Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.   The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim. View "Sacks v. Texas Southern University" on Justia Law

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) suffered a severe COVID-19 outbreak. In an attempt to protect CIM inmates, high-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from CIM to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that infected over two-thousand inmates and ultimately killed over twenty-five inmates and one prison guard. The wife of one of the deceased inmates sued, claiming that the prison officials had violated her husband’s constitutional and statutory rights. The officials moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were barred by various federal and state immunities, including immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and qualified immunity. The district court held that the officials were not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and the officials filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the PREP Act and qualified immunity in an action brought against California prison officials arising from the death of a San Quentin inmate from COVID-19; and (2) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Defendants’ claims asserting immunity under state law. The panel held that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, which adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of San Quentin inmates, including Hampton. View "MICHAEL HAMPTON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the Hocking County Common Pleas Court and Judge Dale Crawford in Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims.Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. The court of appeals affirmed. About seven years later, Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional right to counsel and lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that res judicata barred this mandamus and prohibition action. View "State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

Defendant is a Pasco County, Florida, Sherriff’s Office deputy. Chris Nocco, the Pasco County Sheriff, is a codefendant. Plaintiff’s initial complaint in this case consisted of twelve counts. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, the complaint at hand, contains ten counts. Count I of the amended complaint, which replicates verbatim Count I of the initial complaint, was brought against Defendant in his individual capacity and is the only count before the Eleventh Circuit in this appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.   At issue on appeal is whether the Fourth Amendment precluded a law enforcement officer—who had stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation—from asking a passenger in the vehicle to identify himself unless the officer had reason to suspect that the passenger had committed, was in the process of committing, or was likely to commit a criminal offense. The second question is whether binding precedent clearly established, at the time relevant here, that an officer could not ask a passenger to identify himself absent this reasonable suspicion.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that it doubts that the Florida Supreme Court would hold that a passenger is free to resist an officer’s request for identification in the setting this case presents. At the very least, it is arguable that the court would uphold the request and find the officer had at least arguable cause to arrest the passenger for resisting an officer without violence in violation of Section 843.02. View "Marques A. Johnson v. James Dunn" on Justia Law

In 1907, the then-owner executed the “Stimson deed,” transferring to the Railroad “its successors and assigns, the right to cross said right of way at any point or points where such crossing is desired” the land at issue. POTB later took ownership of the railroad. A 2007 storm caused severe damage to the railroad tracks. POTB did not repair the damage, resulting in the disbandment of the Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority. POTB, with governmental entities, established the Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency, to construct “a new multi-use trail” that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities, and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. In 2016, POTB filed a notice of intent to abandon service of the portions of the railroad line at issue with the Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) allowing interim trail use and railbanking under the National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d).The Claims Court and Federal Circuit rejected Stimson’s claim that the creation of the trail constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. Railbanking and interim trail use are within the scope of the easement. Stimson failed to show abandonment for all purposes and had no compensable property interest in the land to which the deed pertained. View "Stimson Lumber Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's performance was deficient.At issue was whether trial counsel's failure to object to an order prohibiting any consultation regarding the case between Petitioner and trial counsel during Petitioner's murder trial resulted in the actual denial of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held (1) prejudice was presumed under the circumstances of this case; and (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that trial counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Officer arrested Plaintiff for telephone harassment after she witnessed Plaintiff call in false complaints about her neighbors’ supposedly loud music. The harassment charges were dropped, however. Plaintiff then sued Defendant for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Her claim was dismissed based on qualified immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the magistrate judge erred by (A) concluding Defendant reasonably believed she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for telephone harassment and (B) determining no issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that, before arresting Plaintiff, Defendant called the district attorney’s office to ensure that a telephone harassment charge was proper. The court wrote that as the magistrate judge observed, nothing about the circumstances taints Defendant’s beliefs as unreasonable: (1) Plaintiff called multiple times to report loud music that day; (2) other officers found no loud music playing when they arrived; (3) the alleged noisemakers claimed they were not playing loud music; (4) no music was playing during the several hours Defendant was on the scene; and (5) while Defendant stood behind the neighbors’ fence hearing no noise, she received reports Plaintiff was still calling in complaints. Thus the court wrote that it sees no error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendant reasonably believed probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest. View "Perry v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Carafem provides abortion care, birth control, and STD testing in several states. One clinic was in a medical office building in a Nashville suburb. Carafem filed suit under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248, alleging that on July 26, 2022, the OSA defendants refused to move from the building's front doors and blocked the entrance for several minutes before police ordered them to move to the sidewalk. The defendants allegedly stated that they would return each day and ‘escalate’ activities. During an alleged incident on July 28, approximately 60 people associated with OSA attempted to enter Carafem’s clinic by pretending to seek services. After being denied entry, one stated that “either they [are] gonna let us in or we take this whole building down.”The district court granted a temporary restraining order and, later, a preliminary injunction under the Act. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and later moved the court to take judicial notice of Carafem’s announcement that it was pausing in-person services at the clinic due to Tennessee’s new abortion ban. The Sixth Circuit dismissed and remanded, The issue of whether the court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction has been overtaken by a dispute over whether intervening events warranted modifying or dissolving that injunction, raising new factual and legal issues that the district court is best positioned to resolve. View "FemHealth USA, Inc. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several officers of the Tucson Police Department. Two officers (collectively, “Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged First Amendment retaliation claims arising from Defendants’ investigation of two arsons that occurred at properties connected to the husband. Defendants appealed from the district court’s order denying without prejudice their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. It was not clearly established that Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by the police. Nor was it clearly established that a retaliatory investigation per se violates the First Amendment. Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims based on the husband's silence and Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and requests for public disclosures. View "GREG MOORE, ET AL V. SEAN GARNAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Parents Defending Education, an association of parents, brought this action to challenge a policy adopted by the Linn Mar Community School District in Iowa. The disputed policy is entitled “Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes.” The policy sets forth regulations for the District that “address the needs of transgender students, gender-expansive students, nonbinary, gender nonconforming students, and students questioning their gender to ensure a safe, affirming, and healthy school environment where every student can learn effectively.” The parents who seek to participate in this case are anonymous; the pleadings identify them by a letter of the alphabet. The district court determined that Parents Defending failed to establish Article III standing because the organization did not show injury, causation, or redressability on its claims.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part as moot and reversed on one claim. The court concluded that at least Parent G has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Parent G asserts that her son wants to “state his belief that biological sex is immutable.” Because of the policy, however, Parent G states that her son remains silent in school “when gender identity topics arise” to avoid violating the policy. This student’s proposed activity “concerns political speech” and is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” Thus, Parent G has standing to bring a claim challenging the policy based on the First Amendment. Therefore, Parents Defending has standing as an association to pursue the claim on behalf of a member. View "Parents Defending Education v. LinnMar Community School Dist., et al" on Justia Law