Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The suit, against law enforcement officers and the county, claimed denial of equal protection in failure to respond to complaints about gang harassment. The district court, interpreting the pro se complaint as concerning inadequate police protection, dismissed. The Seventh Circuit panel interpreted as charging defendants with arbitrarily providing less police protection to than to other residents, a "class of one" discrimination claim, but concluded that the claim failed, absent an allegation of personal animosity. On hearing case en banc, the court split three ways, affirming the dismissal by tie vote. Four judges (with a concurring opinion) stated that a "class of one" plaintiff must establish intentional discrimination by state actors who knew or should have known that they had no justification, based on their public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treatment. The opinion stated that class-of-one suits should not be permitted against police officers or police departments. The complaint did not allege personal motives. "Rightly or wrongly they thought him a paranoid pest obsessed with motorcycle gangs." Four dissenters indicated that plaintiff should be allowed to replead and that the standard, which does not require mindreading," is the rational-basis test.

The city accepted a proposal to develop city-owned property. The developer formed companies to develop and own the affordable housing portion of the project. The city gave the developer an option to purchase the property under certain conditions. The developer failed to meet a condition that it obtain a demolition permit by a specific date. The city terminated the agreement. The developer alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, and state laws, claiming that the city knew or should have known that the condition was impossible to meet and actually terminated the agreement because the project would accommodate handicapped tenants. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts alleged do not plausibly support findings: that the city designed the agreement to fail by including a condition it should have known that plaintiffs, sophisticated developers, could not meet; that the city did not want to house the handicapped; or that termination caused handicapped individuals to suffer disproportionately more than others.

After a jury trial, Matthew Fox was convicted of first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony. Fox appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it found him competent to stand trial and when it allowed him to absent himself from major portions of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it determined that Fox was competent to stand trial, and (2) the district court did not err when it found that Fox knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial and allowed Fox to absent himself from trial.

Pro se prisoner Plaintiff Stephen Burnett appealed a district court’s order dismissing his civil-rights complaint and denying his motion to add a defendant. Plaitiff's case arose from a six-week lockdown at the Cimmaron facility in which Plaitiff was incarcerated. "The linchpin of [Plaintiff's] suit was not whether prison officials had the authority to impose a lockdown, but instead whether the restrictions imposed during the lockdown so altered the conditions of his confinement as to violate his constitutional rights." The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation which concluded that Plaintiff's claims against Warden Joseph Taylor were moot and should have been dismissed without prejudice. As to the director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections Justin Jones, the magistrate found that even if the claims against him were not moot, those claims should have been dismissed with prejudice because the complaint failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted and would have been futile to amend. The magistrate also denied Plaintiff's motion to add Warden Robert Ezell as a defendant. The district court adopted the report and recommendation, effectively ending Plaintiff's case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit partly affirmed, partly reversed the district court (and magistrate judge's) decision. Because the Court's conclusion that the claims against Mr. Jones were moot but for different reasons than the district court, it reversed the decision for dismissal without prejudice. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects.

Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to prove that they were subjected to excessive force while in custody at the Sacramento County Main Jail. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to use certain jury instructions plaintiffs had requested. The court held that the district court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, for purposes of proving a Monell claim, a custom or practice could be supported by evidence of repeated constitutional violations which went uninvestigated and for which the errant municipal officers went unpunished. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

Plaintiff brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging excessive force and other Eighth Amendment and due process violations in connection with a prison yard altercation. At issue was whether a plaintiff in a lawsuit governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was entitled to a jury trial on disputed factual issues relating to his exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court held that the Seventh Amendment did not guarantee a jury trial on factual disputes regarding administrative exhaustion under the PLRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.

Petitioner appealed the district court's order denying him habeas relief where a jury convicted him of first degree murder of a police officer and the trial court imposed a death sentence. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying petitioner relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase; denied petitioner relief on his claim that counsel failed to investigate and present more detailed mitigation evidence at the penalty phase; and determined that petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel of appellate counsel for failure to challenge the trial court's impartiality was barred from federal review. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner habeas relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase where counsel did not proffer a defense counsel could not support and where, even if petitioner could show that counsel were ineffective for failing to proffer a voluntary intoxication defense, petitioner could not demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. The court also held that counsel did not fail to investigate and present more detailed mitigation evidence at the penalty phase where counsel made numerous attempts to secure a mental health expert and strategically decided not to present some of the mental health experts counsel consulted and where the penalty-phase jury was presented with identical evidence of the effects of long-term or continuous drug use that petitioner presented at the collateral hearing. The court further held that, because petitioner never raised his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the district court properly dismissed it.

Appellant, a former student in the Forest Grove School District ("Forest Grove"), appealed the district court's determination that he was not entitled to an award of reimbursement for his private school tuition under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(C). At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in holding that equitable considerations did not support any award of private-school tuition at Mount Bachelor Academy as a result of Forest Grove's failure to provide appellant with a Free and Appropriate Education ("FAPE") under the IDEA. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's factual determination where appellant's parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor solely because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems.

Petitioner, serving 387 months for drugs and weapons offenses, filed a pro se action he characterized as habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2241). The district court characterized the suit as a civil rights action and dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. The petitioner has a long history of abusive litigation and may not proceed in forma pauperis, under the "three strikes" rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly characterized the claim, which stated that it was asserting a âcivil tort action for civil rightâs violation,â alleged violations of the First Amendment, and sought monetary damages. The district court effectively warned the petitioner about the consequences of recharacterization in a 2002 order, stating that he âshall not be permitted to file any further actions in forma pauperis without first obtaining leave."