Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court overruling Appellants' motion to vacate the court's order appointing a receiver for Appellants, holding that the petition filed by Patriots Bank seeking the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Missouri Commercial Receivership Act (MCRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 515.500-515.665, did not violate due process.Bank entered into lending relationships with Appellants, all of which defaulted. Bank filed a petition seeking the appointment of a receiver for Appellants. The circuit court entered the receiver order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Bank complied with the plain language of the MCRA's notice requirement; (2) the application of the MCRA to Appellants' case did not violate the due process protections under either the state or federal constitutions; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellants' motion to vacate the receiver order; and (4) the receiver order did not violate the MCRA. View "Black River Motel, LLC v. Patriots Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of possessing a controlled substance, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 579.015.1, and unlawfully using a weapon while in possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.030.1, holding that Defendant's convictions did not infringe upon his right to be free from double jeopardy.On appeal, Defendant argued that his convictions violated double jeopardy protections because they arose from the same conduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no double jeopardy violation existed because the plain language of the states combined with fundamental principles of statutory interpretation clearly demonstrated the legislature's intent to authorize multiple punishments under sections 579.015 and 571.030.1(11). View "State v. Onyejiaka" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a tenured psychology professor at George Mason University (GMU), appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX, procedural due process, and First Amendment claims against GMU and other defendants sued after he was disciplined for creating a hostile educational environment that amounted to sexual harassment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s erroneous-outcome claim. Such a claim requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that (1) he was subjected to a procedurally flawed or otherwise flawed proceeding; (2) which led to an adverse and erroneous outcome; and (3) involved particular circumstances that suggest ‘gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding. Here, Plaintiff does not connect these generalized pressures to his case in a way that creates a reasonable inference that anti-male bias-motivated GMU’s finding that he sexually harassed his students. Thus, as the district court explained, Plaintiff “has provided no basis from which to infer the existence of bias in his specific proceeding.” Further, Plaintiff’s “allegations of selective enforcement are not supported by any well-pled facts that exist independent of his legal conclusions.” Finally, the court explained that while Plaintiff’s research, publishing, and teaching about sex may qualify as matters of public concern, his contested speech veered well outside his teaching and scholarship into areas of private, personal interest. View "Todd Kashdan v. George Mason University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that when he was a first-year student-athlete at the University of Arizona, his teammates subjected him to frequent “sexual and homophobic bullying” because they perceived him to be gay. He claims that the Arizona Board of Regents and the University of Arizona (“University Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to his claims of sexual harassment and that they retaliated against him in violation of Title IX. He also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two of his coaches (collectively, “Defendant Coaches”). Finally, he sought punitive damages against the Defendant Coaches. The district court dismissed the action.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. The panel held that Title IX bars sexual harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation. The panel held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex-based discrimination under Title IX. The panel held that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the first, third, and fourth elements of his Title IX harassment claim, but the operative complaint failed to allege a deprivation of educational opportunity. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the harassment claim, vacated the portion of the district court’s order denying leave to amend, and remanded for the district court to consider Plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint again, should he renew that request before the district court. The panel held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged that Plaintiff suffered harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation and that Defendants retaliated against him when they failed to investigate his accusations adequately. View "MICHAEL GRABOWSKI V. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellant complaint, filed in 2021, repeated the claims she had made against the defendants in her 2018 complaint. The district court dismissed her 2018 complaint because the D.C. statutory limitations period had run. In both of her complaints Appellant alleged that in 2004, when she was 14 years old and a student at a KIPP charter school in the District of Columbia, one of her teachers began having sexual relations with her. She further alleged that this man continued to abuse her after she enrolled in another school and that they began living together in Maryland. She claimed that she ended her relationship with him in 2009. At issue is whether, as the district court ruled, res judicata barred Appellant’s second action.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the District of Columbia’s Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act went into effect on May 3, 2019. The new and expanded limitations period extends to “the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.” Here, the court held that the district court did not decide whether the old or the new D.C. statute of limitations applied to several of Appellant’s claims. The court wrote that the district court also concluded that its interpretation of the new Act depended on constitutional avoidance, which the DC Circuit determined to be inapplicable. View "Shanique Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corporation" on Justia Law

Three former officers of a local affiliate of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (“AFGE”) filed a lawsuit alleging that AFGE unlawfully retaliated against them for speech protected under Section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Specifically, the former officers challenge AFGE’s imposition of a trusteeship on the local union and their removal from office. The district court granted summary judgment to AFGE as to two officers and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on the merits for AFGE as to the third officer.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a prima facie free speech claim under Section 101(a)(2), then, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in speech protected by LMRDA; (2) she was subject to an adverse action; and (3) that action is causally linked to the protected speech. If the non-movant, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, “fails to make a sufficient showing to establish an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” a court must enter summary judgment against it. Here, the court wrote that Appellants failed to make the requisite showing, and consequently summary judgment was appropriate on their free speech claims. View "Alexander Bastani v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus challenging the decision of the Ohio General Assembly placing a proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the ballot for a special election to be held on August 8, 2023, holding that a writ was warranted in part.In May 2023, the Ohio General Assembly passed a joint resolution to place to placed a proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the ballot for a special election. Relators filed this original action against Secretary of State Frank LaRose and the Ohio Ballot Board arguing that the ballot language and title of the proposed amendment were incomplete and misleading. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding that LaRose's use of the word "any" in reference to "constitutional amendment" in the ballot title was likely to mislead voters, and the ballot board shall reconvene to adopt lawful ballot language that accurately characterizes and explains the definition of "electors" in reference to the petition signature requirements in the proposed amendment. View "State ex rel. One Person One Vote v. Ohio Ballot Bd." on Justia Law

The City of Balch Springs Police Department hired an officer who a jury later convicted of murdering a teenage boy while on duty. Plaintiff (the boy’s father) sued the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the department’s use-of-force policy was constitutional and also that Plaintiff’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary theories of liability lacked factual support.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ultimate judgment. Plaintiff argued that the City’s policy is facially unconstitutional because it contains “no immediacy requirement necessary to justify an officer’s use of deadly force” and because it calls “for an officer to use the officer’s own subjective beliefs in determining whether deadly force was justified.” The court explained that a local government’s official, written policy is itself unconstitutional only if it affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional conduct. The City’s policy passes muster under that standard. It does not affirmatively allow officers to use deadly force absent an immediate threat, and it does not affirmatively allow officers to rely on subjective factors when evaluating whether to use deadly force. Likewise, the prior constitutional violations that Plaintiff relies on are too dissimilar and generalized to establish a pattern. For that reason, Plaintiff cannot show that the City’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary failures (if any) arose from deliberate indifference. In turn, he cannot satisfy Monell’s third element. View "Edwards v. Balch Springs, Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's conviction of attempted murder in the second degree and other crimes, holding that the principles of double jeopardy were violated by Defendant's convictions for brandishing a deadly weapon and wanton endangerment involving Deputy Coty Pierson.Defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, two counts of wanton endangerment, one involving Deputy Pierson and the other involving Jeffrey Barnhouse, and brandishing a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for resentencing, holding (1) the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer should not be set aside; (2) it was plain error for Defendant to have been convicted and sentenced for brandishing and wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson because those crimes were lesser included offenses of the offense of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; and (3) the trial court did not favor the State during Defendant's trial. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the required "substantial threshold showing of insanity" and that his mental illness claims were procedurally barred.On April 19, 2023, the Supreme Court issued a warrant for Petitioner's execution. One month later, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because he was incompetent to be executed under the standard set forth in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and because he was severely mentally ill. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ prohibiting his execution and to appoint a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his incompetency claim and filed a motion for a stay of execution while his incompetency claim was adjudicated. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's habeas petition and overruled as moot his accompanying motion for a stay of execution, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate the substantial threshold showing of insanity required by Panetti and Ford. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. Vandergriff" on Justia Law