Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against T-Mobile and Broadspire, alleging transgender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his treatment while working as a retail employee at a T-Mobile store.The Fifth Circuit held that, under Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), a plaintiff who alleges transgender discrimination is entitled to the same benefits—but also subject to the same burdens—as any other plaintiff who claims sex discrimination under Title VII. In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to support an inference of transgender discrimination—that is, that T-Mobile would have behaved differently toward an employee with a different gender identity. The court explained that, where an employer discharged a sales employee who happens to be transgender—but who took six months of leave, and then sought further leave for the indefinite future, that is an ordinary business practice rather than discrimination. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's remaining issues on appeal are likewise meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two prisoners on Idaho's death row, filed suit seek information concerning Idaho's execution procedures. Plaintiffs claim that the deprivation of execution-related information itself constitutes a violation of their constitutional and statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court determined that plaintiffs' claims were unripe because they have ongoing post-conviction litigation, the outcome of which remains uncertain.The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. As to ripeness, Idaho acknowledges that both plaintiffs are close to exhausting their post-conviction appeals and intends to proceed with their executions; plaintiffs claim the state's refusal to provide certain information violates their rights now; and the state has issued a revised execution protocol, from which the court can readily determine now whether plaintiffs' alleged rights, if they exist, have been violated. In these circumstances, the panel concluded that plaintiffs' claims are ripe. Given the unusual timeline of events in this case, the panel must also consider mootness. Because Idaho has now issued a revised Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that explains the procedures and drugs the state will use, these claims are moot. Applying the ripeness and mootness principles to each of plaintiffs' specific claims, the panel concluded that Claim One, Claim Two, part of Claim Four, part of Claim Five, and Claim Seven are ripe. The panel found the rest moot. Furthermore, the panel lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. View "Pizzuto v. Tewalt" on Justia Law

In 2005, Guenther was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the penalty for that offense to a 15-year minimum and a maximum of life in prison if the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” Guenther’s PSR identified two convictions for first-degree burglary (1990 and 1992), second-degree burglary (1986), and kidnapping (1990), all under Minnesota law. The judge applied ACCA and sentenced him to 327 months. His Eighth Circuit direct appeal failed as did his petition for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2017, incarcerated in Wisconsin, Guenther sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that his Minnesota burglary convictions are not “violent felonies”The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief. A section 2255 motion in the sentencing court is normally the exclusive method to collaterally attack a federal sentence, but the “saving clause,” 2255(e) provides a limited exception, allowing a prisoner to seek section 2241 relief in the district of confinement if “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit applies the exception when the prisoner relies on an intervening statutory decision announcing a new, retroactive rule that could not have been invoked in his first section 2255 motion and the error is serious enough to amount to a miscarriage of justice. Guenther’s Minnesota burglary convictions are not ACCA predicates under Seventh Circuit law. View "Guenther v. Marske" on Justia Law

Triplett pleaded guilty to three charges of human trafficking, pimping and pandering, and possession of a firearm by a felon, in exchange for the dismissal of 17 charges (including attempted first-degree homicide and kidnapping), which were to be “read-in” at sentencing (essentially allowing the judge to consider them as relevant conduct), Triplett’s total sentencing exposure was reduced from 354 years to a maximum of 47.5 years. The judge confirmed with defense counsel that the dismissed charges would be read-in. Defense counsel noted that Triplett did not admit the truth of the charges. In signing his plea agreement, Triplett acknowledged that “although the judge may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, the maximum penalty will not be increased.” The judge ordered Triplett to serve 11 years in prison followed by nine years of supervision.Triplett unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea. Without conducting a hearing, the court determined that even if Triplett was given incorrect advice about the read-charges, Triplett was not prejudiced. The plea questionnaire and waiver of rights warned Triplett that the court could consider those charges. The court also represented that it had not considered the read-in charges at sentencing. Wisconsin's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The Wisconsin court’s rejection of Triplett's ineffectiveness claim rests on an adequate, independent state ground--Triplett’s failure to allege objective facts in support of his claim of prejudice. View "Triplett v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Five South Bend officers were assigned to an area of the city that was considered to be a “hot spot.” One drove a fully marked police vehicle. Two officers patrolled in an unmarked car without sirens or lights; two sat in an unmarked car that had sirens and lights. Around 4:30 am, the patrolling car radioed over the tactical channel that they planned to stop a speeding car. The remaining officers promptly acknowledged the report but did not indicate that the traffic stop was an emergency, nor did they request assistance from other officers.After hearing the exchanges, knowing that no one was requesting assistance, Gorny (two miles away) roared through a residential neighborhood at 78 miles per hour, disregarding the 30 mph speed limit, with infrequent use of lights or sirens. On Western Avenue, he accelerated up to 98 mph and reached the Kaley Avenue intersection with an obstructed view. Disregarding the red light, Gorny sped across and crashed into Flores’s car, killing her.The district court dismissed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive due process action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Flores’s allegations plausibly state claims against Gorny and the city. The law does not provide a shield against constitutional violations for state actors who consciously take extreme, obvious risks. Flores’s complaint plausibly alleges that the city acted with deliberate indifference by failing to address the known recklessness of its officers as a group and Gorny in particular. View "Flores v. City of South Bend" on Justia Law

After an allegation that Bush had choked his son, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) began an investigation. Bush’s then-wife, Erika, obtained a court order suspending Bush’s parenting time. Bush filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of himself and his children, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and claiming that DCFS employees’ conduct set off events culminating in a state court order infringing on his and his kids’ right to familial association.The district court dismissed, finding that Bush and his children lacked standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and that the Younger abstention doctrine barred the court from ruling on the remaining constitutional claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.. Bush failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing for his First Amendment claim. Adhering to principles of equity, comity, and federalism, the court concluded that the district court was right to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the remaining claims. View "J.B. v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Cuyahoga County planned for CCCC to house detainees and prisoners from nearby communities in exchange for significant payments. CCCC was already severely overcrowded and understaffed. In March 2018, Cleveland transferred inmates to CCCC. In May, the County Council agreed that CCCC’s issues were “mission-critical” but no action was taken.On June 20, 2018, Johnson was detained at CCCC, awaiting trial for petty theft. During intake, a nurse noted that he was “likely a suicide risk" having previously attempted self-harm. No protective action was taken. Days later, Johnson told a nurse that he was “suicidal.” No action was taken. CCCC correctional officers were aware that Johnson was a suicide risk. On June 29, Officers placed Johnson in solitary confinement for allegedly trying to steal food; no one checked on him. That evening, Johnson was found hanging in the cell. CCCC lacked a device for cutting him down. On July 1, Johnson died.The Department of Justice reviewed and reported CCCC's “appalling conditions,” including medical staff lacking proper licenses, mental health appraisals not being conducted in a timely manner, and deliberate use of food deprivation as punishment. CCCC housed 2,420 individuals; its capacity was 1,765. There were 96 correctional officer vacancies.Moderwell sued corrections officers and executives under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants judgment on Eighth Amendment claims and dismissed an excessive force claim against the executives but concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged excessive force against the officers and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against the executives. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against the officers rely on the same facts as the excessive force claims, so denying qualified immunity did not impose additional discovery burdens. Whether precedent clearly established a right that was violated by the executives requires factual development. View "Moderwell v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant with the Binghamton Police Department, filed suit against the City, the City's mayor, and two Department officials, alleging that he was racially harassed by members of the Department and retaliated against for voicing concerns about discrimination.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because the complaint does not support an inference that he was punished for engaging in protected speech. Although the complaint does not "enumerate" a claim for discrimination alongside the cause of action for retaliation, the court found that plaintiff does identify a discrimination claim. In this case, the introduction of the complaint specifies that plaintiff brings a "claim for discriminatory conduct based on Hispanic origin . . . pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Furthermore, the complaint includes numerous factual allegations sufficient to notify defendants that plaintiffs seeks redress for discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part for further proceedings. View "Quinones v. City of Binghamton" on Justia Law

After a federal district court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus triggering plaintiff's release from prison, he filed a claim with the Board, seeking compensation as a wrongfully convicted person. The Board denied the claim and plaintiff sought mandamus relief in the trial court, which upheld the board's determination.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court should have granted the mandamus petition because the federal court's Schlup finding and the later grant of habeas relief that resulted in plaintiff's release from prison without retrial by the state amount to a finding of factual innocence that the Legislature intended to be binding, and to preclude holding a Board hearing. In determining otherwise, the court concluded that the Board did not accord the Schlup finding the significance it deserves and the Board construed Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (a) in a manner that undermines the Legislature's intent and effectively renders the statutory provision inoperative in practice. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment reversing the Board's order denying plaintiff's compensation claim and directing the Board to recommend, pursuant to section 4904, that an appropriation be made and petitioner's claim paid. View "Larsen v. California Victim Compensation Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, high school students, filed suit against two Northwest Missouri State police officers for allegedly violating certain statutory and constitutional rights during the investigation of misconduct by plaintiffs attending a summer camp on the university campus. Plaintiffs' claims arose from an incident where the officers directed the high school coach to gather students in a room to hold them there "for interrogation" following a report that someone was photographing a female coach in one of the dormitory rooms.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the officers' motion to dismiss the claims against them based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that, given the state of the law, a reasonable officer could have proceeded on the understanding that a student seizure is permissible if it is reasonable under the standard of New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). In this case, a reasonable officer could have believed that the seizure was reasonable where a reasonable officer could have believed that they were authorized to investigate the incident to comply with both Title IX and Missouri law regarding invasion of privacy. Furthermore, the seizure was reasonable in scope and duration. Finally, 18 U.S.C. 5033 and 5038 are inapplicable here, and thus the officers are entitled to dismissal on these claims. Finally, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the conspiracy claim. The court remanded with directions to dismiss the claims against the officers. View "T.S.H. v. Green" on Justia Law