Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple felonies, including first degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contended that the trial court failed to make him aware of the disadvantages of self-representation or to make sufficient inquiries to assess whether Defendant's decision to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Petitioner to represent himself. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a construction supply business that entered into a dispute with City over a project upgrading City's wastewater treatment facility. After City excluded Plaintiff from its list of preapproved material suppliers, Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaration that City's preapproval process violated Iowa's public construction bidding statute and constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. In addition, Plaintiff sought relief under the Open Records Act, claiming that City's significant delay in responding to Plaintiff's open records request violated the Open Records Act. The district court rejected each of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment dismissing Plaintiff's public biding and constitutional claims, as (i) Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge City's preapproval process, and (ii) Plaintiff's constitutional claims failed on the merits; and (2) reversed the district court's ruling denying Plaintiff relief under the open records law, as City's substantial and inadequately explained delay in responding to Plaintiff's open records request violated the law. View "Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of Dyersville" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of his brother as well as obstructing an investigation. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility for parole. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed because Appellant failed to show that, but for his attorneys' alleged errors, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been different; and (2) any error in the admission of statements made by Appellant's sister and girlfriend was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Hawes v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint in district court after making an unsuccessful construction bid to the Town of Thayne City Council, claiming (1) a civil rights violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, (2) that the Town failed to provide an independent observation of the bid evaluation and selection process, and (3) a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed given the deficient brief filed by Appellant and Appellant's failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Call v. Town of Thayne" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a preliminary inunction, plaintiff labor unions claimed that sections 6.007-.010 of Law 222, Puerto Rico's campaign finance law, placed an unconstitutional burden on the union's First Amendment right to engage in political speech. Both the district court and the government declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals issued an appellate injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged provisions of Law 222 pending the final disposition of this appeal. In this opinion the First Circuit outlined the reasons it ordered entry of the appellate injunction, holding, among other things, that it was incumbent upon the district court to engage with the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court also ordered the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain sections of the law. View "Puertorriqueno v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with a witness. In this direct appeal, Defendant contended (1) the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the district court erred in giving jury instructions that incorrectly stated the law; and (3) the prosecutor's closing remarks were so inflammatory that reversal under the plain error standard was warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced and his substantial rights were not affected by the jury instructions; and (3) the prosecutor's comments did not prejudice Defendant.

Torrance Bunch and Fernando Sanchez-Garcia were each convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The jury also found Bunch guilty of three counts of distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, Bunch alleged that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Sanchez-Garcia contended that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and committed other trial-related errors. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by repeatedly rejecting all options except self-representation, after having been warned of the consequences, Bunch necessarily chose self-representation, and thus, the district court's ruling did not violate Bunch's rights under the Sixth Amendment; (2) the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were not improper, and thus Sanchez-Garcia was not entitled to a mistrial; (3) the district court did not commit plain error by proceeding with a joint trial; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a recording of a telephone call into evidence.

Defendant appealed his convictions of four counts of child enticement after the circuit court declined to suppress an incriminating statement Defendant made to police officers who were conducting a follow up investigation of incriminating admissions that Defendant made to his probation agent during a compelled polygraph examination. Defendant claimed that his admissions to the agent were subject to use and derivative use immunity, and that the derivative use immunity covered the subsequent statement he made to the police, even though this statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's statement to officers was subject to derivative use immunity and could not be used in any subsequent criminal trial; and (2) Defendant's compelled statement to his probation agent, his subsequent statement to the police, and any evidence derived from either statement must be suppressed in any criminal trial.

Plaintiff Paul Braunstein, the owner and operator of an Arizona engineering and land surveying firm that previously performed work for the Arizona Department of Transportation, sought damages based on Arizona's use of an affirmative action program in its award of a 2005 transportation engineering contract. The district court concluded that Braunstein lacked standing to seek damages in this equal protection suit because he never demonstrated that the challenged affirmative action program affected him personally or impeded his ability to compete for subcontracting work. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Braunstein lacked standing; but (2) the district court erred in awarding Defendants attorneys' fees and imposing sanctions against Braunstein's attorneys for unreasonably prolonging the proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of the assault of another inmate. He retained trial counsel to pursue his appeal of right, but the attorney failed to timely file. He filed delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit. The Michigan Supreme Court denied appeal. Defendant pursued state collateral proceedings and filed a motion for relief in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to timely pursue appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the higher courts denied subsequent applications for leave to appeal the denial. The district court conditionally granted a habeas petition, finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely pursue appeal of right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed with no further showing. Appellate review of the denial of collateral relief is not a sufficient substitute for direct appeal; an applicant denied leave to appeal does not receive the benefit of oral argument, nor does the defendant have a right to appointed counsel on post-conviction review.