Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part Defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, abuse of a child, aggravated endangering a child, aggravated assault, and criminal damage to property, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in providing to the jury Instruction No. 15, the jury instruction on aggravated kidnapping with intent to facilitate a crime; (2) Instruction No. 9, the aiding and abetting instruction, did not misstate the law, was legally appropriate, and was constitutional; (3) Defendant's argument that his convictions for felony murder and aggravated child endangerment must be reversed because his convictions for those crimes were logically impossible was without merit; (4) Defendant's constitutional challenge to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2302(c) was without merit; (5) assuming without deciding that the prosecutor erred in saying that the victim's eyes were gone, the error was harmless; and (6) Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5408(a)(3) is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Bodine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal challenging his guilty plea to theft in the second degree, holding that Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of new legislation limiting his ability to appeal was unavailing.The legislation at issue limits the ability of a defendant to appeal as a matter of right from a conviction following a guilty plea and directs that ineffective assistance of counsel claims be presented and resolved in the first instance in postconviction relief proceedings. On appeal from his conviction of theft in the second degree Defendant argued that the new legislation violated his right to equal protection of then laws and the separation of powers doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's constitutional challenges failed. View "State v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dissolving the marriage of Daniel Cornwell and Melanie Cornwell, holding that the district court did not err in using the immediate offset method of valuation to value the martial portion of Daniel's pension.Both parties appealed in this case. Daniel argued that the district court erred in using the immediate offset method to value his pension. On cross-appeal, Melanie argued that the district court erred in not awarding her attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by using the immediate offset method of valuation and to accordingly value and divide the estate; and (2) did not err in not awarding Melanie attorney fees and costs. View "Cornwell v. Cornwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the allowance of Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the evidence supporting the charge of armed home invasion was insufficient to allow a finding beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of the offense.Defendant was convicted of armed home invasion, armed burglary, robbery while armed and masked, and other charges. Defendant later filed a motion for a new trial on the charge of armed home invasion, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he was armed when he entered the building. The superior court allowed the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed and vacated and set aside Defendant's conviction of armed home invasion, holding that because there was no evidence that Defendant armed himself with a weapon before he entered the building, he could not be convicted of armed home invasion. The Court remanded the matter to the superior court for reconsideration of the sentencing scheme on the remaining convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Tinsley" on Justia Law

Owens was convicted of five counts of possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)), one carjacking, four counts of bank robbery by force or violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. A single section 924(c) conviction carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Each subsequent 924(c) conviction then (2004) triggered an additional 25 years, even if those convictions were part of a single indictment. If Owens had agreed to cooperate, the government would have allowed him to plead guilty to a single count. After Owens rejected the government’s offers, he was convicted and sentenced to 1260 months.Owens’s co-conspirators pleaded guilty and were sentenced, respectively, to 21 months, 33 months, 39 years, and 25 years of incarceration. In 2019, Owens sought resentencing, noting that he would not be subject to the same lengthy sentence if sentenced today because the First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. 924(c), so that his sentence would be 25 years. Appointed counsel argued that Owens was punished for going to trial and emphasized his “remarkable” record of rehabilitation. Owens then moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Owens’s motion, concluding that the disparity between Owens's sentence and the sentence that he would receive today was not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. The court did not consider any other factors. The Sixth Circuit reversed, directing the court to consider whether Owens’s rehabilitative efforts and the lengthy sentence he received because of exercising his right to a trial may, in combination with the First Step Act’s changes, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

A Milpitas Fire Department captain responded to Nunes’s house one afternoon based on a report of a “whole structure fire.” He saw no fire and no smoke. Neighbors standing outside stated they had recently seen smoke coming from the backyard. A police officer “pounded” on the house’s door. No one answered. The fire captain opened a gate and entered the backyard, where he smelled smoke in the air. He found no active fire but saw test tubes, chemistry equipment, and a homemade toy rocket that looked burned on the ground. The captain noticed a closed shed. No smoke was coming from it, nor did the smell of smoke seem to originate there. He opened the shed “to make sure everything is clear,” and saw a metal cabinet. The captain admitted there was nothing specific about the cabinet that made him think he should look inside: He opened the cabinet, saw unfamiliar bottled chemicals, and called the hazardous materials team.The police ultimately obtained a search warrant, based in part on those chemicals. After the search warrant was executed, Nunes was charged with numerous offenses for possessing explosives and explosive materials. Denying Nunes's motion to suppress evidence, the trial court concluded that the search was valid under the exigent circumstances exception. The court of appeal reversed. Opening the cabinet inside the shed, however prudent and well-intentioned, was not an action necessary to prevent imminent danger. View "People v. Nunes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed with Andersen from 2000-2018, was terminated for violating lock-out, tag-out (LOTO) safety procedures. After plaintiff filed suit against Andersen, he voluntarily dismissed four of his eight claims and the district court granted summary judgment on the remaining four claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that Andersen did not violate the Minnesota Whistleblower Act by terminating his employment in retaliation for his previous sexual harassment and falsified documentation complaint. The court explained that plaintiff failed to show causation between the protected activity and his discharge, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. The court also concluded that plaintiff was unable to establish the causal link necessary for a prima facia case of retaliation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Family Medical Leave Act also failed for lack of causation. View "Lissick v. Andersen Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA in an action brought by plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and a hostile work environment she experienced during her employment at the Kansas City VA.Applying the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims failed at the first step because she did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, or constructive discharge. In this case, many of the events plaintiff presents as adverse employment actions—the decision not to "board" the Coding Document Improvement Program (CDI) position, inadequate training on CDI duties, assignment of additional coding work, her performance review, and the written counseling—are not adverse employment actions for purposes of Title VII. View "Watson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second-degree rape and simple assault, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the second-degree rape charge.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction for second-degree rape because there was sufficient evidence of "force" as required under S.D. Codified Laws 22-22-1(2); (2) the circuit court did not commit plain error by allowing certain testimony; and (3) the representation provided by Defendant's trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient. View "State v. Townsend" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence of death imposed on Defendant after a new penalty phase ordered by the Supreme Court, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court remanded for a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), after, after a new penalty phase, the jury returned a unanimous verdict recommending that Defendant be sentenced to death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to show error, much less prejudicial error. View "Deviney v. State" on Justia Law