Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Horton was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm crimes. Horton had been convicted of four prior state drug felonies. The court imposed three concurrent life sentences. Horton’s direct appeal and collateral relief motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255, failed. Under 2255(h) a successive motion is permitted only if it contains “newly discovered evidence” of innocence or is based on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” Horton filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing the “saving clause,” 28 U.S.C. 2255(e); a 2241 motion “shall not be entertained” unless the remedy by motion under 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”The Seventh Circuit previously held (Davenport) that 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective”— and 2241 is available—when the limits on successive 2255 motions bar relief and the prisoner’s claim is based on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that was previously foreclosed by circuit precedent. Horton's Davenport claim challenged his sentences based on the Supreme Court’s 2016 Mathis decision.In the interim, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Hendrix, (2022): The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy 2255’s conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all." The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, abrogating Davenport. View "Horton v. Lovett" on Justia Law

Sanders was convicted in 2006 of firearms offenses. The court imposed an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, based on three prior convictions, including one for Illinois residential burglary. His direct appeal and 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for collateral relief failed. Sanders has three times unsuccessfully sought permission to file a successive 2255 motion. A successive motion is permitted only if it contains “newly discovered evidence” of innocence or is based on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”Sanders filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, citing the “saving clause.” 28 U.S.C. 2255(e); A federal prisoner’s 2241 motion “shall not be entertained” unless the remedy by motion under 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Seventh Circuit precedent (Davenport) applied the saving-clause gateway to habeas claims premised on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that was previously foreclosed by circuit precedent. Sanders’s Davenport claim challenged his ACCA-enhanced sentence based on the Supreme Court’s 2016 Mathis decision.The district judge denied relief. The Supreme Court held, in Jones v. Hendrix, (2022): The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy the 2255 conditions does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, abrogating Davenport. View "Sanders v. Joseph" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the decision of the circuit circuit court that examination of data contained on Defendant's hard drive was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, holding that the government violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in this case.Defendant voluntarily consented to government agents seizing his laptop computer, creating a copy of its hard drive, and searching the data on it. After the copy was made but before the government examined the data Defendant withdrew his consent. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the forensic examination of the copy of his laptop's hard drive. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant asserted that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mirror-image copy of his laptop hard drive. The appellate court agreed and reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data contained on his hard drive; (2) because the government did not examine the data before Defendant withdrew his consent Defendant did not lose his reasonable expectation of privacy in the data; and (3) the government conducted an unreasonable search by examining the data without any authority to do so. View "State v. McDonnell" on Justia Law

While serving a 55-year sentence for murder, Love assaulted a correctional officer, resulting in state convictions for felony battery. The Indiana Department of Correction also found Love guilty of violating prison rules and imposed sanctions including revocation of 5,700 days of his accrued good time credit, which extended Love’s release date by more than 15 years. Love unsuccessfully pursued prison appeals. The district court denied his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Love procedurally defaulted his constitutional claims and forfeited them by failing to present them in administrative proceedings or the district court.One argument concerned Executive Directive 17-09, under which the Department must revoke all accrued good time credit from inmates found guilty of qualifying offenses. There is no additional hearing; the inmate is not provided an opportunity to argue why revocation of less time is appropriate. Love argued that the Department cannot, consistent with due process, predetermine how it will use its discretionary power over sanctions without first considering arguments in mitigation. Love also argued that Directive 17-09 is facially arbitrary in tying punishment to the amount of good time credit an inmate has rather than the severity of his misconduct. Love offered two examples where other inmates presumably should have been punished in accordance with the Directive but were allegedly shown leniency instead. View "Love v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In 2007, Hogsett was convicted of crimes, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that Hogsett was an armed career criminal, with three prior convictions for violent felonies, and sentenced him to 295 months. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) interpreted “violent felony” in 924(e) to exclude crimes that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. Hogsett sought to challenge his sentence under Borden. To collaterally attack a conviction or sentence, a federal prisoner files a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, not a habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241. Hogsett had filed a 2255 motion in 2010. A prisoner can only file another 2255 motion in two circumstances: newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish innocence or a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Hogsett argued that he was eligible to file under 2255(e), the “saving clause,” which applies when “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of Hogsett’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court cited the Supreme Court’s intervening Jones holding: “The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy” 2255(h)’s requirements “does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause … he cannot bring it at all.” Borden is a statutory interpretation decision. View "Hogsett v. Lillard" on Justia Law

Sacramento County Sheriffs’ Deputies encountered Celia and William Bernal (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) at their home during the Deputies’ investigation into allegations that Plaintiffs’ son planned a shooting at his school that day. During the interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twistlock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in handcuffs. The district court held that the Deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment by detaining Plaintiffs even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during Plaintiffs’ detention and, even if they had, qualified immunity applied.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Deputies in Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 action. The panel first considered whether the initial seizure of Plaintiffs was reasonable. Because Plaintiffs were detained but not arrested, the reasonableness of their detention depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. The panel held that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain and question Plaintiffs about Ryan’s location due primarily to the exigencies inherent in preventing an imminent school shooting. Further, on balance, the panel concluded that the Deputies’ use of force against Celia was reasonable under the circumstances. The panel concluded that the district court erred in finding that the Deputies’ use of force against William was not excessive. The intrusion on William’s liberty was too great in the context of detaining a non-suspect witness. View "WILLIAM BERNAL, ET AL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff wanted to enjoy that terrific feeling of carefreely careening down a waterslide with his son to celebrate his son’s seventh birthday. So he took his son to Universal’s Volcano Bay waterpark and got in line to ride its Krakatau Aqua Coaster— a waterslide version of a roller coaster. But as Plaintiff approached the front of the line, Universal pulled him aside and told him he was “unfit” to ride the Aqua Coaster. Plaintiff was born with only one hand. And Universal doesn’t allow people without two natural hands to ride. So Plaintiff sued Universal for imposing an allegedly discriminatory eligibility criterion in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). During the litigation, Universal stipulated that the Aqua Coaster’s manufacturer had identified “no specific risks” of riding to anyone like Plaintiff. Universal argued that complying with this morass of mandates was “necessary.” The district court agreed and also concluded that the ADA did not preempt Florida law. It therefore entered summary judgment for Universal.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that the ADA prohibits imposing a discriminatory eligibility criterion unless the criterion is “necessary.” Universal argues that “compliance with state law” necessitates Universal’s discriminatory eligibility requirement. But to the extent that state law conflicts with the ADA and requires disability discrimination, the court held that “compliance with state law,” in and of itself, cannot qualify as “necessary” under the ADA, or it would impermissibly preempt and effectively eviscerate the ADA. So “compliance with state law” does not relieve Universal of its obligation to follow the ADA View "Dylan Campbell v. Universal City Development Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

D.T. and six other Plaintiffs were arrested for violating a citywide temporary curfew in Washington, D.C., in June 2020. At the time of their arrests, Plaintiffs were standing on a public street peacefully protesting police killings of Black Americans. Plaintiffs alleged they were out on the streets four hours after the start of the curfew on June 1, 2020, when they were arrested for violating the mayor’s order. Plaintiffs sued the arresting officers and the city for damages. Their principal claim is that, because they were engaging in peaceful public protests, their arrests for breaking the curfew violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the June 1 curfew order was a constitutionally valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court held that the remaining claims also failed because they were contingent on the order’s asserted invalidity under the First Amendment.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs included an allegation that their overnight detention in handcuffs injured their wrists, but they sued the arresting officers, not persons responsible for the conditions of their detention. That allegation thus does not support an excessive force claim against these Defendants. Further, Plaintiffs argued that the June 1 Order violated their fundamental right to travel, but that claim is forfeited. Plaintiffs neither pleaded nor pressed a right-to-travel claim in the district court. View "Devon Tinius v. Luke Choi" on Justia Law

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered all members of the Armed Forces to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro followed suit soon after, mandating vaccination for all Navy servicemembers. Plaintiffs are thirty-five members of Naval Special Warfare Command units. Each sought an exemption due to a sincere religious objection to the Navy’s authorized vaccines. Plaintiffs sued Secretary Austin, Secretary Del Toro, and the Department of Defense (collectively, “the Navy”), alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment and RFRA. They also sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the policies described above. Specifically, they asked the court to enjoin “any adverse action” based on their vaccination status, such as job loss, ineligibility to deploy, and restrictions on promotion and training opportunities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court twice enjoined the Navy’s policies as likely illegal under RFRA. After the entry of those injunctions, however, Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy complied with that directive and then rescinded all the challenged policies and formally announced that COVID-19 vaccines would not be imposed on any servicemember.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded. The court explained that the interlocutory appeal is moot because the Navy’s vaccine policies challenged here have been rescinded and because no exception to mootness applies. That does not end the litigation, however, and Plaintiffs’ case remains before the district court, which will decide in the first instance whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit alleging that he suffered adverse employment action in retaliation for unpopular protected speech. Appellant’s complaint alleges that he has been outspoken in recent years concerning the focus on “so-called ‘social justice’ affecting academia in general” and “his concern that the field of higher education study is abandoning rigorous methodological analysis in favor of results-driven work aimed at furthering a highly dogmatic view of ‘diversity,’ ‘equity,’ and ‘inclusion.’” In this vein, Appellant identified three statements or communications he made between 2016 and 2018, which, in his view, are protected speech. According to Appellant, he was eventually subject to adverse employment actions in retaliation for these three communications. The district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal finding that Appellant has failed to allege a causal connection between the only communication that is arguably protected under the First Amendment and the alleged adverse employment action. The court held that the survey question incident and the faculty hiring email were not protected speech. Even assuming the “Woke Joke” blog post was protected speech, Appellant has failed to allege that it was a “but for” cause for any alleged adverse employment action. View "Stephen Porter v. Board of Trustees of N. C. State University" on Justia Law