Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This litigation challenges the bail practices of one Louisiana parish. The claim is that money bail is required for pretrial detainees without consideration of alternatives, violating the rights of indigents to substantive due process and equal protection. The district court denied all relief.   The Fifth Circuit held that abstention is mandated and remanded in order that the district court may dismiss the suit. The court explained that Texas courts are neither unable nor unwilling to reconsider bail determinations under the proper circumstances, thus providing state court detainees the chance to raise federal claims without the need to come to federal court. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Louisiana is unable or unwilling to reconsider bail determinations. How quickly those can be reconsidered is irrelevant because “arguments about delay and timeliness pertain not to the adequacy of a state proceeding, but rather to ‘conventional claims of bad faith.’” View "Little v. Doguet" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an aspiring sidewalk counselor, brought a First Amendment challenge to Westchester County’s recently enacted “bubble zone” law, which makes it illegal to approach within eight feet of another person for the purpose of engaging in “oral protest, education, or counseling” when inside a one-hundred-foot radius of a reproductive health care facility. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff lacks standing to mount a pre-enforcement challenge to the bubble zone law and that, in any event, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) forecloses her First Amendment claim.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of standing. The court nevertheless affirmed the judgment on the merits because the district court correctly concluded that Hill is dispositive of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Plaintiff has standing to seek pre-enforcement relief because she has pleaded sufficient facts to support a credible threat that Westchester County will enforce the bubble zone law if she pursues her stated intention to engage in sidewalk counseling. View "Vitagliano v. County of Westchester" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s criminal history included a 1998 guilty plea to felony mail fraud. After maintaining an otherwise clean record for 24 years, he decided he wanted a gun. But 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) bars gun possession for anyone who, like Plaintiff, has a conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” So he brought this suit under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A to challenge the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as the law applied to him. Relying on pre-Bruen framework, The district court granted a motion from the government and dismissed the case.   The Seventh Circuit remanded to allow the district court to undertake the Bruen analysis. The court explained the parties may be unable altogether to find answers to certain questions, may find incomplete information in response to others, and perhaps in some instances, may identify substantial historical information pertinent to one or another dimension of the required inquiry. In the end, the district court will have to give the best answer available to whether the government has carried its burden of “affirmatively proving that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” View "Patrick Atkinson v Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the superior court convicting Defendant following a jury trial for larceny of an automobile and adjudicating him a probation violator, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence collected as a result of a warrantless search of his real-time cell-site location information (CSLI). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the acquisition of real-time CSLI qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment for which a warrant is required; (2) any error in the trial justice's determination that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied to the facts of this case was harmless; (3) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion to exclude certain testimony, and any error in allowing other testimony to be admitted at trial was harmless; and (4) Defendant waived his last argument for appeal. View "State v. Sinapi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to suppress the results of a search of Defendant, holding that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant, and therefore, the underlying search was a lawful search incident to arrest.A police officer executed a traffic stop of Defendant for speeding and, during her initial contact with Defendant, "detected an odor of raw marijuana." The officer called for back-up, and two officers escorted Defendant out of the vehicle. The officers proceeded to search Defendant based on the odor of marijuana and found two baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the State lacked probable cause to arrest and search him. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant on the belief that he was committing or had committed a crime, and therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Baton Rouge police officer, sued Defendant, the organizer of a protest after Plaintiff was seriously injured by a protestor at a protest Defendant arranged. After a lengthy procedural history, the case came back to the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed that state law recognizes a negligence cause of action in the circumstances alleged in Plaintiff's complaint.In turn, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim. Additionally, due to these developments, the district court also erred in failing to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Otherwise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims. View "Doe v. Mckesson, et al" on Justia Law

Believing that two men were about to engage in the armed robbery of a gas station, defendant police officers ("Defendants") approached the Plaintiff's’ vehicle with guns pointed and forcibly removed him. The district court denied the Defendants' claim to qualified immunity, and the Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, it was not clearly established that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur. Second, clearly established law did not prevent the officers from suspecting Plaintiff might be armed. Here, Defendants believed Plaintiff was about to commit and armed robbery, which is a crime typically involving the use of a weapon. Nothing gave the panel any reason to second guess the officer's "on the ground" determination.The court also rejected Plainitff's claim that it was a violation of a clearly established right to point a firearm at the Plaintiff and demand he exits his vehicle without first identifying themselves as law enforcement. View "DEJUAN HOPSON V. JACOB ALEXANDER, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs and entering judgment on Defendant's plea of guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Defendant was pulled over by a New Hampshire police officer, Stephen DiChiara, following a suspected drug buy. DiChiara was asked to conduct the stop by a United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) task force officer, DiChiara stoped and seized the car Defendant was driving. A subsequent search of the car revealed uncovered roughly one kilogram of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, arguing that DiChiara could not act solely on the DEA officer's probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the directive given to DiChiara was sufficient to attribute the DEA officer's probable cause to DiChiara. View "United States v. Balser" on Justia Law