Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of rape, one count of aggravated assault, and two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his multiple claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in not withholding from jury deliberations a video exhibit of Defendant's police interview; (2) Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for a mistrial and a new trial arising out of a child witness's breakdown on the witness stand. View "State v. Centeno" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder and sentencing him to forty years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) as concerning the prosecutor's effort to conceal the State's involvement in Defendant's transfer proceedings, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion to neutralize any error; (2) the circuit court acted within its discretion to denying Defendant's motion for mistrial; (3) viewed in their entirety, the instructions given to the jury correctly stated the applicable law; (4) the exercise of the circuit court's discretion did not contravene Defendant's right to present a complete defense; and (5) Defendant's sentence could not be described as grossly disproportionate to his crime. View "State v. Black Cloud" on Justia Law

Parolees sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), claiming that its parole revocation system violated the Due Process Clause. Recognizing the system’s flaws, MDOC rewrote its policies and consented to summary judgment. Later, MDOC moved to dismiss for failure to join a required party—the Missouri Public Defender Commission (Commission). The district court denied MDOC’s motion and held a hearing to determine whether MDOC’s revised policies satisfied due process. Finding additional problems, the district court issued a remedy order instructing MDOC to make changes.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that the state must hold a revocation hearing “within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” The court wrote that MDOC has a policy requiring a revocation hearing within 30 days, but it does not always follow that policy. The district court ordered MDOC to follow its 30-day policy. The court wrote that because it has held that longer delays may be reasonable in some cases, the remedy is not tailored to the violation and was an abuse of discretion. View "Stephanie Gasca v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law

McMullen was convicted under Indiana law of possession of cocaine and marijuana. In preparation for sentencing, McMullen’s attorney, Lewis, said he “really didn’t do anything independently to develop any mitigation” and “just relied” on the PSR although he knew McMullen “came from a seriously troubled background.” Lewis did not consider having a mental health professional evaluate McMullen, who was given a 50-year sentence, largely based on his criminal history. State courts rejected his claim of ineffective assistance. The district court denied his petition for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although in 2021, an Indiana trial court modified McMullen’s sentence and placed him on probation, the issue was not moot. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to “Strickland.” Given that the state was asking for the statutory maximum prison term, Lewis’s investigation should have gone beyond reliance on the PSR, and talking to a relative. The state appellate court failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence, which is significant and compelling. On remand, the district court must consider evidence and argument as to whether Lewis had any strategic reasons for the limits of his investigation into McMullen’s mental health and background and the presentation of mitigating circumstances. View "McMullen v. Dalton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions for felony charges stemming from an inventory search of an impounded truck that Defendant was driving when he was pulled over by a law enforcement officer, holding that the search was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth Amendment.Law enforcement performed an inventory search as to the truck at issue and found a handgun in the truck's right door panel. After Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence of the gun the trial court found him guilty. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the state's evidence was insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the inventory search was lawful. View "State v. Toran" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by the State of an order and judgment dismissing with prejudice criminal charges against Defendant, holding that there was no final, appealable judgment, and therefore, the State lacked statutory authority to appeal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 547.200.Defendant, who was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court sustained the motion in part and dismissed the murder and robbery charges with prejudice, concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded those charges. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this was an improper appeal. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states —had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics like the COVID-19 lab-leak theory. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. The officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court affirmed with respect to the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, and CISA and reversed as to all other officials. As to the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. Instead, the record shows, at most, that public statements by Director Anthony Fauci and other NIAID officials promoted the government’s scientific and policy views and attempted to discredit opposing ones—quintessential examples of government speech that do not run afoul of the First Amendment. Further, as for the State Department, while it did communicate directly with the platforms, so far, there is no evidence these communications went beyond educating the platforms on “tools and techniques” used by foreign actors. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.   The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim. View "Sacks v. Texas Southern University" on Justia Law

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) suffered a severe COVID-19 outbreak. In an attempt to protect CIM inmates, high-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from CIM to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that infected over two-thousand inmates and ultimately killed over twenty-five inmates and one prison guard. The wife of one of the deceased inmates sued, claiming that the prison officials had violated her husband’s constitutional and statutory rights. The officials moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were barred by various federal and state immunities, including immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and qualified immunity. The district court held that the officials were not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and the officials filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the PREP Act and qualified immunity in an action brought against California prison officials arising from the death of a San Quentin inmate from COVID-19; and (2) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Defendants’ claims asserting immunity under state law. The panel held that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, which adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of San Quentin inmates, including Hampton. View "MICHAEL HAMPTON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the Hocking County Common Pleas Court and Judge Dale Crawford in Appellant's action for writs of mandamus and prohibition, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims.Appellant was found guilty of assaulting a peace officer. The court of appeals affirmed. About seven years later, Appellant filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition alleging that the trial court deprived her of her constitutional right to counsel and lacked jurisdiction to hold the sentencing hearing. The court of appeals concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that res judicata barred this mandamus and prohibition action. View "State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law