Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Raynard Jackson, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), was placed in a cell without running water for five days. He alleged that Lieutenant Dane Esser, among other WSPF staff, knew that he did not have water and yet failed to turn the water on. After Jackson showed another staff member that he did not have water, the water was promptly turned on; however, he claimed Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff failed to provide him with medical care for his dehydration. Jackson filed grievances pertaining to these issues. After he exhausted his administrative remedies within the WSPF, he sued Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The district court, only considering the processed grievances, and without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Jackson had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to certain claims and defendants. Additional defendants, Nurse Beth Edge and Captain Dale Flannery, were dismissed at summary judgment, leaving only the claims against Lt. Esser for trial. The jury found for Lt. Esser on both claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Jackson that the district court should not have disregarded his allegedly unprocessed grievances without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, the court found no error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson’s processed grievances did not exhaust remedies as to all his claims. The court also found no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nurse Edge or its evidentiary rulings before trial. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a hearing on the allegedly unprocessed grievances. View "Jackson v. Esser" on Justia Law

The case involves two states and five individual social media users who sued several federal officials and agencies, alleging that the government pressured social media platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs' speech was related to COVID-19 and the 2020 election. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, which was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit held that both the state and individual plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive relief and that the government entities and officials, by coercing or significantly encouraging the platforms’ moderation decisions, transformed those decisions into state action.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding that neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs have established Article III standing to seek an injunction against any defendant. The Court found that the plaintiffs' theories of standing depended on the platforms’ actions, yet the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin the platforms from restricting any posts or accounts. Instead, they sought to enjoin the Government agencies and officials from pressuring or encouraging the platforms to suppress protected speech in the future. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs must show a substantial risk that, in the near future, at least one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff in response to the actions of at least one Government defendant. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden. View "Murthy v. Missouri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to interpret Florida’s law prohibiting riot, section 870.01(2), Florida Statutes (2021). The question was whether the law applies to a person who is present at a violent protest, but neither engages in, nor intends to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct. The court ruled that it does not.The case originated from a lawsuit filed by a group of plaintiffs against Governor Ron DeSantis, three Florida sheriffs, and Attorney General Ashley Moody in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court agreed and enjoined the enforcement of the statute. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the central constitutional question was the statute’s scope and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that a "violent public disturbance" under section 870.01(2) is characterized by harm to persons or property, and not by peacefulness. To "willfully participate" in a "violent public disturbance," a defendant must have "intentionally, knowingly, and purposely" chosen to be part of it. Therefore, to be guilty of the crime of riot, one must "engage in," or at least "intend to assist others in engaging in, violent and disorderly conduct." The court found that the statute was not ambiguous and returned the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. View "DeSantis v. Dream Defenders" on Justia Law

The case involves three transgender individuals, Rowan Fowler, Allister Hall, and Carter Ray, who sued the Governor of Oklahoma, the Commissioner of Health for the Oklahoma State Department of Health, and the State Registrar of Vital Records. The plaintiffs challenged an executive order issued by the Governor that directed the Oklahoma State Department of Health to stop amending sex designations on birth certificates. The plaintiffs, who had obtained court orders directing that their sex designations on official documents be amended, had their applications for amended birth certificates denied by the Department of Health, citing the Governor's executive order.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that the policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the equal protection claim, but affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim. The court found that the policy of denying sex-designation amendments on birth certificates was not rationally related to any legitimate state interest and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege that their involuntary disclosures of their transgender status amounted to state action. View "Fowler v. Stitt" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, a law that categorically bans transgender women and girls from participating in women's student athletics. The Act also provides a sex dispute verification process, which allows any individual to dispute the sex of any student athlete participating in female athletics in the State of Idaho and require her to undergo intrusive medical procedures to verify her sex. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman who wished to try out for the Boise State University women’s track and cross-country teams, and Jane Doe, a cisgender woman who played on high school varsity teams and feared that her sex would be disputed under the Act due to her masculine presentation, filed a lawsuit against the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction against the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the Act subjects only students who wish to participate in female athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender girls and women at all levels from competing on female teams. The court also found that the State of Idaho failed to provide any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Act likely violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the Act discriminates on the basis of transgender status and sex, and that it is not substantially related to its stated goals of equal participation and opportunities for women athletes. The court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate scope of injunctive relief. View "Hecox v. Little" on Justia Law

Seattle Pacific University (SPU), a religious institution, filed a lawsuit against the Washington Attorney General, alleging First Amendment violations arising from the Attorney General's investigation into the university's employment policies and history under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). SPU prohibits employees from engaging in same-sex intercourse and marriage. After receiving complaints, the Attorney General requested documents related to SPU's employment policies, employee complaints, and job descriptions. SPU sought to enjoin the investigation and any future enforcement of WLAD.The district court dismissed the suit, citing lack of redressability and Younger abstention. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that SPU failed to allege a cognizable injury for its retrospective claims, as the Attorney General's request for documents carried no penalties for non-compliance. However, the court found that SPU had standing for its prospective pre-enforcement injury claims, as SPU intended to continue employment practices arguably proscribed by WLAD, the Attorney General had not disavowed its intent to investigate and enforce WLAD against SPU, and SPU's injury was redressable. The court also held that Younger abstention was not warranted as there were no ongoing enforcement actions or any court judgment. The case was remanded to the district court to consider prudential ripeness. View "SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

A group of patrons of the Llano County library system in Texas sued the county, its officials, and the library's director and board, alleging that their First Amendment rights were violated when seventeen books were removed from the library due to their content. The plaintiffs claimed that the books, which covered topics such as sexuality, homosexuality, gender identity, and the history of racism, were removed because the defendants disagreed with their messages. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, requiring the defendants to return the books and preventing them from removing any other books during the lawsuit.The defendants appealed the decision, arguing that the removal of the books was part of the library's standard process of reviewing and updating its collection, known as the "Continuous Review, Evaluation and Weeding" (CREW) process. They also claimed that the plaintiffs could still access the books through an "in-house checkout system."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but modified the language of the injunction to ensure its proper scope. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim, as the evidence suggested that the defendants' substantial motivation in removing the books was to limit access to certain viewpoints. The court also found that the plaintiffs would likely suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted, as they would be unable to anonymously peruse the books in the library without asking a librarian for access. The court concluded that the balance of the equities and the public interest also favored granting the injunction. View "Little v. Llano County" on Justia Law

The case involves the American Alliance for Equal Rights (the Alliance), a membership organization dedicated to ending racial classifications and preferences in America, and Fearless Fund Management, LLC (Fearless), a venture capital fund that invests in businesses led by women of color. Fearless organized the "Fearless Strivers Grant Contest," a funding competition open only to businesses owned by black women. The Alliance, representing several members who wished to participate in the contest but were not black women, sued Fearless, alleging that the contest violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits private parties from discriminating on the basis of race when making or enforcing contracts.The district court denied the Alliance's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent Fearless from closing the application process. The court concluded that the Alliance had standing to sue and that § 1981 applied to Fearless's contest. However, it also concluded that the First Amendment "may bar" the Alliance's § 1981 claim on the ground that the contest constitutes expressive conduct, and that the Alliance hadn't demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Alliance has standing and that preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate because Fearless's contest is substantially likely to violate § 1981, is substantially unlikely to enjoy First Amendment protection, and inflicts irreparable injury. The court affirmed the district court's determination that the Alliance has standing to sue but reversed its decision and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. View "American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Fearless Fund Management, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Maria Vullo, the former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS). The NRA alleged that Vullo violated their First Amendment rights by pressuring regulated entities to disassociate from the NRA and other gun-promotion advocacy groups. The NRA claimed that Vullo threatened enforcement actions against those entities that refused to disassociate, thereby stifling the NRA's pro-gun advocacy.The District Court initially denied Vullo's motion to dismiss the NRA's First Amendment damages claims, holding that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo's actions could be interpreted as a veiled threat to regulated industries to disassociate with the NRA or risk DFS enforcement action. However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision, concluding that Vullo's alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement, not unconstitutional coercion. The Second Circuit also held that even if the complaint stated a First Amendment violation, the law was not clearly established, and so Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity.The Supreme Court of the United States, however, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's advocacy. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo" on Justia Law

Sanjay Tripathy, a former inmate in the New York correctional system, filed a lawsuit against state prison officials. He claimed that they forced him to enroll in a sex-offender program that required him to accept responsibility for his crimes, which he argued violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. He also claimed that he was assigned to a more intensive tier of the program in violation of his due process rights, and that he was retaliated against after he challenged the program by filing grievances and this lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed Tripathy's claims. The court ruled that his claim for damages under RLUIPA was barred by precedent that the statute does not permit individual-capacity damages. The court also found that his demands for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when his state convictions were vacated and he was released from prison. Regarding his constitutional claims, the court concluded that Tripathy’s free exercise claim under the First Amendment was barred by qualified immunity, that he lacked standing to seek damages for his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he failed to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Tripathy's claim for damages under RLUIPA was barred by precedent, that his demands for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to his release from prison, and that his constitutional claims were properly dismissed by the district court. View "Tripathy v. McKoy" on Justia Law