Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Construction Law
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The Supreme Court withdrew its opinion issued on January 24, 2018 in this case and substituted this opinion in its place, holding that the circuit court properly denied Appellant’s motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851.Appellant’s motion sought relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The Supreme Court held that Appellant’s valid waiver of postconviction proceedings and counsel in 2008 precluded him from claiming a right to relief under Hurst. Moreover, even if Appellant’s postconviction waiver did not preclude him from raising a Hurst claim, Hurst would not apply retroactively to Appellant’s sentence of death. View "Trease v. State" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from a grant of summary judgment against Plaintiff-Appellant Parker Excavating, Inc. (“PEI”) on its civil rights claim against Defendants-Appellees Lafarge West, Inc. (“Lafarge”), Martin Marietta Minerals, Inc. (“MMM”), and Nick Guerra, an employee of Lafarge and MMM. Lafarge, a construction company, was the primary contractor on a paving project for Pueblo County, Colorado (“the County”). PEI, a Native American-owned construction company, was a subcontractor for Lafarge. MMM replaced Lafarge as the primary contractor. PEI’s participation in the project was terminated before it entered into a new subcontract with MMM. PEI alleged Lafarge retaliated against it with a letter of reprimand and a demand to sign letters of apology after PEI Vice President Greg Parker complained that County employees discriminated against PEI on the basis of its Native American ownership. In separate orders, the district court granted summary judgment on PEI’s 42 U.S.C 1981 retaliation claim to: (1) MMM and Guerra, because PEI could not show its opposition to County employees’ discrimination was “protected” opposition under section 1981; and (2) Lafarge, because PEI could not show Lafarge took an adverse action against it. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Parker Excavating v. LaFarge West" on Justia Law

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Demien, the unsuccessful bidder for the construction of a new firehouse, filed suit against the District under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District violated federal and state constitutional rights, as well as state law, in the bidding process. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that it need only determine whether Damien has Article III standing under Federal law and not whether Damien has standing under Missouri law. Determining that Demien has Article III standing, the court concluded that Demien has abandoned its claims under the First Amendment by failing to argue them before the district court, and that Demien failed to allege that the District deprived Demien of any entitlement, and so it failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court concluded that, under Missouri law, there is no property right to the lowest bidder, and standing to bring a state court claim of deprivation of property rights does not establish a protected property interest. In this case, the District stated that it may accept the lowest bid, but does not need to. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Demien Construction Co. v. O'Fallon Fire Protection Dist." on Justia Law

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Keepers appealed, and the City cross-appealed, from partial summary judgment awards. At issue are two questions related to Chapter 2.3 of Milford’s municipal code, which regulates “adult‐oriented establishments.” First, whether the district court improperly considered the affidavit of the police chief in granting partial summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” in considering the affidavit and therefore affirmed as to this issue. Second, whether the City’s requirement that sexually oriented businesses publicly post the names of their operators, officers, and significant owners violates the First Amendment. The court concluded that the district court should not have reached the merits of that issue, nor does this Court do so, because Keepers’ First Amendment challenge does not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Even if Keepers originally had standing to challenge the public‐posting requirement based on its asserted right against compelled speech, the case has become moot on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated as to this issue and remanded with directions. View "Keepers Inc. v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Amtrak, alleging that it discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and District of Columbia law. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak. After the engine plaintiff was driving passed a stop signal at the rail yard and was forced off the rails by a safety derailer, Amtrak fired him and suspended his engineer certificate. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that no jury could reasonably conclude based on the evidence in the record that Amtrak was motivated by plaintiff's race to take the adverse actions of which he complains. View "Burley v. Nat'l Passenger Rail Corp." on Justia Law

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Dunnet, a highway construction company, is prequalified to bid and work on Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) projects and competes for federally assisted highway construction contracts. Dunnet is owned and controlled by two white males. Between 2007 and 2009, its average annual gross receipts were over $52 million. To receive federal-aid funds for highway contracts, IDOT must have a “disadvantaged business enterprise” (DBE) participation program. A DBE is a for-profit small business concern that is at least 51% owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. There is a rebuttable presumption that women and members of racial minority groups are socially and economically disadvantaged, but an individual owner of any race or gender may qualify as “socially and economically disadvantaged.” A firm is not an eligible DBE if the firm (including affiliates) has had average annual gross receipts over its previous three fiscal years, greater than $22.41 million. Illinois has not met its DBE participation goals. Dunnet was denied a goal waiver and was not awarded a major expressway project. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting Dunnet’s claim that IDOT’s DBE Program discriminates on the basis of race, concluding that Dunnet lacked standing to raise an equal protection challenge based on race and that the Program survived the constitutional and other challenges. View "Dunnet Bay Constr. Co. v. Borggren" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit challenging the religious exemption in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Plaintiff also argued that the Administration’s decision to temporarily suspend enforcement of some of the Act’s requirements for a transitional period deprived him of the equal protection of the laws. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss and held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring either claim. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff lacks standing to assert his equal protection claim because nothing in the transitional policy requires him to buy insurance. In this case, plaintiff's inability to maintain his old plan was the independent choice of his insurer. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff did have standing to bring his Establishment Clause challenge. On the merits, the court concluded that the claim fails because the qualifications for exemption are not drawn on sectarian lines. Rather, they simply sort out which faiths have a proven track record of adequately meeting the statutory goals. Moreover, the exemption promotes the Establishment Clause’s concerns by ensuring that those without religious objections do not bear the financial risk and price of care for those who exempt themselves from the tax. As configured by this specific statutory framework, that is an objective, non-sectarian basis for cabining the exemption’s reach. View "Cutler v. HHS" on Justia Law

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Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony theft. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to deprive; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed no sanction for the State’s discovery violation; (3) the district court erred when when it allowed evidence of Defendant’s prior felony conviction, but the error was harmless; (4) the district court did not commit plain error when it prohibited defense counsel from questioning a police officer about Defendant’s “nonstatements” made during his interview following his arrest; and (5) Defendant waived his right to challenge the district court’s response to the jury question under the invited error doctrine. View "Toth v. State" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Miller sought to build a four-unit condominium project on her Monona lot. The process stalled while Miller bought another lot, amended the plan, and abated an unexpected asbestos problem. She had unsuccessful negotiations with her neighbor, a former mayor, who trespassed on her property at the direction of city officials and took photographs for use at a planning commission meeting to oppose her project. Citations were issued for creating a public nuisance and working without a proper permit; the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issued a “stop work” order because of asbestos; Miller was required to erect a fence; and she was told that weeds were too high and was ordered to remove various structures. A court rejected three out of four citations issued against her, stating that, although “some of the efforts to enforce compliance were unreasonable,” Miller had not pointed to any similarly situated person who had been treated differently. Monona refused to adjust the taxes on Miller’s property to reflect the demolitions. Officials continued to trespass by parking cars on her property. In 2010, Miller filed suit, asserting equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, finding that Miller had not identified a suitable comparator and that there was no evidence that Miller had been treated unfairly because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting conceivable rational reasons for various actions and requirements. View "Miller v. City of Monona" on Justia Law