Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Township solicited bids for the demolition of former hospital buildings. ICC, a Detroit-based minority-owned company, submitted the lowest bid. AAI, a white-owned business submitted the second-lowest bid, with a difference between the bids of almost $1 million. The Township hired a consulting company (F&V) to vet the bidders and manage the project. F&V conducted interviews with both companies and provided a checklist with comments about both companies to the Township. ICC alleges that F&V made several factual errors about both companies, including that AAI had no contracting violations and that ICC had such violations; that ICC had no relevant experience, that AAI had relevant experience, and that AAI was not on a federal contracting exclusion list. F&V recommended that AAI receive the contract. The Township awarded AAI the contract. ICC filed a complaint, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and Michigan law.The district court dismissed the case, finding that ICC failed to state a claim under either 42 U.S.C. 1981 or 42 U.S.C. 1983 by failing to allege the racial composition of its ownership and lacked standing to assert its constitutional claims and that F&V was not a state actor. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. ICC had standing to bring its claims, and sufficiently pleaded a section 1981 claim against F&V. The other federal claims were properly dismissed. View "Inner City Contracting LLC v. Charter Township of Northville" on Justia Law

Sergeant Albee saw a truck pulling a partially loaded car hauler semitrailer with no driver’s side markings indicating the company name or the DOT number required by federal regulations. The hauler was only partially loaded, which Albee found unusual; no registration was displayed on the trailer. During the subsequent traffic stop, Webb displayed “a state of panic” and had no organized documentation. He volunteered that he had been stopped several times and that the vehicle had been checked for drugs. Albee found that statement “bizarre.” Webb gave Albee a cab card that was Illinois apportioned, but the displayed license plate was from California. Albee performed a free air sniff test with his canine partner. After a positive alert on the trailer, a search revealed an unlicensed firearm and 2736 grams of cannabis–street value $40,000.Webb was convicted of cannabis trafficking, possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and possession of cannabis. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Webb’s argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the cannabis on the basis that the positive canine alert, without more, was not sufficient to establish probable cause following changes to Illinois cannabis legislation. Albee relied on more than the dog sniff. The totality of the facts and circumstances justified a reasonable person in believing that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity. View "People v. Webb" on Justia Law

Montanez was convicted based on the 2002 murder of Villalobos and Ramirez. The court sentenced him to mandatory natural life for two first-degree murder convictions, a 20-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction, and a 27-year consecutive sentence for an aggravated kidnapping conviction.Montanez challenged the denial of his request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. He sought to raise a claim that the prosecution violated “Brady” by failing to disclose evidence relevant to his defense that was stored in a file in the basement of the Chicago Police Department and was discovered after his convictions. Montanez claims that although he became aware of the file during his first postconviction proceedings (which included 46 constitutional claims) he was unable to obtain the file during those proceedings to establish that it contained material that would have been helpful to his defense.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial. In addition to failing to raise a Brady violation claim based on the entirety of the CPD file in his proposed successive petition, Montanez’s attempt to raise this claim on appeal was barred by res judicata. Montanez’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition falls short of demonstrating that the procedural hurdles for filing a successive petition should be lowered in this case. View "People v. Montanez" on Justia Law

In 2010, Agee strangled his girlfriend, Davis, during a physical altercation. He went directly to the police station and voluntarily made a statement, which was recorded on video. Agee did not realize that Davis had died and expressed concerns that she would be okay. Agee pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to 25 years.Agee filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek an expert to testify as to his mental health. Postconviction counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition adding a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Agee that he could pursue a second-degree defense murder at trial. The court dismissed the amended petition. Agee appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel erroneously failed to allege all the elements of a second-degree murder claim. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Rule 651(c), requiring reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, does not require “any level of representation in the presentation of new claims.”The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The appellate court erred in finding that Rule 651(c) does not require any level of representation in the presentation of added claims in an amended pro se postconviction petition but Agee failed to demonstrate that postconviction counsel failed to make amendments to the pro se petition as necessary for an adequate presentation of his claims. He cannot show deficient performance. The record rebuts Agee’s claims about a second-degree murder defense. View "People v. Agee" on Justia Law

Roland, filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his bench trial for a 2002 attempted murder when his attorney failed to present evidence of his mental health history. After a pre-trial evaluation, Roland had been found fit to stand trial. The expert determined he was legally sane at the time of the offense but that he may have been experiencing symptoms of a depressive mood disorder that was likely exacerbated by alcohol and illegal substances. At trial, Roland testified to having attempted suicide in jail and that he fired a gun while being chased by police because he had wanted police to shoot and kill him.After the petition was advanced to the second stage of proceedings, it was dismissed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. It is not reasonably likely that further evidence of Roland’s mental health history would have changed the trial court’s determination that Roland’s conduct during the shooting did not demonstrate that he wanted to commit suicide by police; the court noted that he fled from the police, taking evasive measures to avoid being shot. Roland’s postconviction petition failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of “Strickland.” View "People v. Roland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was bitten and injured by a police dog after Plaintiff’s partner called 911 to report that Plaintiff was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot. In the operative third amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted various claims against Sutton and Montes in their individual capacities as well as claims against the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, she asserted (1) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 excessive force claim against Sutton; (2) a Section 1983 failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim against Montes; (3) a Section 1983 municipal/Monell liability claim against the City of Conroe; and (4) various failure-to-accommodate claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against both the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Montgomery County and Montes jointly moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, raising, inter alia, a qualified immunity defense as to Montes.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to allege specific and nonconclusory facts that would show that the City was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy. Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Sligh’s failure-to-train claim against the City of Conroe. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff can “prevail only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” But she does not attempt to make this showing. Nor could she. View "Sligh v. City of Conroe" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants, several city officials of the City of Gloucester, Massachusetts, in this First Amendment action brought by Plaintiff, the Harbormaster of the city, holding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment by retaliating against him for his giving expert testimony in a maritime tort dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, at the time of the alleged retaliation, the law did not clearly establish that the value of Plaintiff's speech outweighed the city's interest in the efficient provision of public services by the Harbormaster's office. View "Ciarametaro v. City of Gloucester" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Petitioner’s initial 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition, he obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He argued that exceptional circumstances warranted this relief because his original Section 2254 counsel had, in effect, abandoned him by submitting a Section 2254 petition that omitted several potentially meritorious issues and inadequately presented the issues that had been raised. He asked the court to reopen the judgment and allow him to file additional briefings and new claims. The district court concluded that Petitioner’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, Petitioner was attempting to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent the statutory limits placed on second or successive Section 2254 petitions. Recognizing that it would lack jurisdiction to consider a second Section 2254 petition, the district court denied Petitioner’s motion without considering its merits. Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion because he effectively sought to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition, something that a district court cannot authorize. The court also wrote that because it also concludes that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner’s motion rather than deny it, it vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Steven Bixby v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for relief and resentencing under the new procedure set forth in Senate Bill No. 1437 (former Cal. Penal Code 1170.95, subd. (a); now Cal. Penal Code 1172.6, subd. (a)), holding that the trial court erred.Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 narrowing or eliminating certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. Petitioner petitioned for relief and resentencing under the new procedure, but the trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Petitioner's prima facie showing and should have proceeded to an evidence hearing on Petitioner's resentencing petition. View "People v. Curiel" on Justia Law