Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and unlawful discharge of a firearm, holding that there was no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion for new trial; (4) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not sufficiently pled; and (5) the cumulative error doctrine did not apply in this case. View "State v. Dap" on Justia Law

Appellant sued the Northside Independent School District, arguing that the District failed to properly accommodate her hearing impairment as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that Appellant’s ADA claim was barred by 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(l), the “exhaustion requirement” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the summary judgment order; the court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of Section 1415(l). The court explained that the district court erred when it held that Appellant did not have a standalone claim under the ADA because the gravamen of her complaint was the denial of a FAPE. Under the plain text of Section 1415(l), “nothing in [the IDEA]” “restricts or limits” Appellant’s ability to assert her claim “under . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act.” The court noted that as Fry explained, “the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under [other federal] laws”—including “the ADA”—“even if . . . those claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would). Further, the court wrote that it cannot affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, as it would return the Circuit to the Smith era—an erroneous decision that would have “consequences . . . for a great many children with disabilities and their parents,” and one which Congress directly abandoned by enacting Section 1415(l). View "Lartigue v. Northside Indep" on Justia Law

Escorted by an officer who had followed him from the scene of a shooting, Hudson entered the Medical Center seeking emergency treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer stood outside Hudson’s hospital room. Medical staff discovered Hudson was concealing “something plastic” in his mouth and spent nearly 20 minutes admonishing Hudson to spit it out before he finally complied, revealing a device used to convert a firearm into a fully automatic weapon. Hudson moved to suppress the device, arguing that the medical staff acted as government agents in conducting a warrantless search.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Knowledge and inaction alone are insufficient to establish an agency relationship. There must be some evidence of government participation in or affirmative encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it unconstitutional. Viewed in context, the officer answered questions but did not direct the medical staff to act in any particular way. The facts supported a finding that medical staff acted with the purpose of providing medical treatment, not assisting law enforcement. The court noted that both the officer and the medical staff apparently assumed that Hudson was concealing drugs, voicing concerns that the suspected drugs could cause him to overdose. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was filming a protest when Officer Olsten pepper sprayed the crowd. She sued Officer Olsten, Commissioner Hayden, and the City of St. Louis for violating her First Amendment rights, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her First Amendment claim against Officer Olsten and her municipal liability claim against the City. She also argued that her state law causes of action should be “reinstated.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that De Mian’s actions motivated Officer Olsten to spray in her direction. So the lack of a causal connection is “so free from doubt as to justify taking this question from the jury.” Plaintiff argued that she is a well-known reporter and is readily identifiable because she is in a wheelchair. But this fact, without more, is insufficient for a jury to infer that Officer Olsten knew or recognized her. She also speculates that Officer Olsten may have been retaliating against her for filming. But “there is no evidence Officer Olsten observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so.” View "Heather De Mian v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

S.C., a high school freshman, was unwillingly video-recorded engaging in non-consensual sexual activity with a male student on school property. The video was shared online and other students began to harass S.C. Students then began harassing and threatening S.C. and her family. S.C. and her mother met with Detective, Carrigan, who assumed the video-recording and sexual encounter were consensual and repeatedly rejected S.C.’s statements and information about the threats, suggesting that S.C. had participated in producing child pornography. Following another meeting, Principal Kessler denied being informed that the encounter was not consensual or of any harassment, although a list of students making threats was found in Kessler’s file. Kessler suspended S.C., after which she was expected to return to school. The Assistant Principal also declined to address the threats. S.C. entered an in-patient facility and continued coursework remotely. Because the threats continued, her family moved to a different county. S.C.'s grades dropped substantially, she began abusing drugs and alcohol, and she engaged in self-harm. Before the incident, the district already had “a widespread problem of students circulating sexual pictures and videos of themselves and their peers.” The district was aware of the problem.S.C. alleged deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment before she was assaulted; deliberate indifference during the investigation; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed. The court found the district liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the Title IX and Section 1983 “before” claims and affirmed that the district is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim. View "S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former pretrial detainees in Prince George’s County, Maryland, appealed from the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The detainees sought an injunction that would require the County to release them, and others similarly situated, on the ground that the County’s pretrial-release program violates the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion without stating its factual findings and legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court explained that the detainees’ motion for a preliminary injunction presented the district court with a disputed factual record and a difficult, fact-bound constitutional question. Thus, the district court had to explain the factual findings and legal conclusions that supported its determination that the preliminary injunction should be denied. Yet it only made generalized comments about the difficulty of deciding. So it violated Rule 52(a)(2). Further, the court wrote that it will disregard a Rule 52(a)(2) error and reach the merits of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order only if there is a record sufficient “to enable us to pass upon the questions involved.” However, there isn’t one here. View "Robert Frazier v. Prince George's County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resisted arrest during a traffic stop, and Officer Patrick deployed a burst of pepper spray to her forehead. Further, Sheriff S. Kincaid’s officers required Plaintiff to remove her hijab for the purpose of taking booking photographs. Plaintiff claimed that Officer Patrick used excessive force in arresting her and that Sheriff Kincaid was liable for her office’s policy that disregarded Plaintiff’s religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Patrick on the basis of qualified immunity, but it granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction, requiring Sheriff Kincaid to destroy all copies of the booking photographs of Plaintiff without her hijab. Sheriff Kincaid filed an appeal seeking to reverse the district court’s order, and Plaintiff filed an appeal from the district court’s order denying her motion for attorneys fees.   As to Sheriff Kincaid’s appeal, the court dismissed it as moot and remanded with instructions to vacate the district court’s judgment. As to Plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissal of her claim against Officer Patrick, the court affirmed. And as to Plaintiff’s appeal of the district court’s order denying her motion for attorneys fees, the court vacated and remanded. The court explained that under Section 1988(b), a prevailing party should ordinarily be awarded reasonable attorneys fees unless special circumstances would render them unjust, whereas under Rule 54(d)(1), a prevailing party is presumed to be entitled to an award of costs unless the court finds an element of injustice in doing so. By addressing Plaintiff’s motion under the incorrect legal standard, the district court erred. View "Abrar Omeish v. Stacey Kincaid" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or to dismiss the indictment and that the government set forth sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his residence and in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to inadequate notice of the warrantless search. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) assuming that the search of Defendant's home was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the facts gathered legally provided an independent and adequate source for the warrant application; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment or suppress the fruits of the warrant due to insufficient notice; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B). View "United States v. Royle" on Justia Law

The appellants in this case filed an action to permanently enjoin enforcement of five Acts of the Oklahoma Legislature. Each Act concerned the termination of a pregnancy. The appellants' challenges were based upon Oklahoma law and not federal law. They argued there was a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy under the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court denied a temporary injunction on three of the Acts, which was the basis of this appeal. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted a temporary injunction pending appeal, vacated the trial court's order denying temporary injunction, directed it to grant a temporary injunction and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the merits. View "Oklahoma Call for Reproductive Justice v. Drummond" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, section 26, protects the right to hunt. Since 1990, Wisconsin has had a special statute making it a crime to harass hunters in various ways; a 2016 amendment makes it a crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by “maintaining a visual or physical proximity” to the hunter, by “approaching or confronting” the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or otherwise recording the hunter's activity. The plaintiffs oppose hunting. They have observed hunters on public land, have sometimes approached and confronted them, have photographed and filmed hunters’ activities, and intend to continue all those activities.The plaintiffs assert that the prohibitions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In a pre-enforcement challenge, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the law and that their facial constitutional challenges failed on the merits.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, first holding that the plaintiffs have standing to bring both their as-applied and facial challenges before formal enforcement efforts because the statute has been used to harass and intimidate them and has caused them to refrain from engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. Certain clauses of the law are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The statute discriminates against speech and expressive activity based on viewpoint and the defendants have not offered justifications for the provision that satisfy strict scrutiny. View "Brown v. Kemp" on Justia Law