Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court summarily denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Appellant was conclusively entitled to no relief on his claims even if the facts alleged were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.Appellant, who was imprisoned for first-degree premeditated murder, filed a petition seeking postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal. The district court summarily denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. View "Woodard v. State" on Justia Law

Based on a tip from foreign law enforcement, Kentucky Detective Gatson and federal agents went to Lewis’s home. Lewis invited them inside and signed a form, consenting to “a complete search of the premises, property or vehicle” and electronic devices. A forensic examiner arrived and generated a preview of Lewis’s laptop, which revealed file names indicative of child pornography; on Lewis’s cell phone, he found thumbnail images of Lewis’s cousin’s children bathing naked. Lewis reportedly stated that he did not know that it was illegal to look at child pornography, then invoked his Miranda rights but did not say that he was revoking his consent to search. Gatson obtained a warrant. A forensic search of the seized devices revealed evidence of child pornography on Lewis’s laptop, cell phone, and USB thumb drive.The district court found that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause but that suppression was inappropriate because officers had relied on the warrant in good faith. Lewis conditionally pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The Sixth Circuit vacated. Lewis consented to the initial search of his laptop and cell phone and the officers’ account of that search and the preview generated were validly obtained and are admissible. All other evidence taken from Lewis’s electronic devices was obtained through searches and seizures that were not supported by a valid warrant. The warrant affidavit stated only Gatson’s conclusory belief that a suspect committed a crime and could not establish probable cause, which precludes the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's second-degree murder conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Defendant was the aggressor when she shot and killed the victim, and therefore, the trial court did not err in giving an instruction on the aggressor doctrine.At issue was the proper application of North Carolina's castle doctrine statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-51.2(b). Defendant and the victim in this case had a tumultuous relationship, and on the day of the murder Defendant had warned the victim not to come to her residence. The victim came anyway and was shot and killed. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the aggressor doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury that if it found that Defendant was the aggressor, the presumption in section 14-51.2 was no longer available for her. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict that Defendant was guilty of the first-degree murder of a young child as well as of first-degree kidnapping, sexual offense with a child and felony child abuse inflicting serious injury, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted at trial a full-body photograph of the victim during certain testimony, but the error was not prejudicial; (3) the trial court may have improperly allowed certain witnesses to testify about their emotional reactions to seeing the victim's injuries, but the evidence was not prejudicial; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's second motion to suppress a statement he made to law enforcement officers at a hospital, but there was no prejudice; (5) there was no cumulative prejudice; (6) there was no error in the trial court's rulings related to Defendant's attempt to establish a prima facie case of racial or gender-based discrimination; (7) North Carolina's death sentence system is constitutional; and (8) Defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court that overruled Defendant's motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant's challenges to his convictions and the five death sentences he received for murders he committed during a bank robbery were unavailing.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of five counts of first degree murder, among other offenses, and sentenced to death for each of the five murders. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and additional claims. The district court denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) denying relief for other alleged violations of Defendant's constitutional rights. View "State v. Galindo" on Justia Law

Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officer Gunn testified that he observed a Buick parked in a “known high-crime area” and ran a license plate check, which came back as belonging to an Acura. Finley, who is Black, stepped out of the vehicle with his wife. Finley stated that they had recently purchased the vehicle and provided title and registration information, establishing the car was not stolen. After obtaining Finley’s driver’s license, Gunn learned that Finley was on federal probation with a search clause. Gunn searched the vehicle and retrieved a backpack, containing a loaded handgun without a serial number.Finley alleged a violation of the Racial Justice Act (Penal Code 745(a)(1)). The prosecution noted that the Supreme Court has stated that an area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in determining the reasonableness of investigative detention and that it is “common practice” for an officer to run a query of a person’s name. The trial court concluded that Finley did not establish a prima facie violation of the Racial Justice Act under the totality of the circumstances, noting that the officer was courteous.The court of appeal ordered a rehearing. The trial court’s review of Finley’s motion went beyond the confines of determining whether it stated a prima facie case. The focus at this stage of the proceedings should be on Finley’s allegations and supporting evidence, not evidence supporting the prosecution’s argument. View "Finley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the circuit court on postconviction review ordering a new trial for Petitioner, holding that Petitioner was provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's order prohibiting any consultation about the case (a no-communication order) between Petitioner and trial counsel under the circumstances of this case.At issue was a no-communication order entered into between Petitioner and trial counsel during an overnight recess prior to the final day of testimony in Petitioner's murder trial and trial counsel's failure to object to the order. The circuit court ruled that the no-communication order, and trial counsel's failure to object, deprived Petitioner of the assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and presumed prejudice, thus ordering a new trial. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Petitioner could not show prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) trial counsel's conduct in this case resulted in the actual denial of the assistance of counsel, and prejudice was presumed; and (2) therefore, the circuit court properly ordered a new trial for Petitioner. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wayne County has a policy or practice of seizing vehicles and their contents without probable cause, simply because of the vehicle’s location in an area generally associated with crime. Wayne County impounds the vehicles and their contents until the owner pays a redemption fee: $900 for the first seizure, $1,800 for the second, and $2,700 for the third, plus towing and storage fees. The owner's only alternatives are to abandon the vehicle or to wait for prosecutors to decide whether to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings. Before a forfeiture action is brought, there are multiple pretrial conferences involving the owner and prosecutors, without a judge; prosecutors attempt to persuade the owner to pay the fee by pointing out that storage fees accrue daily. Missing just one conference results in automatic forfeiture. It takes at least four months, beyond any previous delays to arrive before a neutral decisionmaker. The seizure proceedings are conducted under Michigan’s Nuisance Abatement statute, the Controlled Substances Act, and the Omnibus Forfeiture Act, which do not protect plaintiffs from the pre-hearing deprivation of their properties.The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods— with no timely process to contest the seizure. Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. View "Ingram v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Appellant was civilly committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246 in February 2009 due to a mental disease or defect that created a substantial risk of harm to the public. After several conditional releases and revocations, in April 2022, and while represented by counsel, Appellant filed a motion for discharge pro se, which the district court denied on the basis that a motion for discharge may not be filed by a pro se petitioner. Appellant appealed, asserting that prohibiting him from seeking a discharge pro se is a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 4247(h) provides the process by which a civilly committed person may seek a discharge. The provision plainly permits only counsel or the legal guardian of the committed person to file a motion to discharge Accordingly, it follows that a committed person may not file such a motion pro se. The court explained that Appellant asserts that this amounts to a denial of access to the courts. The court wrote that it has previously addressed the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation in the context of civil commitment, concluding that this right does not apply to civil commitment proceedings. Further, the court explained that even assuming that the right of self-representation applies to a Fifth Amendment access-to-the-courts claim, Appellant’s claim would still fail because he cannot show the requisite prejudice. View "United States v. Luis Vazques" on Justia Law