Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Marc Susselman received a traffic ticket from a Washtenaw County Sheriff’s deputy for failing to yield to a police cruiser with flashing lights. This ticket was later dismissed, but Susselman received another citation for failing to obey a police officer directing traffic. The Michigan circuit court ultimately dismissed the second ticket as well. Susselman then filed a federal lawsuit asserting constitutional and state law claims against Washtenaw County, the Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office, the sheriff’s deputy, and Superior Township, Michigan.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all claims. Susselman appealed the decision. The district court had found that the Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Susselman had waived certain state-law claims. The court also dismissed Susselman’s federal claims, including First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution, as well as state-law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Susselman failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation or behavior by the deputy that would support his claims. Specifically, the court found that the issuance of the second ticket did not constitute a violation of substantive due process or First Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Susselman did not establish a civil conspiracy or meet the requirements for his state-law claims. The court also concluded that Susselman did not identify any municipal policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional violation, thus dismissing his claims against Washtenaw County and Superior Township. View "Susselman v. Washtenaw County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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In September 2018, Bryana Baker was arrested and taken to Butler County Jail, where she began experiencing drug withdrawal symptoms. After attempting to escape, she was placed in disciplinary isolation. Despite multiple mental health assessments indicating she was not suicidal, Baker was placed on suicide watch due to erratic behavior. On September 24, she was removed from suicide watch but was not cleared for single-celling. The next day, after a series of altercations with her cellmate, Officer April Riahi closed Baker’s cell door. Shortly thereafter, Baker was found hanging in her cell and later died.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants, including Officer Riahi, Sheriff Richard Jones, and Butler County. The court found no evidence of deliberate indifference or constitutional violations by the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Officer Riahi was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law indicated her actions were unconstitutional. The court also found that Sheriff Jones could not be held liable under supervisory liability since there was no underlying constitutional violation by Riahi. Additionally, the court ruled that Butler County was not liable under municipal liability theories because there was no deliberate indifference to a clearly established right. Lastly, the court determined that Riahi and Jones were entitled to Ohio statutory immunity on the state-law claims, as their actions did not amount to recklessness under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, granting summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. View "Campbell v. Riahi" on Justia Law

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A civilian, Clarissa Gilmore, was strip-searched while visiting her incarcerated husband at Smith State Prison in Georgia. During the search, officers manipulated her breasts, ordered her to bend over, and felt between her buttocks with a gloved hand. The officers did not inform her of the reasons for the search, and no contraband was found. Gilmore sued the officers and the Georgia Department of Corrections, claiming the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that the search did not violate clearly established law and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court concluded that the officers acted within the scope of their discretionary authority and that there was no clearly established requirement for reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search of a prison visitor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the strip search violated Gilmore’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that correctional officers must have at least reasonable suspicion that a visitor is concealing contraband before conducting a strip search. However, the court also found that no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent expressly prohibited suspicionless strip searches of prison visitors at the time of the search. As a result, the law was not clearly established, and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Gilmore v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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A retired Navy chaplain, Allen Lancaster, sued several Navy officials in their official capacities, alleging discrimination in the Navy’s promotion practices. Lancaster claimed he was not promoted due to retaliation based on personal hostility and denominational prejudice. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including orders to remedy the harm to his career and to hold new promotion boards. Lancaster also challenged the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States and the constitutionality of a statutory privilege for selection board proceedings.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Lancaster’s amended complaint with prejudice on res judicata grounds, referring to several prior decisions in the longstanding dispute over the Navy’s promotion procedures for chaplains. After Lancaster’s death, his widow, Darlene Lancaster, sought to reopen the case, substitute herself as the plaintiff, and amend the dismissed complaint. The district court denied these requests, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Lancaster’s death mooted his claims for prospective relief, as he could no longer benefit from the requested declarations and orders. The court also found that any potential claims for retrospective relief were barred by sovereign immunity, as the Lancasters failed to demonstrate an unequivocal waiver of this immunity. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case on res judicata grounds or to rule on the widow’s post-dismissal motion. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Lancaster v. Secretary of the Navy" on Justia Law

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Aly Abdellatif, an Egyptian citizen, suspected he was placed on government watchlists after experiencing unwarranted airport security screenings. He sought correction through the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) redress program, which responded without confirming or denying his watchlist status. Abdellatif and his wife, Nina Araujo, petitioned for review, challenging the administration of the traveler redress program and their treatment during travel.The petitioners initially filed their case in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They named multiple federal agencies and officials as respondents, alleging that Abdellatif's inclusion on the Selectee List and TSA watchlists led to enhanced security screenings and secondary inspections. They argued that TSA's redress process failed to correct erroneous information, violating statutory obligations and due process rights. The court dismissed the petition against all respondents except TSA, citing jurisdictional limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition in part for lack of standing, as TSA cannot remove names from the Selectee List, which is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The court found that petitioners' injuries related to the Selectee List were not redressable in this lawsuit. However, the court denied the remaining claims on the merits, concluding that TSA's redress process complies with statutory requirements and does not violate due process. The court also rejected the Fourth Amendment claims, finding that the enhanced security screenings and secondary inspections described were reasonable and did not constitute unreasonable searches or seizures. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Abdellatif v. DHS" on Justia Law

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The case involves two groups of Montgomery residents who were jailed for failing to pay traffic fines. They sued the City of Montgomery, a private contractor (Judicial Correction Services, Inc.), and a lawyer (Branch D. Kloess), alleging that the process of converting fines into jail sentences violated the U.S. Constitution and Alabama law. The plaintiffs sought to certify their claims as class actions, arguing that the City and its contractors systematically failed to conduct proper inquiries into their ability to pay before jailing them.The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied class certification in both cases. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, particularly the predominance and superiority requirements under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the claims would require individualized inquiries into each probationer's circumstances, such as whether they were given proper hearings and whether the City or its contractors acted wrongfully or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of class certification. It agreed that the plaintiffs' claims necessitated individualized proof, making it difficult to resolve the issues on a class-wide basis. The court emphasized that the evidence required to prove the claims, such as records of what happened at individual probation hearings, was not available on a common, class-wide basis. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' claims involved a variety of individual incidents rather than a single, systemic issue that could be addressed collectively.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification, as the plaintiffs' claims required individualized inquiries that did not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). The decision to deny class certification was affirmed. View "Carter v. The City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

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In 2020, a student organization at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, along with two students, sued the University for alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The case centered on the University's allocation of lounge space in the Coffman Memorial Union to certain student organizations, particularly nine cultural centers. The plaintiffs argued that this allocation constituted viewpoint discrimination and gave unbridled discretion to University officials.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed three of the five claims and later granted summary judgment in favor of the University on the remaining claims. The court found no evidence of viewpoint discrimination and deemed the unbridled discretion doctrine inapplicable to the University's past allocation decision. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment on one claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed that the lounge space was a limited public forum and found that the University's allocation process was viewpoint neutral and reasonable. The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of viewpoint discrimination and that the University's decision was based on status-based distinctions, not viewpoint-based ones. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the unbridled discretion doctrine did not apply, as the challenge was to a past decision rather than an ongoing policy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment, concluding that the University's allocation of lounge space did not violate the First Amendment. View "Viewpoint Neutrality Now! v. Regents of the University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

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On December 26, 2019, Officers Rozeboom and Malone responded to a shoplifting report at Dick’s Sporting Goods in Papillion, Nebraska. The suspects were described as a black male and black female in a silver four-door sedan. Malone spotted a similar vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. Storrs, a black male, was driving, and Smith, a white female, was the passenger. Despite the discrepancy in the suspect description, the officers detained Storrs and Smith. During the encounter, Storrs and Smith were uncooperative, leading to their arrest and a search of their vehicle, which allegedly smelled of marijuana.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. The court determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and probable cause for the continued detention and search based on the alleged odor of marijuana. The court also found no evidence of excessive force or First Amendment retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision in part, agreeing that the officers had probable cause to arrest Storrs and Smith for obstructing a peace officer and that there was no evidence of excessive force or First Amendment retaliation. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the claim of unlawful continued detention, finding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion once they saw Smith was white. The court also found a genuine dispute of fact regarding the alleged odor of marijuana, precluding summary judgment on the illegal search claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Storrs v. Rozeboom" on Justia Law

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Gary Hicks, a corrections sergeant, was suspended for 10 days by the Illinois Department of Corrections after an internal investigation into his Facebook posts, which were described as "Islamophobic" and "offensive" by a news article. The investigation concluded that Hicks violated Department policies prohibiting conduct unbecoming of a State employee or that may reflect unfavorably on the Department. Hicks admitted to making the posts, which included derogatory comments about various groups and a prayer for a civil war or government overthrow. He sued the Department and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Department’s policies.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both claims. The court held that Hicks’s suspension did not violate the First Amendment because his posts were not on matters of public concern, and the Department’s interest in maintaining discipline outweighed his interest in speaking. The court also found that the Department’s policies were not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks’s conduct and granted qualified immunity to the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the Department’s interest in managing its affairs outweighed Hicks’s interest in posting the content, thus he could not sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim. Additionally, the court found that the Department’s code of conduct was not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks, as a reasonable officer would understand that his posts were unbecoming and could reflect unfavorably on the Department. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. View "Hicks v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

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On June 7, 2019, around 4:20 a.m., two police officers detained Anthry Milla, who was sitting in his car in his driveway. The officers were investigating a nearby stabbing but had no description of a suspect. Milla was cooperative but closed his car door when the officers approached. The officers, suspecting involvement in the stabbing, detained Milla at gunpoint, searched his car, and found no evidence. Milla's parents confirmed his identity, and he was released after about eight minutes.Milla filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the officers, finding their actions justified under the totality of the circumstances. The court also held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as they did not violate Milla's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the officers lacked reasonable, particularized suspicion to detain Milla. The court emphasized that proximity to a crime scene and Milla's actions, such as closing his car door, did not constitute reasonable suspicion. The court also vacated the district court's award of qualified immunity, as the officers' actions were not justified under established Fourth Amendment standards. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Milla v. Brown" on Justia Law