Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact. View "Perez v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, in 1999. At the age of 47, Plaintiff took disability retirement on November 1, 2018. When Plaintiff retired, she continued to receive free health insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Plaintiff first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying disability reasons, such as Plaintiff’s Parkinson’s disease, received free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan, disability retirees such as Plaintiff are entitled to the health insurance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Her complaint alleged various claims, including violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court entered judgment for the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot establish that the City committed any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the essential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Further, the court held that the City’s s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and government-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental right. Thus under rational basis review, the City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving funds. View "Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, moved to recall the mandate and reinstate his 2017 appeal of the dismissal of his civil rights action against state agencies and Salinas Valley Prison medical staff and officials.   The Ninth Circuit denied the motion to reinstate the appeal but directed that his filing fees be refunded. The panel first determined that Plaintiff’s motion to recall the mandate, filed 661 days after the mandate became effective, was untimely. The panel next held that the extraordinary remedy of recalling the mandate and ordering reinstatement to prevent injustice or address exceptional circumstances was not necessary given that Plaintiff did not dispute that he had three strikes, was ineligible to proceed IFP under Section 1915(b)’s payment plan, and had not timely paid the filing fee. The appeal therefore was properly dismissed. The panel held that Section 1915 neither permits nor requires the collection of fees from a prisoner who is ineligible for IFP status because he has struck out under Section 1915(g). Plaintiff purported IFP appeal therefore was barred by 1915(g), and the district court was without authority to collect the filing fees from Plaintiff’s prison account. View "LEON MEYERS V. EDWARD BIRDSONG, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody and care of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC). Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C (HCV) in 2009 but did not receive medication for it until nine years later. By then, Plaintiff’s HCV had progressed to stage F4 cirrhosis with indications of severe liver inflammation. Plaintiff sued numerous prison doctors, three of whom are the subject of this appeal, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors and dismissed all claims against them. Plaintiff appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its denial of his motion to amend the complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment but affirmed its denial of the motion to amend. The court explained that the bar to proving an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is high, but it is not insurmountable. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a number of factual disputes regarding the denial of his HCV treatment for over eight years. These disputes are sufficiently material to be decided by a jury. View "Ricky J. Johnson v. Dr. Sharon Lewis, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after he was pepper-sprayed and tackled by a Des Moines Police Officer while photographing a protest. Plaintiff, who was covering the protest as a journalist, claimed that the officer and other city officials violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the city officials’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims but affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing the retaliation claim. The court explained that viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact on whether there was an excessive use of force. To begin, they arrested Plaintiff for failure to disperse—a misdemeanor. Second, while the officer focuses on the fact there had been “hours of criminal activity occurring” and that he was “under constant threat of harm from active rioters,” he cannot point to any facts suggesting an immediate threat to his safety or the safety of others. Further, the court wrote that numerous cases show that the identified general constitutional rule applies with obvious clarity to the conduct in question. View "Mark Nieters v. Brandon Holtan" on Justia Law

Whitaker, an Illinois prisoner, had $573 when he filed a notice of appeal in his Section 1983 lawsuit; he subsequently spent most of his money at the prison commissary and on postage. The district court denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1).The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court did not adequately consider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) balance between the need to collect fees and a prisoner’s discretionary use of his funds. The PLRA mandates that a court apply a statutory formula and collect an initial partial filing fee, then collect the remainder of the fees in installments. Whitaker had enough money to pay the fees in full when they were due and when this court sent him a notice informing him as much but the statute does not mandate that prisoners prioritize their filing fees above all other expenses. Drawing the line for in forma pauperis eligibility at the mere ability to pay the full fee can lead to odd, unintended results. There is nothing suggesting that Whitaker deliberately depleted his account to avoid payment. Whitaker should be permitted to prepay the prescribed portion of the fee with the rest to be collected from his future income, as Congress envisioned. View "Whitaker v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for interference with a peace officer, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's due process rights by conducting a hearing under Asch v. State, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), in Defendant's absence after he refused to attend the hearing.Defendant, who was serving three consecutive life sentences at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, was charged with interference with a peace officer. Before the scheduled trial date, the State moved to require Defendant to be restrained during trial. The district court conducted an Asch hearing without Defendant and decided to impose restraints at trial. Defendant was convicted of one count of felony interference with a peace officer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived any right he had to be present at the Asch hearing by knowingly and voluntarily failing to appear at the hearing due to circumstances within his control. View "Castellanos v. State" on Justia Law

In this case concerning how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment the Supreme Court held that a prisoner satisfies the "causes to be delivered" requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.Appellant, who was indicted on counts of aggravated robbery and robbery, moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant had strictly complied with section 2941.401 when he provided written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition and that the 180-day speedy trial time was not tolled by the warden's failure to comply with his duty to send out Appellant's written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant had not strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final disposition under the statute when he provided them to the warden. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA) allows the state to take custody—not ownership—of unclaimed property “in trust for the benefit of the rightful owner” After publishing required notices, the state sells or liquidates the unclaimed property within three years of receiving it, unless the owner brings a valid claim, then deposits the proceeds into its general fund, subtracting reasonable administration costs; the owner can no longer reclaim his property, but can still recover the “net proceeds” from its sale. UUPA apermits owners to recover the interest earned on their property and post-liquidation interest if the property accrued interest before the state took custody of it.Two companies delivered O’Connor’s properties—checks collectively worth no more than $350— to the state after he failed to claim them. The state liquidated them. O’Connor filed a claim for compensation. Michigan reimbursed O’Connor for the value of his property, but not any post-liquidation interest. O’Connor alleges that neither the state nor the third-party holders provided him with the statutorily required notices. O’Connor sued Michigan under the Fifth Amendment; Michigan’s Treasurer, and the Administrative Manager of the Unclaimed Property Program, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit held that the officials are entitled to qualified immunity on O’Connor’s taking claims but not his due process claims. The district court correctly dismissed O’Connor’s claims against the state but should not have dismissed them with prejudice. View "O'Connor v. Eubanks" on Justia Law