Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Protect Illinois Communities Act restricts firearms and related items that the Act defines as “an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge” (assault weapons), 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b), and “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s],” section 24-1.10(b)). Certain restrictions do not apply to law enforcement agencies and individuals who complete firearms training as part of their employment in law enforcement, corrections, the military, and private security (trained professionals), and individuals who possessed assault weapons or LCMs (large capacity magazines) before the restrictions became effective.The circuit court of Macon County entered declaratory judgment, finding that the restrictions facially violated the Illinois Constitution because the exemptions deny the “law-abiding public” equal protection and constitute special legislation. On appeal, opponents of the law alleged for the first time that, regardless of the exemptions, the restrictions violate the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violated the three-reading requirement of the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exemptions neither deny equal protection nor constitute special legislation because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that they are similarly situated to and treated differently from the exempt classes. The plaintiffs expressly waived in the circuit court any independent claim that the restrictions impermissibly infringe the Second Amendment and are jurisdictionally barred from renewing their three-readings claim. View "Caulkins v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that portions of the victim's then-girlfriend's grand jury testimony were properly admitted in accordance with the hearsay exemption for prior inconsistent statements.Prior to trial, the victim's then-girlfriend Shyla Bizarro identified Defendant as the victim's attacker from surveillance video footage and testified to her identification before the grand jury. Prior to her testimony, however, Bizarro revealed that she wished to recant her statements to police and her grand jury testimony. The trial judge admitted substantively the recanted portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony, including her prior statements of identification. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony were properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements; (2) portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony identifying Defendant in the video independently satisfied the hearsay exemption for statements of identification; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant's remaining arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Brum" on Justia Law

Burroughs went to the Niles Municipal Court to pay a traffic fine. The electronic docketing system alerted court officials that there was an active warrant for Burroughs’s arrest, relating to a recent domestic violence incident. Zickefoose, a probation officer, followed Burroughs outside, commanded him to stop, and told him to put his hands behind his back. When Zickefoose tried to grab Burroughs’s forearm, he pulled away and ran toward the parking lot. Zickefoose, injured as Burroughs drove away, reported the incident to the police. Four officers responded separately to Burroughs’s apartment complex, where they boxed in Burroughs’s car and yelled for Burroughs to “[s]hut the car off” and “[g]et out of the vehicle.” Officer Mannella fired three rounds into the windshield, which hit Burroughs in the chest, killing him. Officer Reppy fired an additional five shots that penetrated the car but did not hit Burroughs.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could find that when Mannella opened fire, Burroughs was moving slowly or was stationary; Burroughs was complying with Mannella’s commands and was standing to the side of the car, not in the vehicle’s path. The court noted testimony and unrebutted forensic analysis. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Mannella. View "Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio" on Justia Law

International sought permission to erect two two-sided billboards in the City of Troy. These billboards were to be 14 by 48 feet in area and 70 feet in height when mounted; they did not conform to height, size, and setback requirements in the Ordinance. After the City denied its permit application and request for a variance, International sued, citing the First Amendment and arguing that the Ordinance’s variance procedure imposed an invalid prior restraint and that its permit exceptions were content-based restrictions on free speech. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the City on International’s prior-restraint claim but remanded for the court to consider whether the Ordinance, with the permit exceptions, survived strict scrutiny.The district court held that the permitting requirements, with the content-based exceptions. did not survive strict scrutiny but that the permit exceptions are severable, leaving intact the Ordinance’s height, size, and setback requirements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. International’s proposed billboards do not satisfy those valid, content-neutral standards, View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a 1983 claim, arguing that he was held in administrative segregation for 300 days over his 30-day disciplinary sentence without additional due process, such as new disciplinary hearings or periodic review of his custody status. The magistrate judge reviewed Petitioner's suit under 28 USC 1915(e) and 1915A and issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Petitioner's federal claims be dismissed with prejudice as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim. The district court reviewed and adopted the magistrate judge’s report, dismissing Petitioner's 1983 suit with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court failed to apply the appropriate, multi-faceted legal test considering the conditions and length of confinement, and thus, dismissing the Petition was an abuse of discretion. View "Carmouche v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that led West Memphis Police Department (WMPD) officers on a dangerous chase. He was shot and killed when officers tried to stop the car, and his estate sued them under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force and state-created danger. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that Plaintiff had his hands up. And the court has no doubt that shooting into the car posed a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to him. But the driver had just led police on a reckless, high-speed chase, which involved swerving into oncoming traffic, hitting a police car, and resisting efforts to stop the car by other means. By the time officers started shooting, the car had run over one officer’s legs and was headed toward others. Here, the court wrote that all things considered, officers acted reasonably in using deadly force, and the district court didn’t err in granting summary judgment. View "Estate of De'Angelo Brown v. E.C. West" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former Texas state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Defendant alleged in his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action that the director of his former state prison’s faith-based dorm program conspired with a prison chaplain to retaliate against him for filing a complaint under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). He challenged the district court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that the purpose of the rule laid out in Heck was to stop civil tort actions for damages where the plaintiff would be required “to prove the unlawfulness of his . . . confinement.” Here, Defendant believes he is owed money damages because he was not released after his early 2021 parole hearing due to Defendants alleged retaliatory actions. The court wrote that granting such relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement after that hearing for reaching the wrong determination. Consequently, Heck renders Defendant’s claims frivolous. View "Collins v. Dallas Ldrshp Fdn" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court erred when it determined that trial counsel for Petitioner rendered deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-years' imprisonment. Petitioner later brought his habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court determined that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that Petitioner accept the court's pretrial offer of a forty-five-year sentence of incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, counsel's representation of Petitioner did not amount to ineffective representation. View "Maia v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Malhotra subleased a room in a fraternity house while attending the University of Illinois in 2021. The University prohibited students from permitting underage drinking in their residences. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the University then restricted the number of people who could attend social gatherings. According to Malhotra, days after he moved in, the other residents threw a party. Malhotra was not involved in planning or hosting the party. During the event, Malhotra was wearing noise-canceling headphones and studying in his room when his roommate alerted him to loud noises. Malhotra discovered a large group of people partying, including a young woman who was visibly intoxicated. The party ended when officers arrived at the house.The University charged Malhotra and the other residents with violating the University’s code of conduct. Malhotra met with the University’s Assistant Dean of Students and subsequently appeared at a hearing before the “Subcommittee on Undergraduate Student Conduct,” which found Malhotra guilty and suspended him for two semesters. Dean Die explained that Malhotra had been held responsible because he was a signatory on the fraternity house’s lease. Malhotra, however, had not signed the lease; he had merely subleased a room. He appealed, attaching the lease as evidence. The suspension was upheld. Malhotra filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Malhotra did not allege a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest as required under the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Malhotra v. University of Illinois at Urbana" on Justia Law