Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress items seized during a traffic stop, holding that the government was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.Defendant was stopped by a New Hampshire police officer for failing to use a turn signal on a road that narrowed from two lanes to one lane. After the officer discovered that Defendant had outstanding arrest warrants the officer arrested Defendant and seized a bag from him containing narcotics. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that New Hampshire law did not require use of a turn signal at the merge point on the roadway at issue. The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to rely on a yield sign in the roadway to govern the factual situation he was encountering; and (2) it was not a reasonable mistake of law for the officer to believe that a turn signal was required at the merge point. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Appellant's conviction for willfully violating 18 U.S.C. 922(n) - the federal prohibition on the receipt of a firearm by someone "under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" - and vacated Appellant's sentence, holding that an instructional error and the application of a "trafficking of firearms" enhancement were in error.Appellant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(n) and 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A), the federal prohibition on "dealing in firearms" without a license. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the "willfully" element of the section 922(n) offense; (2) remand was required for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's claim of actual conflict of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and (3) the trial court erred in applying the "trafficking" enhancement, and the error was not harmless. View "United States v. Daniells" on Justia Law

Over 20 years ago, taxpayers sued Kentucky and Sunrise, a religiously affiliated organization, for alleged violations of the Establishment Clause by paying for religious services that Sunrise allegedly imposed on children in state custody. The Sixth Circuit remanded the approval of a 2013 settlement. In 2015, the parties replaced monitoring provisions that mentioned Sunrise with general language about “any Agency.” The Third Circuit held, for the third time, that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their Establishment Clause claim but that the 2015 Amendment required new regulations or modifications to existing regulations for implementation, which meant the Amendment violated Kentucky law. In 2021 Kentucky and the plaintiffs jointly moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. Kentucky agreed to pursue new regulations in good faith; certain provisions of the Agreement would not take effect unless those regulations were adopted. The Settling Parties did “not” seek to have the court retain jurisdiction for enforcement, nor to incorporate the Agreement in the order of dismissal.Noting that the motion was filed by “the parties to the sole remaining claim,” the Establishment Clause claim against Kentucky, the district court dismissed the case. The court refused to address the terms of the 2021 Agreement, which was not properly before it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “Sunrise no doubt is frustrated to find itself unable to vindicate the legality of its program” but federal courts do not decide constitutional issues in the abstract. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Cichocki called the police to report that her 15-year-old daughter, G.C., had been sexually assaulted by Garcia days earlier at a resort where the families were vacationing. Cichocki told Detective Posewitz that G.C. had reported that, while G.C. and the other children were in the pool, Garcia purposely touched her breasts and “down there.” Both families stayed at the resort until the next afternoon. Cichocki suggested that G.C. could not remember all the details of the incident and had expressed fear that the video would contradict her report. Posewitz interviewed G.C., who described the incidents. Surveillance footage of the pool area was poor quality and inconclusive. Although the area was crowded, there were apparently no witnesses. ADA Spoentgen drafted a criminal complaint, which ADA Hoffman reviewed. It did not refer to the surveillance footage or Cichoki's statements. The Court Commissioner found probable cause for Garcia’s arrest. The court found probable cause to proceed to trial. After Hoffman’s opening statement, the judge declared a mistrial because Hoffman mentioned that G.C. had a learning disability, which had not been disclosed to the defense.Garcia sued Posewitz, Hoffman, and Spoentgen under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. No reasonable jury could find that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the information omitted from the complaint would have negated probable cause. G.C.’s and Cichocki’s accounts were largely consistent; the defendants lacked any indication that either had a motive to lie. View "Garcia v. Posewitz" on Justia Law

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted in part Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and vacated the BIA's order denying Petitioner CAT relief as to Ecuador, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Petitioner was charged with removability for entering the country without admission or parole. Petitioner conceded removability and sought deferral of removal under CAT. An immigration judge (IJ) denied relief. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner petitioned for review and was subsequently removed to Ecuador. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision insofar as it denied Petitioner's CAT claim linked to the vernal violence in Ecuadorian prisons, holding that the BIA and IJ failed to apply the proper legal test in assessing whether the Ecuadorian government would consent or acquiesce to acts of torture by private actors in Ecuadorian prisons. View "Murillo Morocho v. Garland" on Justia Law

This appeal centers around section 4(a)(1)–(3) of Alabama’s Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection Act (the “Act”). Section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act states that “no person shall engage in or cause” the prescription or administration of puberty-blocking medication or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor’s perception of his or her gender or sex if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Shortly after the Act was signed into law, a group of transgender minors, their parents, and other concerned individuals challenged the Act’s constitutionality, claiming that it violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As part of that lawsuit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Alabama from enforcing section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing this preliminary injunction because it applied the wrong standard of scrutiny. The plaintiffs have not presented any authority that supports the existence of a constitutional right to “treat [one’s] children with transitioning medications subject to medically accepted standards.” Nor have they shown that section 4(a)(1)–(3) classifies on the basis of sex or any other protected characteristic. Accordingly, section 4(a)(1)–(3) is subject only to rational basis review. The court explained that the district court erred by reviewing the statute under a heightened standard of scrutiny, its determination that Paintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits cannot stand. View "Paul Eknes-Tucker, et al. v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

Doe, a University of Michigan student, was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded, he sued. alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction preventing the disciplinary process from proceeding. The Sixth Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of “Baum,” in which it held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision.The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal was heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate. The Sixth Circuit determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the summary judgment order. Doe then sought attorney fees, which the district court granted.The University appealed again. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due process claim seeking the release of his transcript. View "Doe v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2006, Soto’s wife reported the death of their two-year-old son. Soto admitted that the child’s death was his fault but described it as an accident: he said he had been driving an ATV around his property and had run over the toddler by mistake. Soto agreed to plead guilty to child endangerment in exchange for the dismissal of a manslaughter charge. Soto served his five-year sentence and left prison in 2011. In 2016, Soto went to the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office and confessed that he had actually beaten his son to death and had staged the ATV accident to cover up his crime. Soto was charged with aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence.Soto claimed double jeopardy in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Jeopardy attaches to an “offence” under the Double Jeopardy Clause, only when a court or jury has the power to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to that “offence.” During Soto’s 2006 plea hearing, jeopardy attached to the child-endangerment charge once the court accepted Soto’s guilty plea for that charge; the court lacked power to determine Soto’s guilt or innocence of the manslaughter charge. Jeopardy never attached to that charge. View "Soto v. Siefker" on Justia Law

Louisiana State University (“LSU”) (collectively “the Professors”) appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity after Plaintiff alleged that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by conspiring to prevent his continued enrollment in Louisiana State University’s (“LSU”) theatre program.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that they were not entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The court held that the Professors lacked adequate notice that their conduct was violative of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and because they did not have this notice, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that the clearly established standard requires more than that—there must be a “high degree of specificity” between the alleged misconduct and the caselaw purporting to clearly establish the violation. Without it, the requisite “fair warning” required under the clearly established inquiry is absent. View "Babinski v. Sosnowsky" on Justia Law