Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hodkiewicz’s pregnant wife, S.P., reported that Hodkiewicz was abusing her. Hodkiewicz filed for divorce. For the next three years, S.P. endured vandalism, ominous notes. and assaults that resulted in emergency room visits. Hodkiewicz denied involvement and little evidence implicated him other than S.P.’s word. S.P. received 146 calls and harassing text messages. She testified to recognizing Hodkiewicz’s voice. The phone number used to activate the TracFone from which the calls originated belonged to Hodkiewicz's employer. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement. In 2013, Hodkiewicz was charged with stalking, placed on probation, and told to have no contact with S.P. S.P. later walked into her bathroom and was suddenly choked from behind and lost consciousness. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement.A jury convicted Hodkiewicz, who was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. A Wisconsin trial court denied his post-conviction motions, finding that Hodkiewicz failed to prove that his trial attorney was ineffective. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed his convictions for unlawful use of a telephone and disorderly conduct “because his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to hearsay testimony that S.P. received a particular call on her work phone but affirmed his remaining convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, agreeing that Hodkiewicz could not show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome. The jury heard 35 witnesses and had ample evidence to assess S.P.’s credibility. View "Hodkiewicz v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of identity theft, holding that an employee can commit identity theft by using the social security number of another to deceive an employer and induce the employer to rely on the deception and provide employment and its benefits.Defendant's conviction arose from allegations that he was using the social security number of someone else with the intent to defraud his employer so he could receive a benefit. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the identity theft statute is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) the identity theft statute is not unconstitutionally vague. View "State v. Valdiviezo-Martinez" on Justia Law

Metropolitan Police officers in uniform, with body cameras, were patrolling an area known for gun- and drug-related crime. They saw three men hanging out on the sidewalk and exited their car to talk to them. One man began to walk away; Officer Goss approached him. Mabry and the third man stayed. The man who tried to leave became irate as Goss spoke with him. Officer Tariq walked over and patted the man down. Officer Volcin stayed with Mabry and the third man.Seeing the pat-down, Mabry raised his shirt and said, “I’ve got nothing,” and “you have no probable cause to search me.” Volcin asked about a satchel with a cross-body strap Mabry was carrying. The officers requested that he open the satchel. Mabry repeatedly said that he had nothing. Volcin never grabbed Mabry or the satchel, nor said that Mabry could not leave. Eventually, Mabry ran. During the ensuing chase, Mabry discarded the satchel, which Goss recovered. Mabry eventually stopped. Volcin opened the satchel and discovered a spring for a large-capacity magazine. While walking, Mabry made unsolicited statements indicating he was in possession of a firearm and drugs. Mabry had a pistol, 30 rounds of ammunition, an extended magazine, crack cocaine, and amphetamines.The D.C. Circuit reversed the denial of Mabry's motion to suppress. Mabry was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes. The circumstances show the officers’ conduct constituted a show of authority to which Mabry submitted. View "United States v. Mabry" on Justia Law

In April 2017, a tax foreclosure action was commenced against the then-owner of the Cincinnati property, Davis. The city was named as a defendant. Notice of a May 2018 order for a sheriff’s sale was served on the city on June 1, 2018. During 2017-2018, a building on the property was also the subject of administrative condemnation proceedings. The condemnation decision, dated July 16, 2018, was sent by certified mail to the then-owner, Davis. After the public hearing, but before the decision to demolish the building was made, Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the July 5 sheriff’s sale. A decree confirming the sale entered on July 17. A sheriff’s deed was issued and was recorded in August.Plaintiff was not aware of the demolition decision. On November 14, 2018, the city sent letters to Plaintiff summarizing the public nuisance proceedings and the decision to raze the building, requesting that Plaintiff respond within 10 days The letters were sent via certified mail but were never delivered to Plaintiff. The city made no subsequent efforts to provide notice to Plaintiff.The building was demolished on April 8, 2019. The city demanded $10,515.00 from Plaintiff for the costs of the demolition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for trespass. Plaintiff was provided with “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” of the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. The city did not need to obtain a warrant to demolish a vacant building that had been condemned by administrative proceedings which met due process requirements. View "Keene Group, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit amended its opinion, ordered the amended opinion to be filed concurrently with the panel's order, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc.In the amended opinion, the panel held that Bivens remedies were available in the circumstances of this case, where a United States citizen claimed that a border patrol agent violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force while carrying out official duties within the United States and violated the First Amendment by engaging in retaliation entirely unconnected to his official duties. Plaintiff owns, operates, and lives in a bed and breakfast near the United States-Canada border in Blaine, Washington. Plaintiff alleged that a border patrol agent entered plaintiff's property to question guests and used excessive force on plaintiff, ultimately retaliating against plaintiff by, among other things, contacting the IRS to seek an investigation into plaintiff's tax status.The panel agreed with the district court's assumption that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is a "modest extension" of Bivens cases in a new context. The panel did not find that special factors counseled hesitation such that a Bivens action in this new context is foreclosed. In this case, plaintiff, a United States citizen, is bringing a conventional Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising out of actions by a rank-and-file border patrol agent on plaintiff's own property in the United States. The panel explained that this context is a far cry from the contexts in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017), and Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020), where the Supreme Court found that special factors counseled against a Bivens action. In regard to the First Amendment claim, the panel noted that although the Supreme Court wrote in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), that Bivens extends to First Amendment retaliation claims when federal law enforcement officials have no innocent motives for their action, the panel recognized that the Supreme Court has not expressly so held. In this case, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim arose in a new context and the panel found no special factor making it inadvisable to find a cognizable Bivens claim in this new context. Finally, the panel considered the available alternative remedies -- intentional-tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a trespass claim against Agent Egbert, or injunctive relief -- and concluded that none of these suggested remedies defeats a Bivens action. View "Boule v. Egbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the denial of post conviction relief sought by Defendant, holding that Defendant's claims failed.Defendant was convicted of sexually molesting his daughter. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The reviewing court concluded that the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code 78B-9-101-110, barred Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel but allowed Defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims to proceed. The court then denied relief. On appeal, the court of appeals held (1) the PCRA barred Defendant's "direct" claims, and (2) appellate counsel was de facto not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the PRCA barred Defendant's direct claims against his trial counsel; and (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were without merit. View "McCloud v. State" on Justia Law

Hatter was charged with nine counts of criminal sexual assault based on three acts involving F.T., his live-in girlfriend’s 13-year-old daughter. In return for the recommendation of four-year consecutive sentences and an agreement to nol-pros the remaining charges, he pled guilty to counts alleging that he knowingly made contact between his penis and F.T.’s vagina and inserted his finger into F.T.’s vagina while she was a minor and Hatter was her “family member,” as the live-in boyfriend of her mother. The court stated that each charge was punishable by a sentence of four-15 years’ imprisonment, with the potential for an additional 30 years if there were aggravating factors. The court found that he understood the nature of the charges, the possible penalties, and his rights; he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and his guilty plea was supported by a factual basis. The court imposed two consecutive four-year prison terms. Hatter did not appeal. Because of an error with respect to supervised release, at a later hearing, Hatter had an opportunity to vacate his guilty plea. He instead agreed to an amendment of the sentence to provide for the correct mandatory supervised release term.A year later, Hatter filed the pro se post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not argue that F.T. was not a family member. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as patently without merit. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Hatter’s factual allegations do not establish an arguably reasonable probability that he would have decided to plead not guilty, absent counsel’s alleged errors in failing to discover and present the defense to three of the nine alternative charges. View "People v. Hatter" on Justia Law

Jacob and Genetta Clark, fundamentalist Christians, believe that their religion requires them to use corporal punishment with their children, ages 16, 14, and 12. Their son went to school with marks from being hit with a belt and reported being abused. Social workers from the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) investigated. The children confirmed the use of corporal punishment but stated that they were not abused and felt safe at home.The Clarks allege that they were not timely informed of the first hearing, at which the judge issued an order: “no physical discipline, parents to cooperate w/ CHFS” without making findings of abuse. A judge later told Jacob that he did not have a Fourth Amendment right to stop the CHFS visits and that if he failed to cooperate, the children could be removed. Jacob alleges that the abuse charges continued as retaliation for his videotaping of a home visit. After several months the abuse cases were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Clarks's Substantive Due Process, Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and Free Exercise claims. They failed to demonstrate false prosecution. Social workers have absolute immunity for initiating judicial proceedings. While there is a general right to use reasonable corporal punishment at home and in schools, the Clarks offered no authority that imposing corporal punishment that leaves marks is reasonable. Given the existence of a court order, a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would not have understood that he was violating the Clarks’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Clarks failed to state plausible First Amendment retaliation or Free Exercise claims. View "Clark v. Stone" on Justia Law

Ramirez was the target of a drug trafficking investigation, and wiretaps were placed on his phones, providing access to voice and text conversations. Torres was a member of the Latin Kings, and purportedly a methamphetamine supplier for Ramirez. Torres and nine co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) and 846.During the first and second days of Torres's trial, the government presented the testimonies of multiple witnesses. On the second day, the last government witness finished at 7:09 P.M. Defense counsel informed the court that Torres intended to testify, expressing that it would take “several hours” to complete direct examination. Torres took the stand at 7:13 P.M. After approximately 50 minutes of direct examination, the judge declared an overnight recess and dismissed the jury. The court instructed Torres: You are to talk to no one about your testimony. The judge told defense counsel: You may not speak to him. Now that he’s started his testimony, you may not consult with him anymore.Convicted, Torres was given a within-Guidelines sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Torres’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was barred from speaking with his attorney during an overnight recess. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 1999, Holland was charged with drug and conspiracy crimes and using a gun to murder someone during those crimes. Count Three charged him with using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime and with aiding and abetting that crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Holland’s customer, Stewart, testified that she regularly bought crack cocaine from him and had once traded a gun to Holland for cash and drugs. Based on that exchange, the jury found that the gun had been used during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. Holland was convicted on all charges, except the murder count. The court imposed two life sentences plus a five-year consecutive term on Count Three.After an unsuccessful direct appeal, he unsuccessfully sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2007, the Supreme Court held, in “Watson,” that a person does not “use” a gun under section 924(c) when he trades away drugs for a gun. Holland sought habeas relief under section 2241. The district court dismissed, reasoning that he should have filed under 2255.The district court dismissed two more identical 2241 petitions as successive under section 2244(a). The Third Circuit affirmed. Holland's fourth 2241 petition based on Watson was not treated as successive. The court found that the petition was properly filed under 2241 since a 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of Holland’s detention but denied Holland’s petition on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that neither Holland nor his trading partner appears to have violated section 924(c), so he may be actually innocent. View "Holland v. Warden Canaan USP" on Justia Law