Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

During a domestic dispute, Plaintiff shot his unarmed twenty-two-year-old son, killing him. He was arrested and prosecuted for murder but was acquitted after a jury trial. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the City of Apopka, Florida and some of its police officers. He asserted a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim that he was arrested without probable cause, a Florida state law claim for false arrest based on the same contention, and a Section 1983 claim that the officers’ search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial that based on the failure to give a municipal liability jury instruction that he requested. On remand, the district court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. It determined that there was actual probable cause to support Plaintiff’s arrest and that even in light of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contended, among other things, that he was arrested without probable cause.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Plaintiff’s requested instruction because the issue of custom or practice liability was not, as the court pointed out, properly before the jury. The court explained that the district court, as it was required to do, followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate when it determined that the issue of custom or practice municipal liability was not properly before the jury. View "Timothy Davis, Sr. v. City of Apopka" on Justia Law

Defendant, who has long struggled with serious mental-health issues—has a pattern of threatening judges. This case arises out of a threat that he recently made against a federal magistrate judge in his hometown of Fort Pierce, Florida. Defendant was convicted in federal court of (1) mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 876(c) and (2) threatening a federal official. For his crimes, he was sentenced to 60 months in prison. Defendant now challenged his convictions and sentence on five grounds.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the judge expressly considered two other factors when making his sentencing decision, both of which he cited as bases for an upward departure: (1) Defendant’s history of making threats; and (2) the evidence of racial animus. Further, even if the district judge’s reference to his own religious experience was improper, it didn’t “substantially affect his selection of Defendant’s sentence”—and, therefore, was harmless. View "USA v. Lawrence F. Curtin" on Justia Law

Officers swarmed a New Jersey hotel room to execute an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores in connection with his suspected involvement in a robbery. They found car keys during a search incident to arrest. Although Montalvo-Flores exclaimed that those were his car keys, he did not have a valid driver’s license. Upon locating the car in the parking lot, officers discovered that its registered owner was the Enterprise. Officers called Enterprise’s regional risk manager to obtain permission to search the car, stating that Montalvo-Flores was operating the vehicle while involved in criminal activity. The manager, noting Montalvo-Flores was not listed on the rental agreement (his girlfriend, Pisciotta, was) gave officers consent to search the vehicle. In that search, officers found 304 grams of cocaine inside the trunk.Montalvo-Flores, charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), moved to suppress, arguing that he, with his girlfriend’s permission, lawfully possessed and controlled the car. The district court denied Montalvo-Flores’s motion, holding that he lacked standing because he failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Third Circuit reversed. Montalvo-Flores had dominion and control of the car with his girlfriend’s permission and had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. View "United States v. Montalvo-Flores" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against the City of St. Louis and Doc’s Towing, Inc., alleging that Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they detained her truck pursuant to a “wanted” report. On the first appeal of this case the Eighth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient for Plaintiff’s claims to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff then settled with Doc’s Towing, and her case against the City proceeded to trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City on Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on her due process claim and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court denied the City’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law but partially granted its motion to reduce the damages award. Both the City and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as to Plaintiff’s assertion on cross-appeal that the district court erred by granting the City judgment as a matter of law on her unreasonable seizure claim, the court declined to reverse that ruling. The court explained that her due process claims and unreasonable seizure claim sought compensation for the same injury, and she concedes that she would not be entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond those that were already awarded by the jury. Accordingly, the court declined to remand because Plaintiff failed to articulate what relief she could obtain beyond what she has already achieved by way of the jury verdict. View "Mary Meier v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff y filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiff’s post was constitutionally protected speech and that the grant of summary judgment was improper. The court explained that regardless of the unnamed deputy’s comment, Iles admitted that he arrested Plaintiff at least in part because of the content of his Facebook post, rather than for some other conduct, i.e. Iles admitted that the arrest was at least “substantially motivated” by Plaintiff’s speech. Further, there is t no dispute as to the second element, as Plaintiff’s speech was chilled when he deleted his Facebook post in response to the arrest. Thus, when Iles arrested Plaintiff, he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and a patient at Patton State Hospital in California, he was twice attacked by a fellow patient. He sued Defendant, the psychiatrist in charge of his unit, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injuries from the second attack, alleging that Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel determined that both tests ask whether Defendant’s conduct was reasonable, and both require Alexander to show that Defendant’s conduct was worse than negligent. The panel held that under either test, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Defendant failed to act reasonably, let alone that he was “more than negligent” in not transferring Plaintiff or the other patient after the first attack. Although Plaintiff was attacked a second time, the evidence showed that Defendant’s responses to both incidents were thorough and careful. Accordingly, the panel found no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. View "SURIE ALEXANDER V. DAU NGUYEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that his former employer, ADESA Missouri, LLC (ADESA), discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ADESA’s reasons for terminating him were pretext for disability discrimination and retaliation. The court agreed with Plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable jury could determine that the company’s VP made the decision to terminate Plaintiff  because of his medical restriction and only retroactively claimed a performance-based concern after HR advised her that terminating an employee due to his disability could be “an issue.” The evidence shows that the VP sent an email to HR about an employee with a “medical restriction” who had been “identified” for termination, asking if this could be “an issue.” Only after she learned that it could be a problem did the VP respond with specific criticisms of his performance. ADESA argues that because Plaintiff does not dispute he was underperforming compared to his peers, there can be no pretext. But neither the sales director nor the VP was able to say when they took these performance assessments into consideration. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised genuine doubt as to ADESA’s proffered reasons for his termination. View "Roby Anderson v. KAR Global" on Justia Law

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

McElhaney’s daughter, L.M., played high school softball. The school's “Parent–player Information” sheet stated: “Playing time is a non-negotiable for coaches to talk directly with parents about.” L.M.’s playing time decreased. McElhaney texted Coach Williams to express his displeasure. Williams responded, indicating McElhaney should reconsider either his tactics or his participation. McElhaney texted a conciliatory reply but Williams forwarded the messages to Principal Stepp, who banned McElhaney from a week’s worth of softball games. McElhaney unsuccessfully challenged but did not honor the suspension. Stepp spotted McElhaney and asked him to leave. Fearing arrest, McElhaney left. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), asserting that his communications with Williams constituted First Amendment-protected speech and that the school officials had impermissibly retaliated against him for exercising those speech rights and did not afford him due process before infringing on his property right to his season tickets. The district court held that the right to attend games after criticizing the coach was not clearly established, meaning any purportedly retaliatory acts did not violate McElhaney’s settled constitutional rights and that McElhaney did not experience a due process violation because any alleged injury could be remedied through a breach of contract action.The Sixth Circuit reversed. It is clearly established at a low level of generality that when a school employee interacts with a student, speech by the student’s parent about those interactions enjoys First Amendment protection. On remand, the court must resolve whether retaliation occurred. View "McElhaney v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hill and Combs kidnapped 12-year-old Fife, beat Fife, raped him in multiple ways, strangled him, bit his genitals, sodomized him, and burned him. Fife’s father found him in a field. Fife died days later. Several witnesses testified that Hill was around the crime scene. The state introduced Hill’s confession that he had watched Combs beat and rape Fife. There was physical evidence. One witness testified that Hill had raped her in the same wooded area and another testified that Hill had raped her multiple times. Hill was sentenced to death in 1986. Ohio courts rejected Hill’s appeal and state habeas petition.Hill’s 1996 federal habeas petition challenged the denial of expert assistance on bitemark evidence. While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Atkins.” On remand, the state court determined that Hill was not intellectually disabled; his death sentence stood. Following a remand by the Supreme Court and various Sixth Circuit decisions, Hill sought a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence,” a report from the American Board of Forensic Odontology that suggested using bitemarks to identify a specific individual might not be reliable. Ohio courts held that there was “no probability” that a new trial would lead to a “different outcome” because the state had proffered so much other evidence of guilt.Hill’s second federal habeas petition argued that the state trial court violated his due process rights by not properly conducting a materiality review of the bitemark evidence. The Sixth Circuit characterized Hill’s petition as “second or successive,” so Hill was required to meet the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). Under Hill's interpretation, "Hmost convictions involving forensic evidence would never be final." View "In re: Hill" on Justia Law