Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was booked into a federal corrections center in San Diego for an alleged sex offense. Given the nature of his charges, Plaintiff requested protective custody. Jail officials, however, declined his request, instead placing him in general population. Plaintiff experienced harassment by other inmates, and at some point, the inmates forced Plaintiff to exercise to the point of collapse, leading to serious medical complications requiring hospitalization. Plaintiff filed suit under Bivens against two jail classification officers in their individual capacities. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Plaintiff did not state a viable Bivens claim. The district court denied the motion. Although the district court found that Plaintiff’s claim presented a “new Bivens context,” it concluded that an extension of Bivens could be warranted in his case.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court explained that when a party seeks to bring a Bivens action, courts apply a two-step test: whether the case presents a new Bivens context, and, if so, whether there are “special factors” that counsel against extending Bivens. Applying the first step, the panel held that this case presents a new Bivens context that the Supreme Court has not recognized in its Bivens jurisprudence. Applying the second step, the panel held that special factors counsel against extending Bivens to this case. The legislature and executive were best positioned to address Plaintiff’s interest and have, in fact, provided alternative remedies through administrative review procedures offered by the Board of Prisons. Accordingly, the panel declined to overstep its constitutional role to create a new damages action. View "STEVE MARQUEZ V. C. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Louisiana state law against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) supervisory officials Tracy DiBenedetto, Angela Griffin, and Sally Gryder in their individual capacities alleging that he was wrongfully detained for sixty days after the expiration of his prison sentence. The district court denied qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage for DiBenedetto and Gryder but found Griffin enjoys qualified immunity. DiBenedetto and Gryder appealed, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they neither violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights nor acted unreasonably in light of clearly established law   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Plaintiff’s right to timely release was clearly established under these particular circumstances because governing law required DPSC to follow the state court’s orders requiring them to credit the Arkansas time. Further, the court found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that DiBenedetto and Gryder were direct participants in violating his right to timely release from prison. According to the complaint, DiBenedetto reviewed all of Plaintiff’s ARPs, knew he was not being credited for the Arkansas time, yet did not take any action to correct the error. Indeed, she personally informed Hicks that her (incorrect) calculation was correct and refused to modify it despite Hicks’ pointing out that his Arkansas time was not credited. View "Hicks v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dissolving Plaintiff's marriage to Defendant, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.At issue in this case was the extent to which a Connecticut court may enforce the terms of a "ketubah," a contract governing marriage under Jewish law. The trial court in this case denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the terms of the parties' ketubah as a prenuptial agreement on the ground that doing so would be a violation of the First Amendment to the United States constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the ketubah; and (2) the trial court's alimony order, considered in light of Plaintiff's net earning capacity, was not an abuse of discretion. View "Tilsen v. Benson" on Justia Law

A school bus driver filed an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two public-sector unions and her employer, the New Hartford Central School District, alleging that their continued deduction of union fees from her paycheck following her resignation from both unions violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). She appealed the dismissal of her claims, arguing that the district court erred by prematurely dismissing her claims against the unions for, among other things, failing to adequately plead state action.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because Appellant voluntarily became a union member and affirmatively agreed to pay union dues through payroll deductions for a set period, the district court properly dismissed her claims. The court explained that New York’s Taylor Law guarantees public employees the right to choose whether to join the union as members, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law Section 202 and prohibits any union or public employer from “interfering with, restraining or coercing public employees in the exercise of their rights.” Here,  it is undisputed that Appellant voluntarily joined the Unions and authorized dues deductions from her wages when she signed the Membership Agreement in 2018. View "Wheatley v. New York State United Teachers, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant postconviction relief by ordering a substantive sentencing hearing, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, it would be manifestly unfair for the district court not to hold a substantive sentencing hearing in accordance with State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 1999).After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant was seventeen years old when he committed the offenses. The district court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive sentences of life in prison without the possibility of release. After Miller v. Alabama, 467 U.S. 460 (2012), was decided, the district court resentenced Defendant to two consecutive sentences of life in prison with the possibility of release after thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed his postconviction petition requesting a substantive hearing to consider whether, pursuant to the test articulated in Warren, his modified sentences should be served concurrently rather than consecutively. The district court granted the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unique circumstances of this case warranted the exercise of this Court's inherent supervisory powers to direct that the district court hold a substantive sentencing hearing in accordance with Warren. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of felony domestic assault-harm under Minn. Stat. 609.2242, subds. 1(2), 4, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury that Defendant could use reasonable force to resist an "assault against the person" rather than to resist any "offense against the person" but that the error was not plain and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) use of nonlethal self-defense under section 609.06, subd. 1(3) requires a person to resist an offense carrying the threat of bodily harm; (2) the district court's use of the phrase "assault against the person" in the jury instruction at issue was not error; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Lampkin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court summarily denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Appellant was conclusively entitled to no relief on his claims even if the facts alleged were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.Appellant, who was imprisoned for first-degree premeditated murder, filed a petition seeking postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal. The district court summarily denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. View "Woodard v. State" on Justia Law

Based on a tip from foreign law enforcement, Kentucky Detective Gatson and federal agents went to Lewis’s home. Lewis invited them inside and signed a form, consenting to “a complete search of the premises, property or vehicle” and electronic devices. A forensic examiner arrived and generated a preview of Lewis’s laptop, which revealed file names indicative of child pornography; on Lewis’s cell phone, he found thumbnail images of Lewis’s cousin’s children bathing naked. Lewis reportedly stated that he did not know that it was illegal to look at child pornography, then invoked his Miranda rights but did not say that he was revoking his consent to search. Gatson obtained a warrant. A forensic search of the seized devices revealed evidence of child pornography on Lewis’s laptop, cell phone, and USB thumb drive.The district court found that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause but that suppression was inappropriate because officers had relied on the warrant in good faith. Lewis conditionally pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The Sixth Circuit vacated. Lewis consented to the initial search of his laptop and cell phone and the officers’ account of that search and the preview generated were validly obtained and are admissible. All other evidence taken from Lewis’s electronic devices was obtained through searches and seizures that were not supported by a valid warrant. The warrant affidavit stated only Gatson’s conclusory belief that a suspect committed a crime and could not establish probable cause, which precludes the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's second-degree murder conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Defendant was the aggressor when she shot and killed the victim, and therefore, the trial court did not err in giving an instruction on the aggressor doctrine.At issue was the proper application of North Carolina's castle doctrine statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-51.2(b). Defendant and the victim in this case had a tumultuous relationship, and on the day of the murder Defendant had warned the victim not to come to her residence. The victim came anyway and was shot and killed. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the aggressor doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury that if it found that Defendant was the aggressor, the presumption in section 14-51.2 was no longer available for her. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict that Defendant was guilty of the first-degree murder of a young child as well as of first-degree kidnapping, sexual offense with a child and felony child abuse inflicting serious injury, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted at trial a full-body photograph of the victim during certain testimony, but the error was not prejudicial; (3) the trial court may have improperly allowed certain witnesses to testify about their emotional reactions to seeing the victim's injuries, but the evidence was not prejudicial; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's second motion to suppress a statement he made to law enforcement officers at a hospital, but there was no prejudice; (5) there was no cumulative prejudice; (6) there was no error in the trial court's rulings related to Defendant's attempt to establish a prima facie case of racial or gender-based discrimination; (7) North Carolina's death sentence system is constitutional; and (8) Defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law