Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After receiving a long suspension, Jacob Doe sued Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”) and several university officials, alleging that Virginia Tech’s Title IX investigation, hearing, and appeal process denied him due process of law. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding that he hadn’t alleged a cognizable liberty or property interest in his continuing education.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed for a different reason. The court held that even assuming Doe has such an interest, he hasn’t alleged that he was deprived of it without sufficient process. The court wrote that Doe complains that his witnesses couldn’t appear in person at the hearing because it was held during the summer. But he doesn’t allege that the witnesses weren’t able to provide testimony by phone, video, or in writing. Nor does Doe claim he sought to continue the hearing until his witnesses were available. And Doe admits that the investigator interviewed his witnesses during her investigation into Roe, and the allegations against Roe were adjudicated at the same hearing. So these allegations too, don’t rise to the level of a due-process violation.   Moreover, the court explained that to find that Doe alleged a due-process violation on this sparse record, the court would have to hold that university students have a right—in effectively every disciplinary hearing—to advance notice of the evidence to be presented against them. The ask is even more striking here because Doe doesn’t allege that he sought a continuance or that Virginia Tech relied on the surprise testimony. Therefore, the court rejected Doe’s claim of error. View "Jacob Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universit" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco voters amended their city charter to authorize voting in local school board elections by noncitizen parents and guardians of school-age children. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors enacted an ordinance implementing Proposition N, including provisions requiring the City’s Department of Elections to develop a noncitizen voter registration form for school board elections. In 2022, after multiple school board elections in which noncitizens voted, this lawsuit was brought alleging the charter amendment violated the California Constitution. The trial court granted found the effective ordinance void and unenforceableThe court of appeal reversed and awarded the city costs. Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor its history prohibits legislation expanding the electorate to noncitizens. The relevant constitutional provisions authorizing home rule permit charter cities to implement such an expansion in local school board elections. This authority is consistent with the principles underlying home rule and permits the voters of each charter city to determine whether it is good policy for their city or not. View "Lacy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Nichols, charged with sex trafficking, faced a life sentence. Two attorneys with extensive experience were appointed as defense counsel. Months later, Nichols filed a pro se motion, challenging their representation. The judge warned Nichols about the perils of self-representation and stated: I am not giving you another lawyer. After an extended conversation, the attorneys were appointed standby counsel. Nichols objected, stating: “Courts are forcing me to go pro se.” At Nichols's request, the court ordered a competency evaluation. Dr. Goldstein spent 14 hours with Nichols and found Nichols competent to stand trial and to proceed pro se, indicating that his disorders are behavioral, not mental. Nichols twice refused to appear. The court repeatedly reviewed why Nichols should not represent himself but held that Nichols had constructively waived the right to counsel. A second expert, Dr. Fields, was unable to complete any test because of Nichols’s obstreperous behavior and relied on an interview with Nichols to conclude that Nichols’s competency was “not diminished by a severe emotional disorder.” It was Fields’s “clinical sense” that Nichols’s “lack of willingness to work” with counsel rendered him incompetent. At a competency hearing, the government introduced recorded jail calls in which Nichols indicated that he was delaying the proceedings. The court found Nichols competent. Nichols stated, “I’m not working with anybody.”Nichols was convicted and accepted the assistance of counsel before sentencing. A third competency evaluation concluded that Nichols was competent. The court imposed a within-Guidelines life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “District courts are not permitted to foist counsel upon competent defendants.” View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

The Kailins called the Gurnee Police Department to report that their daughter had been the victim of possible criminal conduct. Officer Greer arrived at their house around 8 p.m. to follow up. Six seconds after Kailin opened the door, Greer shot the Kailins’ dog, Timber, on their neighbor’s lawn. The Kailins sued, asserting illegal seizure, 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officer Greer, a “Monell” claim of municipal liability, and a claim for indemnification by the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court noted the Kailins’ assertions, “that Timber never barked nor growled at Greer” and that Timber was "simply playing” but concluded that the video from the body-worn camera controlled and eliminated any dispute of fact.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The question of what Timber was doing and how she was behaving is key to determining the reasonableness of Greer’s actions and therefore to liability on all claims. This is not the rare case where the video definitively demonstrates what occurred. There is no audio to reveal whether Timber was growling or barking as Greer alleged. The entire video lasts only six seconds; it is disputable whether the dog can be seen at any time in the video until she has been shot. View "Kailin v. Village of Gurnee" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Sherwood and Doyle lost their jobs because of the COVID-19 pandemic and applied for unemployment benefits. They never received those benefits, however, and still have not received notice of the denial of their claims or an opportunity for a hearing. Sherwood and Doyle filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES), asserting equal protection and procedural due process claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Under the “Young doctrine,” which provides an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, private parties may sue individual state officials for prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law. Even if these plaintiffs had standing to bring the equal protection claims, sovereign immunity bars them; the Young exception does not apply when federal law has been violated only at one time or over a period of time in the past. The plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury to pursue their procedural due process claims and can invoke the Young exception to sovereign immunity but mandamus provides an adequate state-law remedy in this case. View "Sherwood v. Marchiori" on Justia Law

Whitfield was scheduled for discharge from Menard Correctional Center in January 2010, to begin a term of mandatory supervised release. On that day, prison officials handed Whitfield only the signature page of a document called the “Electronic Detention Program Agreement.” That page stated that “the following conditions of the Program apply only to sex offender cases.” Whitfield was not a sex offender and objected to signing the Agreement without an explanation from a prison official clarifying why he, a non-sex offender, had to sign a form designed exclusively for sex offenders. Whitfield’s objections were rejected. Four times, clinical services supervisor Spiller directed Whitfield to sign the form. After his continued refusal, she issued a disciplinary ticket for failure to follow a direct order. Whitfield was transferred to disciplinary segregation; the Illinois Prisoner Review Board held a hearing and found he had violated the terms of his supervised release. His eligibility for supervised release was revoked. Whitfield remained in custody for another 18 months.Whitfield sued Spiller, other Menard officials, and Board members, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case has narrowed to Whitfield’s claims against Spiller and then-warden Gaetz for First and Eighth Amendment violations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly granted the defendants summary judgment on some claims, but that Whitfield has sufficient evidence that Spiller’s conduct violated his First Amendment rights. View "Whitfield v. Cowan" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute required the automatic suspension of residents’ driver’s licenses if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. in 2016, a group of indigent Virginians who lost their licenses when they were unable to pay court debts initiated a putative class action against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s license-suspension scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs raised several claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: that the statute’s requirement of automatic suspension without notice or a hearing violated their procedural due process rights; and that the statute’s enforcement against those who were unable, not unwilling, to pay violated both their substantive due process rights and their equal protection rights. As relief, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the statute’s enforcement and requiring license reinstatement to the “hundreds of thousands of Virginians” with suspended licenses. Plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), which provides that the district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” in Section 1983 actions “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs here prevailed” in every sense needed to make them eligible for a fee award. The court explained that the named plaintiffs sought not only reinstatement of their own licenses but also class certification, a declaratory judgment that Section 46.2-395 was unconstitutional, and hence permanent license reinstatement for hundreds of thousands of Virginians. Those are precisely the kinds of considerations that bear on the “extent of a plaintiff’s success” – a critical factor in assessing a reasonable fee award in any fee litigation under Section 1988. View "Damian Stinnie v. Richard Holcomb" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted the victim's dying declarations into evidence during the jury trial, and this Court reaffirms that dying declarations are an exception to the Confrontation Clause; (2) the district court did not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police officers because Defendant validly waived his invoked right to counsel; and (3) there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of Spreigl evidence related to a prior assault charge into evidence significantly affected the verdict. View "State v. Buchan" on Justia Law

Prude, serving an 80-year sentence, helped a friend and fellow inmate file a successful civil rights lawsuit against their Wisconsin prison. According to Prude, his friend, grateful for the help, sent him $10,000 of his $40,000 damages award to help Prude retain an attorney for his own appeal. The prison’s Security Director, Meli, characterized the check as the product of an illegal business arrangement, seized the funds as contraband, and launched an investigation, after which he charged Prude with violations of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, including lying, unauthorized use of the mail, threats, and enterprises and fraud. Prude had a disciplinary hearing and was found guilty; the $10,000 was permanently seized. Although Meli was an investigating officer who should have recused himself from the hearing process, Prude claims he controlled the hearing and directed the actions of the hearing officer, Westra, to ensure a finding of guilt and to prevent Prude from ever getting his money.“Despite statements from Meli and Westra before and during the hearing suggesting a predetermined outcome,” the district court dismissed Prude's claims against Westra at the screening stage and later granted Meli summary judgment on all remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the evidence in the record plausibly supports a due process violation. View "Prude v. Meli" on Justia Law

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law