Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Before Dante (age 2) died, his aunt, Mercado, filed a report with the Office of Children and Youth Services, which investigated Dante’s welfare. Bowie, who was dating Dante’s mother, was charged with murdering him. In criminal discovery, Bowie got documents from the investigation that were stored in a statewide database. He gave them to Mercado, who believed he was innocent. Mercado, wanting to blame Youth Services for failing to protect her nephew, started a Facebook group, “Justice for Dante.” and posted some of the documents. Bowie was acquitted. In the meantime, York County District Attorney Sunday charged Mercado with violating Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law. The Law makes it a crime to willfully release or permit the release of any information contained in the Statewide child abuse database to persons or agencies not permitted to receive that information. The DA later dismissed the charge,Schrader, Dante’s grandmother, wants to publish documents generated during Youth Services’ investigation to further publicize Youth Services’ failures. She fears that she will be prosecuted if she does so. Invoking the First Amendment, she claimed that the Law is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to her. The district court agreed with the as-applied challenge and preliminarily enjoined the prosecution of Schrader for sharing child-abuse documents concerning Dante. The Third Circuit vacated with instructions to narrow the injunction to eliminate a reference to "other documents" that may come into Schrader's possession. Under the content-focused test, the Law is likely unconstitutional as applied here. View "Schrader v. District Attorney York County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed law enforcement officers violated the Constitution when they responded to a detainee’s epileptic seizure in a jail cell by restraining and tasing him several times. The district court either dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the individual Defendant Officers as to the Section 1983 claims and the grant of summary judgment on the claims for bystander liability. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on municipal liability and on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that the record is insufficient to support a jury question that the use-of-force and ECW policies were so vague that they amounted to no policy at all. These policies “may have been inadequate,” and while a jury might conclude that the City was negligent in not requiring Plaintiffs’ specified actions, “that, of course, is not enough under Section 1983.” The court explained that without evidence showing that the higher level of care was obviously necessary, we cannot see how the jury could conclude that the use-of-force and ECW policies were deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, there was no substantial evidence that such a policy would obviously lead to the violation of pre-trial detainees’ constitutional rights. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs cite no binding caselaw in which liability under the ADA and RA has been extended to a context similar to this one. View "Austin v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

On the night of May 6, 2020, Lisby, eight months pregnant, and Lewis walked along the shoulder of State Road 37 in Indianapolis to get back to their motel. Indianapolis Officer Henderson was driving to work in his police vehicle on the same road, at 78 miles per hour, 33 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. He illegally changed lanes over a solid white line and his vehicle partially crossed the fog line onto the shoulder of the road. Henderson struck Lisby without seeing her while still traveling at 55 miles per hour. Lisby was transported to a hospital, where she was pronounced dead. Lisby and Lewis’s child was born at the hospital by emergency Cesarian section but died shortly after delivery. Henderson was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a police officer when he killed Lisby.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Henderson. The complaint failed to plead sufficient facts plausibly suggesting that Henderson acted with the criminal recklessness necessary to establish a due process violation. View "Lisby v. Henderson" on Justia Law

According to the complaint, Plaintiff John Jordan alleged he was thrown to the ground and arrested for criticizing the police. Moments before the arrest, Jordan stood across the street from Deputies Michael Donnellon and Chad Jenkins listening as the Deputies questioned his nephew about a car accident involving a truck owned by Jordan’s company. Jordan grew frustrated with what he was hearing and started criticizing the two Deputies. The Deputies retaliated with their own disparaging remarks about Jordan. Eventually, Deputy Jenkins became fed up with Jordan’s criticisms and performed a takedown maneuver on Jordan, placing him under arrest for obstruction of justice. As relevant to this appeal, Jordan sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force. The magistrate judge granted the Deputies’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and dismissed each of these claims. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded granting summary judgment to the Deputies was improper: under the "Graham" factors, it was clearly established that the takedown maneuver utilized by the Deputies here was excessive as applied to Jordan at the time of his arrest. View "Jordan v. Adams County Sheriff's Office, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her friend, both dressed in “sexy cop” costumes, posed with pedestrians on the Strip and accepted tips in exchange for photos. Defendant police officers, working a plain-clothes Strip enforcement assignment, arrested Plaintiff and her friend for doing business without a license after the officers were asked to pay a tip or delete a photo. The charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dropped. Plaintiff sued various people involved in her arrest, asserting eleven federal and state causes of action. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for injuries suffered during detention and attorney’s fees. The district court granted the Officers’ summary judgment motion and denied Plaintiff’s.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing, denying a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the opinion filed on May 24, 2017; and (2) an amended opinion reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel concluded that the First Amendment protections accorded to Plaintiff’s own activities did not lapse because of what her friend said or did without Plaintiff’s direct participation. There was no evidence at all, for example, of a prior agreement between the women to require a quid-pro-quo payment for posing in photos, nor of a demonstrated pattern of demanding quid-pro-quo payments during performances together. The panel held that the district court erred by deciding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff despite the First Amendment protections afforded to her expressive association. View "MICHELE SANTOPIETRO V. CLAYBORN HOWELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to the City of Kingston’s prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the Common Council held at Kingston City Hall. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Common Council meetings are limited public fora in which the City is permitted to reasonably restrict speech that undermines the purpose for which the forum had been opened. The district court granted the City’s motion, noting that government entities are permitted to regulate the manner in which the public participates in limited public fora. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the City’s sign prohibition was unreasonable in light of the potential disruption or distraction that signs at Common Council meetings might pose.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Complaint itself and common sense offer a satisfactory rationale for the City’s sign prohibition, which undermines Plaintiffs’ assertions of unreasonableness. To be sure, there may be cases where restrictions on the form or manner of speech—including the use of signs—in a limited public forum would be unreasonable, but Plaintiffs have not pled such facts here. View "Tyler v. Kingston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree for the killing of Brandy Waryasz on theories of premeditation and felony-murder and murder in the first degree for the killing of Dane Anthony Hall, on a theory of felony-murder, but reversed his conviction for armed robbery, holding that the conviction must be dismissed as duplicative of the felony-murder conviction.Defendant attacked Waryasz while she was working at a gas station by tightly wrapping a ligature around her neck. Waryasz, who was seven months pregnant with Hall, died from a constricted airflow, killing her son within minutes of his mother. Defendant was indicted for two murders and armed robbery and convicted on all charges. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial, which the superior court denied. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree but vacated and set aside the armed robbery conviction, holding (1) as to Defendant's murder convictions, he was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error, and there was no ground for granting relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E; and (2) the armed robbery conviction was duplicative of the felony-murder conviction for the killing of Hall and therefore must be dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Plaintiff argued that LeBlanc violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion. LeBlanc argued that this complaint did not adequately allege the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees “ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Plaintiff that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Further, the court held that there is sufficient clearly established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from prison and that Plaintiff has sufficiently argued a violation of the right. Accordingly, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court agreed they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had fair warning’ that his failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like Plaintiff their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction. View "Parker v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Coopwood has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was institutionalized several times from 2010-2017. On August 13, 2017, Coopwood (six months pregnant) stopped taking her antipsychotic medications because of concerns about potential effects on the fetus. Coopwood fatally stabbed her mother and was ultimately found “guilty but mentally ill.”In pretrial custody, Coopwood, not taking her antipsychotic medications, was repeatedly screened and denied any history of mental health treatment. Employees, aware of Coopwood’s history of inpatient psychiatric care, did not raise concerns. Coopwood alleges that, in August 2017, Jailer Watts dragged her to her cell and kicked Coopwood in the stomach, after which she suffered cramping with a bloody discharge from her vagina. She was hospitalized several times in August and September. On October 19, she was seen by a psychiatrist, Haddad, who determined that Coopwood had been psychotic for an unknown period and seemed unaware of her circumstances. On October 22, Coopwood, exhibiting bizarre behavior, was forcibly given antipsychotic medications. She was readmitted on November 8, reporting contractions. Labor was induced. Coopwood’s baby was stillborn. Coopwood contends that she attempted to file a grievance but that her verbal requests were ignored.Coopwood’s suit, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her medical needs, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants failed to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Jail’s staff thwarted Coopwood’s attempts to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Coopwood v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff argues that former Broward County Public Defender Howard Finkelstein fired her from her position as a public defender in violation of her First Amendment rights. Finkelstein fired Plaintiff after she made public comments during her campaign to replace Finkelstein, who was not seeking reelection. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed on a political podcast that Finkelstein played golf rather than work, did not hire racial minorities or support black social justice organizations, and had used illegal drugs while practicing law earlier in his career. Based on these comments, Finkelstein terminated Plaintiff's employment after the primary election, which Plaintiff had lost to another employee of the office. The district court granted summary judgment to Finkelstein. It concluded that many of Plaintiff’s statements about Finkelstein were eligible for First Amendment protection because they were made on matters of public concern. But, balancing Plaintiff’s interests against her employer’s interests, the district court concluded that her interest in making these statements did not outweigh the government’s interest in the effective management of the public defender’s office.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s termination cannot support a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The court wrote that it is yet to consider whether and how a public employee’s political campaign to replace her supervisor impacts her interest in criticizing that supervisor. Although the court recognized that an employee seeking public office has a strong interest in criticizing the elected official currently holding that position, the court believes the employer’s interest in effective management outweighs the employee’s interest when the employee’s criticisms are likely to frustrate the employer’s mission. View "Ruby Green v. Howard Finkelstein, et al" on Justia Law