Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court concluding that Defendant's conviction of breach of the peace in the second degree must be reversed because the First Amendment barred his prosecution for the statements at issue, holding that Defendant's remarks were unprotected fighting words, and therefore, his conviction did not violate the First Amendment.At issue were Defendant's "vulgar and racially charged" remarks that included utterances of the words "fucking niggers" directed at an African-American parking enforcement official following Defendant's receipt of a parking ticket. As a result of this conduct, Defendant was convicted of breach of the peace in the second degree. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that Defendant's speech was constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Defendant's language did not constitute fighting words. View "State v. Liebenguth" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded the trial court's order granting respondent's anti-SLAPP motion to strike Brighton's cross-claim for fraud. The parties' dispute stemmed from a contract between respondent and Brighton where Brighton would pay respondent $3,000 for a one-day photo shoot. Respondent filed suit against Brighton, alleging that the company failed to pay her immediately upon completion of the photoshoot. Brighton cross-complained, asserting claims for declaratory relief and fraud.The court concluded that, even if it were to assume that respondent met her burden of showing that Brighton's cross-claim for fraud arose from protected conduct, reversal is required because Brighton has shown a probability that it will prevail on its claim. In this case, the evidence submitted shows that Brighton's fraud cross-claim has the requisite minimal merit where Brighton submitted evidence that respondent made a misrepresentation when she told the company to pay LA Models for her services during the photoshoot upon receipt of an invoice rather than immediately upon her "termination" as an employee when the shoot concluded; it can be inferred that plaintiff knew that misrepresentation was false based on her actions, she intended for Brighton to rely on her misrepresentation, and Brighton justifiably did so; and reliance on respondent's misrepresentation damaged Brighton by exposing it to $90,000 in waiting-time penalties plus attorney fees and costs— in addition to the costs Brighton incurred in defending itself against her lawsuit. View "Brighton Collectibles, LLC v. Hockey" on Justia Law

In 1994, Jarvis was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and five counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113, 371, 924(c). The court determined that his first 924(c) firearm conviction generated a statutory minimum sentence of five years and that his other four 924(c) convictions, repeat offenses, were each subject to a statutory minimum of 20 consecutive years and sentenced Jarvis to 85 years plus 11 years on his other convictions. In 2014, the Supreme Court clarified that for aiding-and-abetting liability under 924(c) a defendant must have “advance knowledge” that a firearm would be used. Jarvis successfully moved to have three 924(c) convictions vacated for insufficient evidence of advance knowledge. The district court resentenced Jarvis to five years for his first 924(c) conviction, 20 for his second, and 15 for his other convictions.The 2018 First Step Act amended 924(c), limiting the firearm convictions that count as repeat offenses. Were Jarvis sentenced today, his second 924(c) conviction would generate a statutory minimum of five years. Congress expressly chose not to apply this change to defendants sentenced before the Act's passage, Jarvis moved for a sentence reduction under the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the COVID-19 pandemic and the amendments, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The statute excludes non-retroactive First Step Act amendments from the category of extraordinary or compelling reasons, whether a defendant relies on the amendments alone or in combination with other factors. View "United States v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

Huerta was shot and killed in a parking lot in 2009. Huerta had been drinking with his uncle, Rojas, when a car pulled up, an occupant fired at Huerta, and the car sped away. Officers focused on Villavicencio‐Serna; his girlfriend’s father had reported her missing the morning of Huerta’s murder. The girlfriend eventually stated that she was with Villavicencio‐Serna on that night, that when she woke up, Villavicencio‐Serna stated that he “took care of business,” and that Villavicencio‐Serna had previously stated that he was prepared to shoot Huerta. She later changed her story, claiming that she was in the car with Villavicencio‐Serna’s friends, Daddio and Rogers, when Villavicencio‐Serna leaned out the window and shot Huerta. She later said that Villavicencio‐Serna reached over her to shoot. Daddio recounted that the four drove around the parking lot before Villavicencio‐Serna shouted at Huerta then fired shots. Rogers repeatedly stated that he knew nothing about the shooting, then changed his story, stating that Villavicencio‐Serna shot Huerta. Their stories were somewhat inconsistent.All three recanted at trial, insisting that the officers scared them into implicating Villavicencio‐Serna; the officers’ version of the events was fed to them while the recording equipment was off. Allegedly unprompted, Rojas had identified Daddio’s car, a silver Cadillac, although his original story referred to a dark car.Villavicencio‐Serna was convicted of first‐degree murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal petition for habeas corpus relief while expressing concerns about the “troubling” inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence. View "Villavicencio-Serna v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of an inventory search of the company van he was driving, holding that the van's seizure and search were lawful.Defendant was driving his company van when we served off the road, demolished a utility box, then drove to his nearby home. The responding officer found Defendant as he was parking in his front driveway and took him to the hospital for a blood test. Later, other officers conducted an inventory search of the van, which revealed pills in a bag under the driver's seat, and then towed the van as evidence of leaving the scene of an accident. Defendant was charged with several offenses and moved to suppress the pills. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and a jury convicted Defendant of most of the charges. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the search and seizure of Defendant's van fell under recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the police officers lawfully discovered the pills. View "Combs v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal failed.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court's failure to renew an offer of counsel before commencing the penalty phase did not constitute fundamental error because the trial court cured the error; (2) no error occurred as a result of the prosecutor's statement that he would ask the jury to return a recommendation of death; (3) a challenged guilt-phase instruction was in error, but the error was not fundamental; (4) Defendant waived his claim that a Fifth Amendment violation occurred; (5) the trial court did not err in instructing the penalty-phase jury; and (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of the suppression court denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain eavesdropping evidence, holding that eavesdropping warrants are executed in the geographical jurisdiction where the communications are intentionally intercepted by authorized law enforcement officers within the meaning of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 700.At issue was whether a Kings County Supreme Court justice had jurisdiction to issue eavesdropping warrants for Defendant's cell phones for the purpose of gathering evidence in an investigation of enterprise corruption and gambling offenses in Kings County. The cell phones were not physically present in New York. The suppression court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that since the crimes were allegedly committed in Kings County, the county had jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes and there was a sufficient nexus of the issuance of the eavesdropping warrants in that county. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Kings County Supreme Court Justice presiding in the jurisdiction where Defendant's communications were overheard and accessed and therefore intercepted by authorized law enforcement agents had the authority to issue the warrants. View "People v. Schneider" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner filed a Bivens action against various staff members at the Oakdale Federal Correctional complex, claiming, inter alia, that he had been held in the prison's Special Housing Unit (SHU) without due process for over 280 days. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his First Amendment and Due Process claims, denial of his motions for appointment of counsel, and denial of leave to file a surreply and amend his complaint.The Fifth Circuit concluded that Watkins v. Three Admin. Remedy Coordinators of Bureau of Prisons, No. 19-40869, 2021 WL 2070612, at *3 (5th Cir. May 24, 2021), foreclosed plaintiff's challenge to the district court's conclusion that Bivens did not create an implied cause of action for his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court upheld the district court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff's claim that defendants violated his due process rights by placing him in SHU. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege a protectable liberty interest and thus he has not shown any omissions in process violated the Constitution, regardless of whether the prison did or did not follow its own policies. The court dismissed the portion of plaintiff's appeal challenging the magistrate judge's denial of plaintiff's motions for appointment of counsel. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from a magistrate judge. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motions to amend his complaint. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in all other respects. View "Butler v. Porter" on Justia Law

Taylor was fired from his job as a Cook County Sheriff’s officer. He sued the Sheriff’s Office under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ways, Whittler, and Ernst under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants maintain that Taylor was terminated for having fired pellets with an air rifle at his neighbor, a charge that Taylor denies. Ernst was the lead investigator assigned to Taylor’s case. Taylor offered evidence that Ernst engineered his firing based on racial animosity. Taylor also asserted that Ways and Whittler, Sheriff’s Office officials, are liable because they reviewed Ernst’s final report and endorsed his recommendation of termination.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of qualified immunity as to Ernst. Taylor presented evidence of Ernst’s significant role in the investigative and disciplinary proceedings that brought about Taylor’s termination. Any reasonable official in Ernst’s position would have known that intentional racial discrimination toward another employee was unconstitutional and what Taylor alleges against Ernst is textbook racial discrimination: the word “n****r,” used by Ernst, a white man, aimed at Taylor on several occasions. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity to Ways and Whittler; evidence that they played key roles in approving Ernst’s termination does not signal that either harbored any racial animus or that they knew or suspected that Ernst was motivated by race. Taylor’s Title VII claim remains pending. View "Taylor v. Ernst" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in holding that the placement and use of a GPS tracking device was legal.In investigating suspected drug distribution activities Harford County Narcotics Task Force applied for and received an "application for court order" to install a GPS tracking device on Defendant's vehicle. The Task Force detectives subsequently applied for a received a search warrant for Defendant's vehicle and suspected residence. After the search warranted was executed, Defendant was indicted on drug-related charges. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the GPS tracking of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The circuit court held that the search warrant lacked probable cause but that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the use of the GPS tracking device was legal because the GPS order satisfied the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; (2) the issuing judge had substantial evidence for finding probable cause; and (3) the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in this case. View "Whittington v. State" on Justia Law