Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
by
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered all members of the Armed Forces to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro followed suit soon after, mandating vaccination for all Navy servicemembers. Plaintiffs are thirty-five members of Naval Special Warfare Command units. Each sought an exemption due to a sincere religious objection to the Navy’s authorized vaccines. Plaintiffs sued Secretary Austin, Secretary Del Toro, and the Department of Defense (collectively, “the Navy”), alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment and RFRA. They also sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the policies described above. Specifically, they asked the court to enjoin “any adverse action” based on their vaccination status, such as job loss, ineligibility to deploy, and restrictions on promotion and training opportunities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court twice enjoined the Navy’s policies as likely illegal under RFRA. After the entry of those injunctions, however, Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy complied with that directive and then rescinded all the challenged policies and formally announced that COVID-19 vaccines would not be imposed on any servicemember.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded. The court explained that the interlocutory appeal is moot because the Navy’s vaccine policies challenged here have been rescinded and because no exception to mootness applies. That does not end the litigation, however, and Plaintiffs’ case remains before the district court, which will decide in the first instance whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

by
Appellant filed suit alleging that he suffered adverse employment action in retaliation for unpopular protected speech. Appellant’s complaint alleges that he has been outspoken in recent years concerning the focus on “so-called ‘social justice’ affecting academia in general” and “his concern that the field of higher education study is abandoning rigorous methodological analysis in favor of results-driven work aimed at furthering a highly dogmatic view of ‘diversity,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘inclusion.’” In this vein, Appellant identified three statements or communications he made between 2016 and 2018, which, in his view, are protected speech. According to Appellant, he was eventually subject to adverse employment actions in retaliation for these three communications. The district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal finding that Appellant has failed to allege a causal connection between the only communication that is arguably protected under the First Amendment and the alleged adverse employment action. The court held that the survey question incident and the faculty hiring email were not protected speech. Even assuming the “Woke Joke” blog post was protected speech, Appellant has failed to allege that it was a “but for” cause for any alleged adverse employment action. View "Stephen Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the proposed schedule of June, an adult protected person, in this appeal challenging the court's rulings concerning June's ability to manage familial relationships, holding that there was insufficient evidentiary support for June's schedule.Also at issue in this case was the process for removing June's guardian and appointing a successor guardian and June's standing to challenge certain issues on appeal. The Supreme Court held (1) June had standing to challenge on appeal both the removal or her guardian and the appointment of the successor guardian; (2) the district court has authority to remove a guardian and appoint a successor guardian with the filing of a formal, written petition for removal, and a protected person is entitled to prior notice of and opportunity to be heard on such actions; (3) the district court did not improperly remove June's guardian and appoint a successor guardian, and June was afforded adequate due process; and (4) although the district court erred by improperly shifting the burden to June to file a communication and visitation petition under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.332-.338, the court properly denied June's proposed schedule. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest to voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated robbery, and four counts of interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest pleas.Defendant pleaded no contest to the charges against him pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Before he was sentenced, Defendant moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated and that defense counsel did not provide effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant according to the plea agreement. That Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. View "McHenry v. State" on Justia Law

by
The City of Grants Pass maintains ordinances that preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or a cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping within the City’s limits. Three homeless individuals filed a putative class action complaint against the City, arguing a number of City ordinances were unconstitutional. The district court certified a class of “involuntarily homeless” persons and later granted partial summary judgment in favor of the class. The district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement against the class members of some City ordinances, at certain times, in certain places. The City appealed.   In the amended opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment and permanent injunction in favor of Plaintiffs; affirmed certification of a class of “involuntary homeless” persons; and remanded. The panel rejected the City’s argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ claims were moot or because Plaintiffs failed to identify any relief that was within a federal court’s power to redress. The panel held that the district court did not err by finding Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) such that a class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling that the City of Grants Pass could not enforce its anticamping ordinances against homeless persons for the mere act of sleeping outside with rudimentary protection from the elements or for sleeping in their car at night when there was no other place in the City for them to go. View "GLORIA JOHNSON, ET AL V. CITY OF GRANTS PASS" on Justia Law

by
As a Chicago gang member, States participated in drug trafficking and kidnappings. Officers went to his apartment to arrest him. States fired five shots through the door and hit an officer in the finger. A jury convicted him on 12 counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison, plus 57 years in consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)—two for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and one for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. States subsequently moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the reimposition of his sentence.The Supreme Court subsequently held (Johnson) that the ACCA residual clause, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. Section 924(c) has an analogous residual clause (later struck down). States filed a successive 2255 motion to vacate his 924(c) convictions. His predicate crimes of violence were Hobbs Act extortion and attempted murder of a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 1113–1114. The court vacated the extortion-predicate conviction but denied the motion with respect to the conviction predicated on attempted murder; then-controlling circuit precedent established that an attempt to commit a crime of violence is a crime of violence under 924(c)'s elements clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence--concurrent 20-year terms plus two consecutive five-year sentences for the 924(c) convictions. The district court correctly held that attempted murder of a federal officer is a crime of violence and that drug trafficking and kidnapping offenses could not be grouped. View "United States v. States" on Justia Law

by
Officers discovered Brewer’s naked body tied to his bed frame; he had been shot twice. The case went cold for several years before an inmate told officers that Miller and Hall and two women had set up a threesome with Brewer in order to rob him. DNA found at the scene did not implicate either woman. The women implicated Martin. Officers knew the story was false but nonetheless interviewed Martin; the interview was not recorded. Martin, who claimed to have been "very high" on the night of the murder, waffled between denying any involvement and other stories. Officers falsely told her that her DNA was found at the scene and implied her children could be taken away. Martin failed a polygraph examination. Martin was told that “she’[d] walk” if she revealed the killer but that if she did not implicate anybody else, she would “go down.” Eventually, with a plea agreement, she implicated Miller. Martin repeatedly attempted to recant. Kentucky indicted Miller but eventually dropped the charges.Miller filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, destruction of exculpatory evidence, due process violations, and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Because the conduct at issue was in furtherance of genuine prosecutorial interests, the prosecutor has absolute immunity for his actions, including ordering the destruction of evidence and purported thwarting of a court order. The other defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Price v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

by
Hess, a 17-year-old student, was required to participate in a ride-along with Hammond Officer Garcia. Her complaint describes a day-long sequence of inappropriate comments and questions punctuated by unwelcome physical sexual contact. Garcia allegedly rubbed his arm against her breast, repeatedly placed his hand on Hess’s thigh, put his hand on her buttocks, stated that Hess wanted to become a prostitute, and, while in a secluded location, asked another officer if he wanted to have sex with Hess. After Hess’s ride along, another female classmate participated in the course-required ride with Garcia. When the classmate told Hess that Garcia had acted inappropriately, the girls reported their experiences.Hess sued Garcia and Chief Doughty in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Doughty for lack of allegations of the requisite level of involvement in the alleged violations. The court reversed the dismissal of the claim against Garcia. It is well established that sexual assault by a government official acting under the color of law can violate the Equal Protection Clause as sex discrimination, the Fourth Amendment right “of the people to be secure in their persons,” and the right to bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause. The court rejected arguments that the alleged conduct was simply “boorish” and not serious enough to implicate the Constitution. Sexual assault is an intentional act that never serves a legitimate governmental purpose. View "Hess v. Garcia" on Justia Law

by
This case arose from events involving Defendant-appellant David Bradshaw, a sheriff’s deputy who was off duty, out of uniform, and driving his personal vehicle with his child in the front passenger seat. After a vehicle being driven by Plaintiff-appellant Mario Rosales legally passed Bradshaw, Bradshaw decided to follow Rosales. He then declined backup assistance from another deputy, followed Rosales all the way home, blocked Rosales in his driveway, and began shouting and yelling at Rosales, all before identifying himself as law enforcement. In response, Rosales became afraid and exited his vehicle with a legal and openly carried gun in his pants pocket, intending to protect himself and his property but also to deescalate the situation. Bradshaw, however, continued to shout and pointed his gun at Rosales. Though Rosales feared being shot, he remained calm and nonthreatening throughout the encounter. When Bradshaw eventually identified himself as law enforcement and told Rosales to put his gun back in his vehicle, Rosales complied, and the encounter wound down from there. As a result of this incident, Bradshaw’s employment was terminated, and he was convicted in state court of aggravated assault and child endangerment. Rosales then filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging in part that Bradshaw violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court granted Bradshaw’s motion to dismiss, ruling that he was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law when he unreasonably pointed his gun at Rosales. The critical distinguishing fact, for the district court, was that Rosales was armed. The Tenth Circuit reversed: Bradshaw violated Rosales’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and his "egregious and unlawful conduct was obviously unconstitutional. Bradshaw is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity, and Rosales’s § 1983 claim against him may proceed." View "Rosales v. Bradshaw, et al." on Justia Law

by
On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law