Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs and one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs and finding that $1,500 was subject to criminal forfeiture, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) Defendant's claim that his right to a speedy trial was violation under the Maine Constitution failed because he did not adequately assert his right, and his speedy trial claim under the United States Constitution failed under obvious error review; (2) Defendant's claim under the Maine Constitution that evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant was inadmissible was unpreserved, and his claim under the United States Constitution that the warrants were not supported by probable cause failed; and (3) Defendant's last argument on appeal was unavailing. View "State v. Norris" on Justia Law

A 911 call, reported that “the people that live behind me” were “yelling and what sounds like him hitting something.” Officers Curtis and Gray responded to the address, wearing activated body cameras. Not seeing or hearing anything amiss outside, they knocked. Reed answered the door. Gray asked, “Do you mind stepping out here and talking to me for a second?” Reed asked, “you got a warrant?” Gray replied, “nope,” explaining that “somebody called and said that somebody was fighting.” Reed said, “Wasn’t here.” After additional discussion, Gray stated they needed to talk to other adults in the house; “if not, then we can come in … exigent circumstances.” Reed closed his door. The officers kicked the door down. Curtis stepped inside, drew his firearm, pointed it at Reed’s head. then put the gun away, and pulled Reed outside. Gray pushed Reed against the car and patted him down. Other officers arrived and spoke with Reed’s family. Satisfied that everyone in Reed’s house was safe, the officers documented the damage to Reed’s door and left.The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Campbell County and against the officers in their official capacities; dismissed a Terry claim as “duplicative” of a false arrest claim; dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and declined to award the officers qualified immunity on the individual capacity unlawful-entry, excessive-force, and false-arrest claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights. View "Reed v. Campbell County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

Philadelphia Police obtained a search warrant for the house where Dennis resided, suspecting that it was being used for drug activity. Dennis was not home. Six officers performing surveillance were in plain clothes “to maintain an advantage.” They spotted Dennis driving near his house and decided to stop his car. The ensuing events were captured by a nearby surveillance camera. The plainclothes officers in unmarked police cars surrounded Dennis’s vehicle at an intersection. For 48 seconds, Dennis attempted to free his car, bumping into the police vehicles. When Dennis’s car appeared to have stopped, Officer Nicoletti shot Dennis, who was unarmed, three times through the driver’s window. Dennis died at the scene.In the ensuing lawsuit (42 U.S.C. 1983), the court found open questions of fact concerning excessive force claims against Philadelphia and Nicoletti, regarding whether Dennis posed a threat to the officers or public safety. The court denied Nicoletti qualified immunity, reasoning that his conduct: “sho[oting] at an unarmed driver attempting to escape at slow speed who had hit a car,” and/or “using deadly force against an individual driving a car” when “the driver did not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or others,” violated clearly established law. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to consider Nicoletti’s factual arguments and rejecting any arguments that could be construed as a legal challenge to the holding that his conduct violated clearly established law. View "Rush v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor of economics at SUNY Albany, alleged that his failure to advance within his department to his colleagues’ unfavorable view of the methodology he employs in his scholarship. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants, two of Plaintiff’s colleagues who were involved in the hiring decisions at issue. Plaintiff asserted three causes of action: (1) a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 ; (2) a claim pursuant to Section 1983 for injunctive relief against SUNY Albany President in the form of a court order to “prevent ongoing discrimination against Keynesian economists” in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) an age discrimination claim under New York State’s Human Rights Law. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it disagrees with much of the district court’s reasoning, it nonetheless agrees with its ultimate disposition. The court held that Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), does not apply to speech related to academic scholarship or teaching and that Plaintiff’s speech addressed matters of public concern, but that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim nonetheless fails because under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), a public university’s interest in deciding for itself what skills, expertise, and academic perspectives it wishes to prioritize in its hiring and staffing decisions outweighs Plaintiff's asserted interest in competing for academic positions unencumbered by university decisionmakers’ assessment of his academic speech. View "Heim v. Daniel" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, Tufts University, on summary judgment and refusing to alter to amend that ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued Tufts, her former employer, alleging that she was denied a full professor position on the basis of sex discrimination and/or retaliation for engaging in protected conduct in violation of federal and state anti-discrimination laws, specifically, for her filing a claim of sexual harassment. The district court granted summary judgment for Tufts. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Tufts on Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims; and (2) did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion for an altered or amended judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). View "Ing v. Tufts University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court denying Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance and that the State had not violated its Brady obligations during the underlying proceedings, holding that there was no error.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of distribution of heroin and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the appellate court certified questions of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the post-conviction court did not err in ruling that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move production of certain evidence; and (2) assuming, without deciding, that the State was required to disclose challenged impeachment evidence prior to the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, Defendant failed to establish the Brady materiality standard. View "Blake v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from taking any further action in Petitioner's criminal case other than dismissing the pending charges against him, holding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) mandated dismissal of Petitioner's case.As a basis for the writ, Petitioner claimed that the circuit court violated the IAD by continuing his criminal case and failing to conduct a trial within 180 days of his request to dispose of his pending charges of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the writ, holding (1) the IAD applied to the disposition of the state charges pending against Petitioner resulting in a detainer being lodged with the federal penitentiary where he was serving a federal sentence; (2) the State waived any post hoc objection as to the sufficiency of Petitioner's request to dispose of his pending charges; (3) good cause did not exist under the IAD warranting continuing Petitioner's trial; and (4) Petitioner's actions did not waive, toll or otherwise justify extending the timeline mandated by the IAD. View "State ex rel. Wishom v. Honorable Bryant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Holy Cross College, Inc. and Congregation of Holy Cross Moreau Province, Inc. (collectively, “Holy Cross”) in the district court. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from sexual abuse carried out by Holy Cross teacher on two separate occasions while attending summer camp at Holy Cross as a 10- or 11-year-old boy in either 1968 or 1969. Plaintiff asserted that Holy Cross is liable for the teacher’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the alleged abuse, such an offense was subject to a one-year liberative prescriptive period. Plaintiff invoked the Revival Provision as his basis to bring a suit. The district court granted Holy Cross’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that while the appeal was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in T.S v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc., 2023 WL 4195778. The court wrote that with the benefit of the T.S. decision, the court is now certain as to how this case should be resolved under Louisiana law. As previously noted, the facts of both cases are nearly identical. Therefore, it is apparent that the district court should not have ruled on the Revival Provision’s constitutionality. Instead, it is now clear that the Revival Provision’s wording makes it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, his complaint should be dismissed for that sole reason. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider whether Plaintiff should be provided with leave to amend his complaint. View "Lousteau v. Holy Cross College" on Justia Law

A school resource officer tased a special-needs student who physically struggled with school staff while attempting to leave school following a violent episode. The student’s mother sued the officer and the school district, bringing constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  The district court granted summary judgment to the officer and school district.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, based on recent Supreme Court precedent, that the district court incorrectly subjected the disability discrimination claims to administrative exhaustion. On the merits, however, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the officer and school district. The court explained that the officer’s use of his taser in this situation was poor judgment, especially after Plaintiff’s son had ceased struggling. However, the court explained that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are not the proper vehicles for remedying “all unreasonable, inappropriate, unprofessional, and/or unduly harsh conduct by public agents. View "W. v. Paley" on Justia Law