Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who seeks to knock down his beachfront mansion and to build a new one, filed suit against the town, claiming that the criteria the town's architectural review commission used to deny his building permit violated his First Amendment free speech rights and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. In this case, plaintiff wants to knock down his "traditional" beachfront mansion and to build a new one, almost twice its size, in the midcentury modern style. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the town.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that summary judgment was not granted too early and affirmed on the First Amendment claim because there was no great likelihood that some sort of message would be understood by those who viewed plaintiff's new beachfront mansion. The court also affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims because the commission's criteria were not unconstitutionally vague and plaintiff has not presented evidence that the commission applied its criteria differently for him than for other similarly situated mansion-builders. View "Burns v. Town of Palm Beach" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the City on plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment based on religion. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding plaintiff from introducing testimony and a report by the City's retained but non-testifying expert psychiatrist who had conducted an independent medical examination of plaintiff.The court concluded that the expert's report would have been cumulative with other testimony regarding causation and damages, and any discussion of damages was immaterial because the jury never reached that issue. Therefore, the exclusion did not result in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case, and the court need not consider whether the district court abused its substantial case management and discovery discretion in excluding the expert's independent medical examination report and testimony, an issue the court has not previously addressed. View "Cooper v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

HRDC filed suit against Baxter County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Jail's postcard-only policy violates HRDC's First Amendment right to communicate with Jail inmates. HRDC also alleged that the Jail's rejection of HRDC's mailings violated HRDC's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights to notice and an opportunity to appeal the Jail's decisions. The district court initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of HRDC. After a bench trial, the district court held that the postcard-only policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological goals and did not violate HRDC's First Amendment rights. The district court awarded HRDC four dollars in nominal due process damages for its four discrete August 2016 mailings.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the due process ruling and concluded that the district court did not err in granting only nominal damages where HRDC failed to prove actual injury flowing directly from the technical due process violation in August 2016. The court vacated the First Amendment ruling where the district court made no finding of fact regarding whether HRDC proved its assertion that the postcard-only policy results in "a de facto total ban" on Jail inmates accessing HRDC's materials. The court explained that it is necessary for the court to have a finding on what, if any alternative means are available to HRDC to exercise its First Amendment interest in access to prisoners. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. Baxter County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the State of Georgia, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC), and about 42 correctional officials.The court agreed with its sister circuits that a plaintiff's duplicative complaint is an abuse of the judicial process and is properly dismissed without prejudice as malicious under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court explained that, given plaintiff knowingly filed the third complaint at issue here containing claims duplicative of claims he had already asserted in two other pending civil actions, and in light of his history as a prolific serial filer, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing this third complaint without prejudice as malicious under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). The court also concluded that the district court did not err in alternatively dismissing plaintiff's complaint as barred by the three strikes provision of the PLRA where the complaint as a whole does not sufficiently allege that plaintiff was under imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Daker v. Ward" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal is whether the leaders of the North Carolina House and Senate are entitled to intervene, on behalf of the State of North Carolina, in litigation over the constitutionality of the State's voter-ID law. North Carolina's Attorney General, appearing for the State Board of Elections, already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, actively defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court. Legislative Leaders moved twice to intervene so that they also can speak for the State.The en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of the Leaders' renewed request for intervention. The en banc court explained that, at this point in the proceedings, the legislative leaders may assert only one interest in support of intervention: that of the State of North Carolina in defending its voter-ID law. The en banc court further explained that it follows that they have a right to intervene under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) only if a federal court first finds that the Attorney General is inadequately representing that same interest, in dereliction of his statutory duties – a finding that would be "extraordinary." In this case, after reviewing the district court's careful evaluation of the Attorney General's litigation conduct, the en banc court is convinced that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to make that extraordinary finding here. The en banc court concluded that this is enough to preclude intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). The en banc court similarly deferred to the district court's judgment denying permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Berger" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, an Iowa Department of Corrections inmate, alleging that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and safety. Plaintiff claimed that defendants delayed treatment for a sore on his right foot, allowing it to become a major medical crisis resulting in a below-the-knee amputation.The court concluded that plaintiff failed to provide evidence from which a trier of fact could draw an inference that defendants provided care that was grossly inappropriate or intentional maltreatment. In this case, plaintiff's unsupported medical conclusions cannot create a question of fact about whether defendants' medical decisions were reasonable, negligent, grossly negligent, or so ineffective as to be criminally reckless, rising to the level of deliberate indifference. The court explained that, without medical evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that the providers were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. View "Redmond v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

During heavy snow, Lieutenant McAuly approached a car that was far off the roadway. Lao lowered the driver's window and stated that a tow truck was on its way. According to McAuly, Lao displayed nervousness and was acting as though he wanted McAuly to leave while speaking sharply to his passenger, Chang. Their driver’s licenses revealed extensive recent felony criminal histories. Both were under supervised release for methamphetamine convictions.Both consented to pat-down searches. McAuly discovered that under her shirt Chang was carrying a locked, portable gun safe. Chang denied both ownership of the safe and knowledge of its contents. Through the car windows, McAuly saw a razor blade and a piece of cardboard that he associated with dividing drugs. Wisconsin Act 79 authorizes an officer, without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, to search any property under the control of a person who is under court supervision if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McAuly found the key, opened the gun safe, and found what was determined to be 75.6 grams of methamphetamine and a digital scale. A later search revealed a firearm and ammunition. After receiving Miranda warnings, Chang declared that everything in the safe belonged to her, although she was unable to describe its contents. Both were charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Lao was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of the defendants’ motion to suppress. Although the officer’s hunch alone was not sufficient justification for the seizure, other factors provided the reasonable suspicion necessary. Chang’s statements did not fall within any hearsay exception and could not be admitted if Chang chose to invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. View "United States v. Lao" on Justia Law

Danville Officer Crawley sought a warrant to search Woodfork’s home. Crawley testified under oath, identifying Woodfork as the target of the request, stating that Woodfork had sold crystal methamphetamine in a controlled buy to a confidential source (CS) that day. Officers had searched the SC before and after that buy and surveilled the transaction, which was recorded. Crawley had relied on the CS “multiple times” and found him “reliable.” The officers attempted to set up a second controlled buy, using another reliable CS. Woodfork had insisted that the CS come to Woodfork’s home, which was described by naming an intersection, understood to be 1220 North Franklin Street.The judge issued a search warrant for Woodfork’s North Franklin home. Officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm. Woodfork moved to quash the warrant and or to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was entitled to a "Franks" hearing and suppression because Crawley misled the county judge regarding the identification of his home and by omitting details about the CS's criminal histories.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Woodfork’s motion. Crawley and the judge were not simply relying on the uncorroborated word of the CS; a controlled buy, properly executed, is generally a reliable indicator of the presence of illegal drug activity. The omission of information about the sources’ backgrounds, criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable cause determination. Crawley testified; the court could assess his credibility and ask questions. View "United States v. Woodfork" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to suppress certain firearm evidence on the grounds that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the stop was lawful.At issue was whether the law enforcement officer in this case has a reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The court of appeals concluded that the stop was unlawful. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding that, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable law enforcement officer knowing what the officer in this case knew and seeing what he saw would reasonably suspected that Defendant was engaged in a drug transaction, and therefore, the investigatory stop of Defendant's vehicle complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Genous" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment of conviction of Defendant for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and remanded with instructions to grant Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the seizure of Defendant was unlawful because the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.Defendant's conviction arose from a search of her vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the search violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Defendant was seized when the officer returned to her vehicle after running a records check, withheld her driver's license, and continued to question her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniff dog arrived; and (2) the seizure was unlawful because Defendant did not have a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity at the time he seized her. View "State v. VanBeek" on Justia Law