Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hess, a 17-year-old student, was required to participate in a ride-along with Hammond Officer Garcia. Her complaint describes a day-long sequence of inappropriate comments and questions punctuated by unwelcome physical sexual contact. Garcia allegedly rubbed his arm against her breast, repeatedly placed his hand on Hess’s thigh, put his hand on her buttocks, stated that Hess wanted to become a prostitute, and, while in a secluded location, asked another officer if he wanted to have sex with Hess. After Hess’s ride along, another female classmate participated in the course-required ride with Garcia. When the classmate told Hess that Garcia had acted inappropriately, the girls reported their experiences.Hess sued Garcia and Chief Doughty in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Doughty for lack of allegations of the requisite level of involvement in the alleged violations. The court reversed the dismissal of the claim against Garcia. It is well established that sexual assault by a government official acting under the color of law can violate the Equal Protection Clause as sex discrimination, the Fourth Amendment right “of the people to be secure in their persons,” and the right to bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause. The court rejected arguments that the alleged conduct was simply “boorish” and not serious enough to implicate the Constitution. Sexual assault is an intentional act that never serves a legitimate governmental purpose. View "Hess v. Garcia" on Justia Law

This case arose from events involving Defendant-appellant David Bradshaw, a sheriff’s deputy who was off duty, out of uniform, and driving his personal vehicle with his child in the front passenger seat. After a vehicle being driven by Plaintiff-appellant Mario Rosales legally passed Bradshaw, Bradshaw decided to follow Rosales. He then declined backup assistance from another deputy, followed Rosales all the way home, blocked Rosales in his driveway, and began shouting and yelling at Rosales, all before identifying himself as law enforcement. In response, Rosales became afraid and exited his vehicle with a legal and openly carried gun in his pants pocket, intending to protect himself and his property but also to deescalate the situation. Bradshaw, however, continued to shout and pointed his gun at Rosales. Though Rosales feared being shot, he remained calm and nonthreatening throughout the encounter. When Bradshaw eventually identified himself as law enforcement and told Rosales to put his gun back in his vehicle, Rosales complied, and the encounter wound down from there. As a result of this incident, Bradshaw’s employment was terminated, and he was convicted in state court of aggravated assault and child endangerment. Rosales then filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging in part that Bradshaw violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court granted Bradshaw’s motion to dismiss, ruling that he was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law when he unreasonably pointed his gun at Rosales. The critical distinguishing fact, for the district court, was that Rosales was armed. The Tenth Circuit reversed: Bradshaw violated Rosales’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and his "egregious and unlawful conduct was obviously unconstitutional. Bradshaw is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity, and Rosales’s § 1983 claim against him may proceed." View "Rosales v. Bradshaw, et al." on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Project Veritas sued the Oregon Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, and the District Attorney of Multnomah County, Oregon, Michael Schmidt (collectively, Oregon), challenging section 165.540 as an unconstitutional restriction of protected speech. Oregon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court partially granted the motion, and the parties agreed to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice. Project Veritas appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The law provides two exceptions relevant to this appeal: (1) section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to a person who records a conversation during a felony that endangers human life, and (2) section 165.540(1)(c) allows a person to record a conversation in which a law enforcement officer is a participant if the recording is made while the officer is performing official duties and meets other criteria. Applying Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that section 165.540(1)(c) regulates protected speech (unannounced audiovisual recording) and is content-based because it distinguishes between particular topics by restricting some subject matters (e.g., a state executive officer’s official activities) and not others (e.g., a police officer’s official activities). The panel further determined that section 165.540(1)(c) burdens more speech than is necessary to achieve its stated interest, and there were other ways for Oregon to achieve its interests of protecting conversational privacy. Because section 165.540(1)(c) is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be saved by striking the two exceptions at issue here. View "PROJECT VERITAS, ET AL V. MICHAEL SCHMIDT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, challenges the 300-minute-per-month cap on his phone calls applied by the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff argued that BOP, by applying the policy to him without exemption, unconstitutionally infringes on his First and Fifth Amendment rights to familial association with his three children. Although the district court found that Plaintiff stated plausible First and Fifth Amendment claims, it dismissed his claims as moot after BOP moved Plaintiff between facilities since his complaint did not name the new facility’s warden.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Although the panel agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief were moot as to his two previous wardens who were no longer in a position to grant Plaintiff relief at his present facility, one defendant—BOP’s regional director for the Western Region—still plausibly had the authority to redress his claimed injury by directing his current warden to offer him more phone time. And even if that were not the case, the district court clearly erred by offering Plaintiff no opportunity to amend his complaint to name his current warden since amendment would have resolved the sole stated ground for dismissal.   Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief as to his two former wardens, reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief as to the Regional Director defendant, and held that Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his complaint to add his current warden as a co-defendant. View "KENNETH TIEDEMANN V. BARBARA VON BLANCKENSEE, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and sentence of life without parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error and that there was no reason to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence from the police officers who arrested him; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for a mental impairment jury instruction; (3) testimony by the Commonwealth's fingerprint analysis expert was not improper; and (4) this Court discerns no reason to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to the writ.Appellant was convicted in 1991, following a jury trial, of first-degree murder and kidnapping. Decades later, Appellant filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Appellant claimed that Chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, created a substantive right that must be retroactively applied under the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that this Court had consistently rejected as without merit the claim that chapter 2017-1 created a substantive right that must be retroactively applied, and Appellant's arguments did not compel departing from precedent. View "Arbelaez v. State" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Tennessee law enforcement was alerted to a drug distribution operation and executed a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of over 200 grams of pure meth. Agents executed additional warrants and intercepted phone calls. Twelve individuals, including Reed and Brown, were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of meth. According to trial testimony by the law-enforcement agents, Brown and Reed both admitted to purchasing meth on numerous occasions and named several others. Four co-conspirators testified at trial. The parties agreed, and the judge confirmed, that Brown should not be mentioned during testimony to avoid the possibility of incriminating him. An officer read directly from his report, inadvertently mentioning Brown before stopping midsentence. Brown’s counsel made no objection. A joint stipulation was entered regarding the quantity and purity of the meth seized from various codefendants. No meth was seized from either Brown or Reed, who asked the district court to instruct the jury that “a conspiracy requires more than just a buyer-seller relationship.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Brown and Reed but vacated their 360-month sentences. The defendants’ request for a buyer-seller jury instruction was appropriately denied. The district court procedurally erred when calculating the defendants’ Guidelines ranges; it provided no basis to conclude that at least 4.5 kilograms of the meth distributed was actual meth. View "Reed v. United States" on Justia Law

Smith, wanting to expand her graphic design business to include wedding websites, worried that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act would require her to create websites celebrating marriages that defy her belief that marriage should be between one man and one woman. Smith intends to produce a story for each couple using her own words and original artwork, combined with the couple’s messages. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Smith’s request for an injunction.The Supreme Court reversed. The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs conveying messages with which the designer disagrees. The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to speak his mind regardless of whether the government considers his speech “misguided.” Generally, the government may not compel a person to speak preferred messages. The wedding websites Smith seeks to create involve her speech and are pure speech protected by the First Amendment. Colorado seeks to put Smith to a choice prohibited by precedent. If she wishes to speak, she must either speak as Colorado demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs.Public accommodations laws are vital to realizing the civil rights of all Americans; governments have a “compelling interest” in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation. States may protect gay persons, just as they protect other classes of individuals. However, public accommodations laws are not immune from the demands of the Constitution. Smith does not seek to sell an ordinary commercial good but intends to create “customized and tailored” expressive speech “to celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding.” Speakers do not shed their First Amendment protections by accepting compensation or employing the corporate form to disseminate their speech. Smith will gladly conduct business with those having protected characteristics when the product she is creating does not violate her beliefs. View "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis" on Justia Law