Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A disabled public school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued the school district under Title IX and various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In her Section 1983 claim against the school officials, she alleged liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine. The district court denied that motion and stayed proceedings on the Title IX claim pending this interlocutory appeal of the Section 1983 ruling.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the Circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. As for whether to adopt the state-created danger theory of constitutional liability moving forward, the court was reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process for two reasons: (1) the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition; and (2) the absence of rigorous panel briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action would work in terms of its practical contours and application, vital details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Rather than break new ground, the court ruled instead on a narrower ground, one that follows the court’s unbroken precedent. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' joint motion to suppress more than 300 pounds of marijuana law enforcement discovered during a traffic stop on Interstate 80 in Wyoming, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Appellants' motion to suppress evidence.Appellants - Cristian Ramirez and Hector Zapien-Galvan - were pulled over by state troopers for an expired registration. Appellants refused to consent to a search of the car, after which a certified canine alerted to packages containing 320.6 pounds of marijuana. Appellants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's conduct in pursuing their vehicle without reasonable suspicion negated the subsequent probable cause for the search. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Appellants' motion to suppress because the underlying traffic stop was both objectively justified and reasonable at its inception and did not violate Wyo. Const. art. I, 4 or the Fourth Amendment. View "Zapien-Galvan v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reversing its order suppressing evidence found in the car that Defendant was driving on two separate occasions where law enforcement discovered drugs and other contraband, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reversing its suppression order but erred in admitting prior drug use.Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of possessing methamphetamine and four counts of possessing drug paraphernalia with intent to use to distribute. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the district court erroneously allowed the State to introduce evidence relating to Defendant's prior convictions for similar crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in admitting prior drug crime evidence, and the error was not harmless; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to reconsider its erroneous suppression ruling. View "State v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald worked for Roncalli Catholic High School as a guidance counselor and Co-Director of Guidance for 14 years and earned years of stellar performance reviews. In 2018, the school declined to renew her one-year employment agreement, explaining that her same-sex marriage was contrary to the Catholic faith. Fitzgerald was placed on administrative leave. Her Co-director of Guidance, Starkey, informed Roncalli that she too was in a same-sex marriage. The school did not renew Starkey’s employment agreement. Fitzgerald and Starkey brought separate lawsuits, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII.In both cases, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The school fired Fitzgerald because of her same-sex marriage and Title VII prohibits this kind of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court has held that employment discrimination suits are barred “when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.” Fitzgerald played a crucial role on the Administrative Council, which was responsible for at least some of Roncalli’s daily ministry, education, and operations and “helped develop the criteria used to evaluate guidance counselors, which included religious components like assisting students in faith formation and attending church services.” Fitzgerald held herself out as a minister. View "Fitzgerald v. Roncalli High School, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment against him on double jeopardy grounds after the district court declared a mistrial based on complications brought about by the pandemic, holding that that there was no error.Defendant was charged with transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce. During trial, the government's main witness and a case agent took a test that came back positive for COVID-19. The court ultimately ordered a mistrial and dismissed the jurors. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the steps taken by the district court leading to its declaration of a mistrial were within its discretion. View "United States v. Dennison" on Justia Law

Michigan State University's “COVID directives,” included a requirement that all employees receive a vaccine by August 31, 2021, even those who worked remotely. The policy included religious and medical exemptions. Medical exemptions were limited to “CDC-recognized contraindications and for individuals with disabilities.” It did not provide an exemption based on immunity acquired from a COVID-19 infection. The plaintiffs all tested positive for COVID-10 and claimed that, based on their natural immunity, it was medically unnecessary for them to be vaccinated. They did not comply with the policy; one was terminated, one was placed on unpaid leave, and one received a religious exemption.Their suit claimed violations of their constitutional rights to bodily autonomy and to decline medical treatment, alleging that MSU cannot establish a compelling governmental interest in overriding those constitutional rights; the policy constitutes an unconstitutional condition on continued state employment; and the policy contradicts the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) statute, 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. It is sufficient that MSU could rationally believe that requiring the vaccine for naturally immune individuals would further combat COVID-19 on its campus. The plaintiffs did not adequately explain how receiving a vaccine violates a fundamental right, which would invoke a higher level of scrutiny. The EUA is meant to ensure patients’ consent to the pharmaceutical they are receiving and does not mean that MSU cannot require vaccination as a term of employment. View "Norris v. Stanleys" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mervilus, age 22, supported his mother, a cancer patient, and two younger siblings. Abreu accused Mervilus of robbing and stabbing him. Mervilus agreed to take a polygraph examination. Earlier that year, officers dismissed drug charges after a polygraph exam indicated he truthfully denied responsibility. New Jersey permitted polygraph results to be admitted at trial. The Union County Police Department’s only certified polygraph examiner, Kaminskas, conducted the exam. Kaminskas used the “Arther Method,” an “outlier in the polygraph world,” not accredited by the American Polygraph Association. The Method relies on subjective observations and assumptions, such as that certain ethnic groups do not experience any guilt when they lie. Kaminskas concluded Mervilus was deceptive. The only relevant question where Mervilus’s physiological responses signaled deception was a question for which Kaminskas insisted Mervilus change his answer. At trial Abreu failed to identify Mervilus, pointing to a different Black man. The court admitted the polygraph exam. Mervilus was convicted. In 2011, the conviction was overturned on the ground that Kaminskas’s testimony was improper and prejudicial.Mervilus sued Kaminskas, Chief Vaniska, and Union County, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment rejection of those claims. Mervilus introduced sufficient evidence to try his fabrication-of-evidence claim against Kaminskas. His Monell claim against Union County is viable even if Kaminskas did not fabricate evidence; a jury might not render an inconsistent verdict if it found the County liable but Kaminskas not culpable. View "Mervilus v. Union County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of three counts of first-degree sexual assault, following a jury trial, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme eCourt held that the trial justice (1) did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to present a defense by excluding the proposed expert testimony of Dr. Patricia R. Recupero as not relevant under Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence; (2) did not err in instructing the jury that there was no need for certain testimony to be corroborated in order to support a guilty verdict; and (3) did not abuse his discretion in limiting the redirect examination of Defendant about his preparation for trial. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action after her son was shot and killed by a City of Minneapolis Police Officer. The district court found Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to his initial use of deadly force but not the continued use of force after Jordan dropped his knife and had fallen to the ground. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant asserted he is entitled to qualified immunity as to the entire encounter, which lasted a total of about two seconds.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity. The court explained that its review of the videos of the incident establishes that Defendant never paused during the shooting, which lasted less than two seconds, and he continued shooting for only approximately one second after Plaintiff’s son fell to the ground, dropping the knife. Given the swift and continuous progression of the incident and Defendant’s limited time to observe and process the circumstances, a jury could not find Defendant had sufficient time to reassess the threat presented before he stopped firing. Further, the court explained that even if Plaintiff’s son’s emotional condition perhaps mitigated the threat he posed to the responding officers, a question we need not reach, this detail does not sufficiently distinguish this case from Cook such that Defendant would have had “fair warning” that his conduct violated a constitutional right. View "Florine Ching v. Ofc. Neal Walsh" on Justia Law

In this case regarding the removal of a prospective juror based solely on his or her gender the Supreme Court held that when a party objecting to a peremptory challenge offers a bare allegation of gender discrimination without offering other relevant circumstances to support an inference of gender discrimination, that party fails to establish a prima facie case of purposeful gender discrimination.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the crime of sexual imposition. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor sought to exclude male jurors because they would tend to sympathize with him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination when the state exercised its peremptory challenge on a prospective juror and did not provide a gender-neutral explanation for its challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to recognize that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied to Defendant's objections to the state's peremptory challenges, but the error was immaterial because Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "State v. Stalder" on Justia Law