintiff must offer proof of “actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure. Further, Plaintiff argues that she sustained financial injury based on the denial of her application for a Chase Bank credit card after a hard inquiry on her Experian report. However, her deposition testimony refutes this claim. The record bolsters the conclusion that the bankruptcy drove Chase’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s credit card application. Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion of financial harm is insufficient to create a jury question on damages. Finally, the court wrote that like in other decisions where the court has denied damages for emotional distress, the record reveals that Plaintiff “suffered no physical injury, she was not medically treated for any psychological or emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated any outward manifestation of emotional distress. View "Christa Peterson v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

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The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the district court dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant at summary judgment, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's excessive force claims against correctional officer Brian Piasecki.Plaintiff, the special administrator of the estate of Michael Madden, brought this action alleging deliberate indifference, use of excessive force, Monell liability, and state law claims against the state actors involved in the care of Madden while he was jailed in Milwaukee County. Over the course of one month, Madden developed infective endocarditis, which medical staff failed to diagnose. Madden died at the end of the month. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims at summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in awarding Piasecki summary judgment based on qualified immunity; and (2) the district court's judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Stockton v. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Meemic Insurance Company's motion to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the minimum contacts necessary to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction in accordance with due process requirements were not satisfied.Catherine Davis was riding as a passenger on William Laeder's motorcycle when Richard Otten, who was also driving a motorcycle, collided with them. All three people sustained incapacitating injuries. Meemic had issued an insurance policy in Michigan to Davis, which was in effect at the time of the accident. Davis ultimately filed a complaint against Otten and Meemic alleging that Meemic breached its insurance contract with Davis by failing to compensate her under the underinsured motorist coverage and no-fault insurance terms of her policy. After the circuit court denied Meemic's motion to dismiss, Meemic filed a petition for intermediate appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed, holding that the minimum contacts required to warrant a finding of jurisdiction were not met in this case. View "Davis v. Otten" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff retained an attorney of the Advocacy Law Firm to sue Defendants for alleged ADA violations following Plaintiff’s visit to Defendants’ place of business. The attorney has filed hundreds of lawsuits under the ADA on behalf of Plaintiff and others. As the prevailing party, Plaintiff  moved for attorney’s fees.. While the district court found that Plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees, the district court determined that the requested amount was grossly disproportionate given the case’s circumstances. The district court therefore reduced the requested fees.   Plaintiff argued that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the amount he requested for attorney’s fees.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the attorney billed an excessive number of hours given the complexity of the case. The court noted that the attorney has been involved in hundreds of ADA lawsuits, including 140 during the case. Additionally, the district court found that the pleadings and motions filed here were “boilerplate” and much like filings in the attorney’s other ADA cases.   Further, the record reflects that the attorney was unduly litigious and engaged in unnecessary motion practice. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the attorney unnecessarily prolonged the litigation which, in turn, unnecessarily increased the amount of attorney’s fees. View "Howard Michael Caplan v. All American Auto Collision, Inc., et al" on Justia Law