Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Nueces County and Wellpath for “County/Municipal Liability” under Section 1983. Specifically, he alleged that the county was liable because it “sanctioned the custom, practice, and/or policy or procedure of failing to protect and/or ignoring the serious medical needs of those entrusted to [its] care.” The original claim was not specific about how Wellpath was supposedly liable. The county and Wellpath moved to dismiss. The district court granted both motions but permitted Martinez to file a “Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against Nueces County and the denial of leave to amend as to Wellpath.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Plaintiff had not properly alleged a custom or policy that was the moving force of his injuries, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims against Nueces County. Further, the court found that from the face of Plaintiff’s pleadings, there is no reason to conclude that Wellpath, at an organization-wide level, had a policy of deliberate indifference that was the moving force of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation at the Nueces County Jail. This is doubly so because of Plaintiff’s failure to allege, with sufficient detail, what happened to him at the jail. View "Martinez v. Nueces County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a civil rights action against two Orangeburg County, South Carolina sheriff’s deputies (collectively, the “Defendants”). As a pro se plaintiff, Plaintiff received repeated notice of the requirement to inform the court of any change in her address immediately. After Plaintiff failed to provide an updated address, she did not receive the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation filed in her case. Accordingly, she missed deadlines to file objections to the Report and Recommendation and to note an appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the time to note an appeal, giving her fourteen days to do so. Yet, by the time Plaintiff re-filed her notice of appeal as permitted by the district court below, her appeal was already pending in the Fourth Circuit. At issue in this appeal is what it means to “receive notice” for purposes of a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time to note an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the circumstances warrant the exercise of discretion to reopen the time for Plaintiff’s appeal. The court found that because Plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the entry of judgment in her case, the first of Rule 4(a)(6)’s three statutory requirements for reopening the time for appeal has been met. Further, the court found that the remaining requirements 4 of Rule 4(a)(6) have been satisfied as well. View "Melodie Shuler v. Orangeburg County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

Samia, Hunter, and Stillwell were tried jointly for the murder-for-hire of Lee, a real estate broker. The prosecution argued that Hunter had hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as buyers and visit properties with Lee. The court admitted Stillwell’s confession that he was in the van in which Lee was killed, but he claimed that Samia had shot Lee. Since Stillwell would not be testifying and the full confession implicated Samia, the prosecution introduced the testimony of a DEA agent, who described Stillwell’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s name while avoiding obvious indications of redaction. Before that testimony and again before deliberations, the court instructed the jury that the testimony about Stillwell’s confession was admissible only as to Stillwell and should not be considered as to Samia or Hunter. All three were convicted. The Second Circuit held that the admission of Stillwell’s confession did not violate Samia’s Confrontation Clause rights.The Supreme Court affirmed. The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testimonial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously but applies only to witnesses “against the accused.” Ordinarily, a witness at a joint trial is not considered a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant. This rule is consistent with the Clause’s text, historical practice, and the law’s reliance on limiting instructions in other contexts. To mandate severance whenever the prosecution wishes to introduce the confession of a non-testifying codefendant in a joint trial would be “too high” a price to pay. View "Samia v. United States" on Justia Law

Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U.S. citizenship through “adult adoption,” earning nearly $2 million from his fraudulent scheme. The government charged Hansen under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” The Ninth Circuit found Clause (iv) unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment.The Supreme Court reversed. Because 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Here, Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (capturing only a narrow band of speech) not as those terms are used in ordinary conversation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The context of these words and statutory history indicate that Congress intended to refer to their well-established legal meanings. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review. View "Amaya v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify. View "Corridore v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellants, individual protestors and Black Lives Matter D.C. brought consolidated actions against federal law enforcement officers, alleging that officers’ actions in clearing protestors from Lafayette Park in June 2020 violated their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellees, former Attorney General Barr and various named U.S. Park Police officers moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that a Bivens remedy is unavailable in this context. The district court granted the motions.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that, in applying Supreme Court precedent, Appellants’ claims arise in a new context and that special factors counsel hesitation against extending the availability of Bivens claims to that context. The court explained that it did not reach Appellees’ other special factors arguments regarding the availability of alternative remedies, congressional involvement in the intersection between presidential security and protestors’ rights, the political branches’ activity in investigating the events underlying Appellants’ claims, and the risk that discovery might expose “sensitive Executive Branch communications between high-ranking officials.” View "Radiya Buchanan v. William Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is serving a life sentence in Georgia and is in the custody of the GDC. As an inmate, his communications with those on the outside are governed by GDC policies and regulations. In 2018, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. His complaint named the GDC Commissioner, and Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar—the GDC analysts who had intercepted his emails in September and October of 2017—as defendants. It did not name Ms. Keen—the GDC analyst who intercepted the email to the Aleph Institute in February of 2018—as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit, on Plaintiff’s due process claims, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that Plaintiff had a First Amendment liberty interest in his outgoing emails. As a result, he was entitled to procedural safeguards when his emails in September and October of 2017 were intercepted. Although Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s requests for damages on the due process claims, those claims must be tried by a jury. The requests for declaratory relief on the due process claims are not barred by qualified or sovereign immunity, and a reasonable jury could find that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. With respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims relating to the forwarding and inmate information policies, the court affirmed. View "Ralph Harrison Benning v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law