Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

San Benito police officer Hector Lopez approached Plaintiff while Plaintiff was standing in the front yard of his property. Lopez pushed open the gate into Plaintiff’s yard. Plaintiff told Lopez he needed a warrant and pushed back. Within seconds, the parties physically struggled, with the fifty-year-old, disabled Plaintiff brought to the ground. Plaintiff was taken into custody and, after receiving medical attention for his injuries, was charged with several offenses. All were dismissed. He now seeks recompense from Defendants Lopez and the City of San Benito for false arrest and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff had raised genuine issues of material fact as to his claim for false arrest against Lopez. The court reversed and remanded concerning the false arrest claim. The court otherwise affirmed. The court explained that because the hot pursuit exception does not apply (and because Lopez has not identified any other applicable exception to the warrant requirement), Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of fact as to whether Lopez had the authority to enter his property to arrest him for disorderly conduct. Further, the court wrote that its conclusion that Lopez lacked authority to make a warrantless entry onto Plaintiff’s property applies equal force to Lopez’s argument that he could have entered the property to arrest Plaintiff or failed to identify. Moreover, a rational factfinder could determine that Lopez arrested Plaintiff before Plaintiff applied any resistance. View "Sauceda v. City of San Benito, et al" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant, following a jury trial, of various firearm and controlled substance offenses, holding that none of Defendant's challenges on appeal had merit.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court correctly concluded that the search warrant leading to Defendant's arrest was clearly supported by probable cause, and therefore, there was no error in the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions on the firearm charges; and (3) the district court's seventy-two-month sentence on count one was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Sylvestre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order dismissing his First and Eighth Amendment claims brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that he faced harassment, retaliation, and physical harm. Relevant here, he alleged that prison officer Lieutenant Carmen Herrera repeatedly threatened him, denied him law library access, and assaulted him several times, causing a broken arm and wrist. Plaintiff also alleged that physician’s assistant Jose Esquetini refused to treat his broken bones or take x-rays for six weeks to cover up Herrera’s assaults. Chambers asserts that he was then assaulted by Officer Enrique Velez, who allegedly sprayed him in the mouth and face with mace.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s order. Affirming the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim, the panel agreed with Plaintiff that the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule explicitly disavowed any Bivens claims based on First Amendment retaliation. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim failed to state a claim under Egbert. The panel held that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim similarly failed under Bivens, but dismissal of that claim should be with prejudice because even plausible allegations could not constitute a Bivens claim for excessive force under Egbert, and amendment would be futile. The panel determined that it was unclear whether the Bivens claim was viable because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts about his injuries, examination, or treatment. View "ROSCOE CHAMBERS V. C. HERRERA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Thousands of protesters flooded the streets of the District to proclaim “Black Lives Matter.” Over several weeks, the protesters covered streets, sidewalks, and storefronts with paint and chalk. The markings were ubiquitous and in open violation of the District’s defacement ordinance, yet none of the protesters were arrested. During the same summer, District police officers arrested two pro-life advocates in a smaller protest for chalking “Black Pre-Born Lives Matter” on a public sidewalk. The organizers of the smaller protest, the Frederick Douglass Foundation and Students for Life of America (collectively “the Foundation”), sued. The Foundation alleged violations of the First and Fifth Amendments, conceding the defacement ordinance was facially constitutional but arguing the District’s one-sided enforcement of the ordinance was not. The district court dismissed the complaint. Concluding the First Amendment and equal protection claims were essentially the same, the district court held the Foundation had failed to adequately allege discriminatory intent, which the court considered a necessary element of both claims.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Foundation’s equal protection claim because the Foundation has not plausibly alleged invidious discrimination by District officials. Discriminatory motive, however, is not an element of a First Amendment free speech selective enforcement claim. The First Amendment prohibits discrimination on the basis of viewpoint irrespective of the government’s motive. The court held the Foundation has plausibly alleged the District discriminated on the basis of viewpoint in the selective enforcement of its defacement ordinance. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of the Foundation’s First Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Frederick Douglass Foundation, Inc. v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their child AMS at a private academy after the Chamberlain School District did not meet AMS’s needs. A state hearing examiner decided that Chamberlain violated federal law and awarded Plaintiffs costs associated with AMS’s placement at the academy. The district court affirmed.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Chamberlain argued that Plaintiffs weren’t eligible to remove the case from state court to federal court because they weren’t “defendants” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). The court explained that while Plaintiffs initially sought to recover from Chamberlain, their status changed when Chamberlain sought the state court’s review of the hearing examiner’s decision. At that point, Chamberlain became the plaintiff for removal purposes. Thus, because Plaintiffs were defendants, they were allowed to remove, so the district court didn’t err in denying remand. Further, the court explained that giving due weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, it concludes that Chamberlain denied AMS a FAPE. View "Judith Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on twenty-one counts related to his sexual abuse of his daughter AF, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting a sexually explicit photograph of AF's mother, Mrs. Freer, and a pornographic father-daughter incest video under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the sexually explicit photograph of Mrs. Freer and the pornographic incest video; (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate that alleged prosecutorial misconduct denied him his right to a fair trial. View "Freer v. Wyoming" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on charges of domestic violence aggravated assault and domestic violence assault and the trial court's finding of guilty on a charge of violating a condition of release, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a representative jury by using the absolute disparity test to determine the racial makeup of the jury venire. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) appropriately determined the 1.01% absolute disparity in Defendant's jury venire was insufficient to show underrepresentation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to subpoena the grand jurors. View "State v. Footman" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Forro children attended St. Augustine, a self-identified Catholic school in Hartford, Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides transportation benefits for parents who send their children to private sectarian schools, Wis.Stat. 121.54. The school district and the state superintendent of public instruction denied the Forros' request because transportation was being provided to St. Gabriel, another Catholic school in the area. The law stipulates that only one school from a single organizational entity in each “attendance area” may qualify for benefits. While both claim an affiliation with Catholicism, the two schools are not affiliated with one another in other significant ways. St. Augustine and the Forros sued. Several years of litigation ensued, including a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, two published Seventh Circuit opinions, and a Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinion, after which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of transportation benefits violated Wisconsin law because it rested on an improper methodology for determining affiliation between two schools of similar faith.After noting that certain state law claims had been waived and that the federal constitutional issues did not require resolution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a declaratory judgment remains in effect against the Superintendent and the School District. The district court may decide what attorneys’ fees the plaintiffs should be awarded, if any, given that they have prevailed only in obtaining declaratory relief under state law. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that the closure of in-person education due to the COVID-19 pandemic deprived children of the free appropriate public education to which they were entitled and deprived and parents of their right to participate in their children's education, holding that none of Plaintiffs' claims were cognizable in federal court.Plaintiffs, three children with disabilities and their parents on behalf of a putative class, sued the Governor of Massachusetts, the Commissioner of Schools for Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, and several school districts and their superintendents, claiming that the closure of in-person education during the COVID-19 pandemic violated Plaintiffs' rights under the IDEA and that Defendants illegally discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of disability in violation the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed in full either because Plaintiffs lacked standing to request the relief they sought, because the claims were moot, and/or because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Roe v. Healey" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief challenging the restraint procedures used by the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) under the Eighth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), holding that the district court did not err in denying relief.Plaintiff, an inmate who suffered from severe arthritis in his shoulder joints, challenged the restraint procedures used on him by the DOC, including "rear cuffing" with a single standard handcuff, then later rear cuffing using "double cuffs," and still later using custom modified handcuffs. In this action, Plaintiff argued that the unnecessary pain caused by these restraint procedures violated his constitutional and statutory rights and sought an order requiring the DOC to adopt his own proposed restraint procedure. The district court denied Plaintiff's request for preliminary relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that DOC did not respondent with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs and that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of his ADA claim. View "Sosa v. Mass. Dep't of Correction" on Justia Law