Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit denied the motions for authorization to file a successive federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244 and for a stay of execution. Movant was convicted of capital murder for killing his aunt and sentenced to death. The court concluded that, even if movant establishes a prima facie showing under section 2244(b)(2), he fails to demonstrate that either claim is within the one-year period of limitations provided in section 2244(d). Furthermore, while the one-year time limitation may be equitably tolled, movant makes no argument that equitable tolling is warranted here. The court also concluded that, because the necessary factual predicate for movant's false and misleading testimony claim could have been discovered through due diligence more than a year ago, this claim is also untimely. View "In Re: Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against police officers and the City of Shreveport, alleging that members of the police department used excessive force in effecting plaintiff's arrest. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the police officers' conduct—forcing him to the ground and then beating him in order to place him in handcuffs—violated his rights protected by federal and state constitutional law, as well as Louisiana tort law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers in their official capacities on all claims and denied summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims against the City, as well as his section 1983 and Louisiana law claims against the officers in their individual capacities. The officers appealed.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that factual issues preclude application of qualified immunity as to plaintiff's claims against the officers in their individual capacities. In this case, the facts and circumstances in their entirety created a scenario sufficiently "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" to place the officers' takedown of plaintiff, even if mistaken, within the protected "hazy order between excessive and acceptable force," established by then-existing Fourth Amendment excessive force jurisprudence. Furthermore, the district court erred in not granting summary judgment in the officers' favor relative to the force used against plaintiff while he was on the ground. View "Tucker v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a prison officer based on qualified immunity in an action brought by plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by screening and intermittently checking in on plaintiff's phone conversations with the attorney he had hired to bring lawsuits on his behalf.The panel concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not violate any Fourth Amendment right that was clearly established at the time of her challenged conduct. In this case, the panel exercised its discretion to consider only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel explained that plaintiff has not cited any precedent that has placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. In this case, there is no Supreme Court case considering whether a prison official's monitoring of an inmate's legal calls in this manner violates the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, plaintiff has not pointed to any Ninth Circuit precedent holding that monitoring the beginning of an inmate's calls to ensure their legal character and then intermittently checking on those calls to confirm their continuing legal character violates a prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, the panel declined to address the merits of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. Finally, the panel briefly responded to the concurrence's argument that plaintiff's claim warranted a merits decision even though such a decision could not affect the case's outcome. View "Witherow v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against numerous companies for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) through their marketing of men's and women's antiperspirants. Plaintiff alleges that Conopco, Inc.—doing business as Unilever—discriminates based on gender in pricing two Dove product lines.The court concluded that plaintiff mistakes gender-based marketing for gender discrimination where she ignores the fact that the different scents, packaging, and labels make the products potentially attractive to different customers with different preferences. Because preference-based pricing is not necessarily an unfair practice, the MMPA does not prohibit defendants' pricing here. View "Schulte v. Conopco, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's pretrial rulings in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff after he was assaulted by a group of prison guards. The court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to admit a letter regarding one of the defendants, which discusses an incident that occurred more than two years after what happened in this case, because the letter contained other information which had no connection with the alleged assault of plaintiff and which had the potential to prejudice all defendants. Likewise, the court reached the same conclusion regarding the report. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give plaintiff's proposed, adverse-inference instruction regarding one of the defendant's non-participation, because it would have misstated the law, likely misled the jury, and unfairly prejudiced the remaining defendants. View "Trotter v. Shipley" on Justia Law

Long is serving a 29-year sentence at a federal medical penitentiary for violent racketeering offenses committed over the course of three decades. A double amputee, he suffers from other disabling medical conditions. As the COVID-19 pandemic raged through the federal prison system, Long sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that his distinct medical susceptibility to COVID-19 and the failure of prison officials to curb the disease’s rapid spread constituted “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release. The district court denied his motion, believing itself bound by a policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission that bars courts from releasing any incarcerated defendant unless the court first finds that he “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community,” U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(2).The D.C. Circuit vacated, joining seven other circuits in holding that this policy statement is not applicable to compassionate release motions filed by defendants. The policy statement applies only to motions for compassionate release filed by the Bureau of Prisons. Because it is not clear what the district court might have done had it considered the correct factors, its reliance on an incorrect Guidelines policy establishes an effect on Long’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' Title VII retaliation claims against Bradley Arant and grant of summary judgment to Marion Bank on the Title VII retaliation claims. Bradley Arant is an Alabama law firm that represented the Bank in litigation related to this case. Plaintiffs are related to Ragan Youngblood, a former Bank employee who was hired in February 2008 and fired seven months later, in September 2008. Ragan was the personal assistant to the Bank's president and CEO, Conrad Taylor. After Ragan was fired, she filed an EEOC charge alleging that Taylor had sexually harassed her and retaliated against her for complaining about that harassment. Plaintiffs claim that the Bank and the law firm took adverse action against them in retaliation for Ragan's protected conduct.Pursuant to Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174–75 (2011), the court concluded that plaintiffs must meet two prerequisites to even get out of the starting gate on a third-party Title VII retaliation claim against the Bank. In regard to plaintiffs' retaliation claim based on litigation filed by the firm on the Bank's behalf, and assuming the viability of plaintiffs' claim, the court assumed without deciding that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs qualified under Thompson as proper third-party retaliation claimants. The court concluded that summary judgment is warranted for the Bank based on the McDonnell Douglas standard. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that but for Ragan's claim of sexual harassment, the Bank would not have engaged in the litigation that plaintiffs characterize as excessive.In regard to plaintiffs' claims based on the Bank's decision to stop referring legal work to Plaintiff Greg, the court assumed without deciding that his third-party claim can proceed. Analyzing the claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court concluded that the Bank articulated a neutral, nonretaliatory reason for no longer referring legal work to Greg based on a conflict of interest. Furthermore, Greg has failed to produce any evidence of pretext. Finally, in regard to plaintiffs' claims against the law firm, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where plaintiffs failed to allege an employment relationship between themselves and the firm. View "Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. The district court granted a certificate of appealability as to five claims, and the panel later issued a certificate of appealability as to a sixth.The panel concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of the certified claims. In this case, petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 1, which was predicated on the alleged denial of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, where fairminded jurists applying the governing beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could conclude that the absence of a jury trial did not affect either the finding of the (F)(6) aggravating factor or the determination that the mitigating evidence was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The panel also rejected Claim 2, which alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in presenting mitigation defense during the penalty phase; Claim 8, which alleged that petitioner's waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination was not knowing and voluntary; Claim 4, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel with the same factual predicate as Claim 8; Claim 7, which alleged that Arizona courts violated the Eighth Amendment by applying an impermissible "causal nexus" test when assessing non-statutory mitigating circumstances; and Claim 12, which alleges that the sentencing court violated petitioner's Eighth Amendment rights. View "Sansing v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's conviction and sentences and remanding for a new trial, holding that the trial court did not adequately confirm that Defendant waived his right to conflict-free counsel.Defendant and his co-defendant were charged with conspiracy, possession and transportation of marijuana for sale, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. At Defendant's arraignment, the prosecutor noted his concern about one attorney representing both codefendants were they were competing defenses. Defense counsel dismissed the concerns because the codefendants had signed a waiver of potential conflict after being advised of their rights. The jury ultimately convicted both defendants on all counts. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions, holding that the joint representation presented an actual conflict that violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to conflict-free counsel. View "State v. Duffy" on Justia Law

During an argument with his wife, Caniglia placed a handgun on a table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife left and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, unable to reach her husband by phone, she called the police to request a welfare check. Officers encountered Caniglia on the porch of his home and called an ambulance, believing that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation if the officers would not confiscate his firearms. After Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s “Cady” decision a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement.A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment in light of the officers’ “community caretaking functions.” Searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different; the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his home and “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” View "Caniglia v. Strom" on Justia Law