Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant Officer arrested Plaintiff for telephone harassment after she witnessed Plaintiff call in false complaints about her neighbors’ supposedly loud music. The harassment charges were dropped, however. Plaintiff then sued Defendant for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Her claim was dismissed based on qualified immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the magistrate judge erred by (A) concluding Defendant reasonably believed she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for telephone harassment and (B) determining no issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that, before arresting Plaintiff, Defendant called the district attorney’s office to ensure that a telephone harassment charge was proper. The court wrote that as the magistrate judge observed, nothing about the circumstances taints Defendant’s beliefs as unreasonable: (1) Plaintiff called multiple times to report loud music that day; (2) other officers found no loud music playing when they arrived; (3) the alleged noisemakers claimed they were not playing loud music; (4) no music was playing during the several hours Defendant was on the scene; and (5) while Defendant stood behind the neighbors’ fence hearing no noise, she received reports Plaintiff was still calling in complaints. Thus the court wrote that it sees no error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendant reasonably believed probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest. View "Perry v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Carafem provides abortion care, birth control, and STD testing in several states. One clinic was in a medical office building in a Nashville suburb. Carafem filed suit under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248, alleging that on July 26, 2022, the OSA defendants refused to move from the building's front doors and blocked the entrance for several minutes before police ordered them to move to the sidewalk. The defendants allegedly stated that they would return each day and ‘escalate’ activities. During an alleged incident on July 28, approximately 60 people associated with OSA attempted to enter Carafem’s clinic by pretending to seek services. After being denied entry, one stated that “either they [are] gonna let us in or we take this whole building down.”The district court granted a temporary restraining order and, later, a preliminary injunction under the Act. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and later moved the court to take judicial notice of Carafem’s announcement that it was pausing in-person services at the clinic due to Tennessee’s new abortion ban. The Sixth Circuit dismissed and remanded, The issue of whether the court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction has been overtaken by a dispute over whether intervening events warranted modifying or dissolving that injunction, raising new factual and legal issues that the district court is best positioned to resolve. View "FemHealth USA, Inc. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several officers of the Tucson Police Department. Two officers (collectively, “Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged First Amendment retaliation claims arising from Defendants’ investigation of two arsons that occurred at properties connected to the husband. Defendants appealed from the district court’s order denying without prejudice their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. It was not clearly established that Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by the police. Nor was it clearly established that a retaliatory investigation per se violates the First Amendment. Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims based on the husband's silence and Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and requests for public disclosures. View "GREG MOORE, ET AL V. SEAN GARNAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

Parents Defending Education, an association of parents, brought this action to challenge a policy adopted by the Linn Mar Community School District in Iowa. The disputed policy is entitled “Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes.” The policy sets forth regulations for the District that “address the needs of transgender students, gender-expansive students, nonbinary, gender nonconforming students, and students questioning their gender to ensure a safe, affirming, and healthy school environment where every student can learn effectively.” The parents who seek to participate in this case are anonymous; the pleadings identify them by a letter of the alphabet. The district court determined that Parents Defending failed to establish Article III standing because the organization did not show injury, causation, or redressability on its claims.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part as moot and reversed on one claim. The court concluded that at least Parent G has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Parent G asserts that her son wants to “state his belief that biological sex is immutable.” Because of the policy, however, Parent G states that her son remains silent in school “when gender identity topics arise” to avoid violating the policy. This student’s proposed activity “concerns political speech” and is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” Thus, Parent G has standing to bring a claim challenging the policy based on the First Amendment. Therefore, Parents Defending has standing as an association to pursue the claim on behalf of a member. View "Parents Defending Education v. LinnMar Community School Dist., et al" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Plaintiffs each purchased real estate in Cleveland, planning to rehabilitate and redevelop the properties. Before those purchases, Cleveland declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after the Plaintiffs invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them. After the demolition of the buildings, the Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the demolitions violated state laws and federal constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Each Plaintiff received “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” After their purchases, Cleveland sent “new owner letters” via certified mail both to the property address and to each Plaintiff's statutory agent, including both the notice of condemnation and demolition order. Neither Plaintiff applied for required rehabilitation permits. View "First Floor Living LLC v. City of Cleveland, Ohio" on Justia Law

Louisiana’s Attorney General filed a request for mandamus relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the merits of this congressional redistricting case.   The Fifth Circuit granted in part and ordered the district court to vacate the October Hearing. The court explained that redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. The court explained that the district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal. Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here. The court held that the state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal. Further, the court noted that if this were ordinary litigation, the court would be most unlikely to intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. The court held that the district court here forsook its duty and placed the state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically. View "In Re: Jeff Landry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional because it gives the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections discretion to determine the process by which a lethal injection is administered, holding that there was no error.Appellant, a death-row inmate, argued that section 176.355 lacked suitable standards because it afforded the Director complete discretion to determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the execution. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, combined with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, provided the Director with suitable standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be administered. View "Floyd v. State, Dep't of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court accepting Appellant's plea of no contest to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child and imposed the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q), holding subsection (q) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.Upon accepting Appellant's no contest plea the district court placed him on probation and imposed the special condition mandated by subsection (q), which prohibits a defendant on probation for a sexual offense from accessing the internet without his probation officer's permission. On appeal, Appellant argued that the mandatory internet ban failed intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the mandatory internet ban and otherwise affirmed, holding that because Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest with no tailoring mechanism it is facially unconstitutional. View "Aldape v. State" on Justia Law

TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”). The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying cartridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud controlled Phazzer Electronics, and Phazzer Electronics employed, among others, Defendant. In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt for violating the 2017 injunction, Abboud and Defendant went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names. Based on that activity, the district court found Defendant (and others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. At issue on appeal is whether the 2017 injunction extended broadly enough to bind Defendant and prohibit her conduct under the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the district court decided   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the record cannot sustain Defendant’s conviction.  The court explained that the district court did not make factual findings about whether Defendant was a key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction. View "USA v. Diana Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2003, Salem received a license to practice law in New York. He applied for but was denied a license to practice in Illinois, where he resides, but maintained an Illinois practice, from 2004-2019, by obtaining permission to appear pro hac vice. The Illinois Attorney Disciplinary and Registration Commission (IARDC) charged him with falsely representing that he was licensed in Illinois and successfully requested that the Illinois Supreme Court prohibit Illinois courts from allowing him to appear pro hac vice for 90 days. Salem filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Salem’s suit and ordered him to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court first rejected Salem’s argument that every Illinois district judge should be disqualified and the case transferred to Michigan. The court then held that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court cannot be collaterally attacked in civil litigation. The court noted that the defendant, the IARDC, did not deprive Salem of liberty or property and that there was a rational basis for the Supreme Court’s decision. The court described the litigation as frivolous and noted Salem’s history of “preposterous” behavior in federal court. View "Salem v. Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipinary Commission" on Justia Law