Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2016, a Madison student fired a gun and injured four students. Approximately two years later, the School Board enacted a resolution allowing staff to carry concealed weapons. Around the same time, Madison students walked out of class during the school day to protest gun violence; school administration disciplined those students. The plaintiffs began attending Board meetings. At one meeting, three were not allowed to speak for failure to complete a “public participation form,” in person, at least two business days before the meeting. Another plaintiff finished his (under three-minute) speech while a security officer escorted him from the room.The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the Board Policy’s “use of vague and undefined terms” and “the imposition of content-based restrictions on speech.” The district court granted the Board summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The Policy’s restrictions on “abusive,” “personally directed,” and “antagonist” statements discriminate based on viewpoint and were unconstitutionally applied to silence the plaintiff. The antagonistic restriction, by definition, prohibits speech opposing the Board. The plaintiff spoke calmly and refrained from personal attacks or vitriol, focusing on his stringent opposition to the Board’s policy and his belief that the Board was not being honest about its motives. The preregistration requirement is a content-neutral time, place, manner restriction that narrowly serves a significant government interest and leaves ample alternative channels. View "Ison v. Madison Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

Christina and Dustin lived with Dustin’s parents, Richard and Evalee. Christina filed for divorce. After a physical altercation with her in-laws, Christina left. Christina requested a law-enforcement escort to retrieve her belongings, stating that she was afraid to go alone. Trooper Couch accompanied Christina and followed Christina and her mother inside. Richard and Evalee were disturbed that law enforcement had entered their home. Dustin became hostile and shouted that he did not want Christina, Christina’s mother, or the trooper in his home. Richard called his son-in-law Napier, a Perry County sheriff’s deputy, who soon arrived. As Christina and Couch exited the house, Richard insulted Couch. A fight ensued. Napier disrupted the brawl; Couch deployed his taser to subdue Richard and Dustin. Richard, Dustin, and Evalee were arrested but a grand jury declined to issue indictments. Richard sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for wrongful entry, excessive force, wrongful arrest, deliberate indifference, and failure to train. The district court dismissed the claims against the Commonwealth, the state police, and Couch in his official capacity and granted Couch qualified immunity on the unlawful-entry claim, citing the “community caretaker” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and noting that Couch had Christina’s consent to enter the home. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. A reasonable jury could conclude that Couch’s conduct was in violation of Richard’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from the state’s warrantless entry into his home. View "Clemons v. Couch" on Justia Law

A week after a gunman opened fire inside a Parkland, Florida school with an AR-15-style assault rifle, a 911 call reported a man with an assault rifle walking along Route 33 in Putnam County. Corporal Donahoe and Deputy Pauley were dispatched, knowing that a k-12 school was less than a mile ahead of the armed man (Walker), who was wearing military-style clothing. Seeing Walker, the officers believed that he could be under the age of 18. It is generally legal in West Virginia for persons over the age of 18 to openly carry firearms. Walker challenged the officers’ authority to stop and detain him and initially declined to produce identification, He relented but refused to provide information about his gun and his reason for carrying it. Donahoe did not restrain Walker, pat him down, or otherwise touch him. Donahoe called for a criminal history check, telling Walker “I have the absolute legal right to see whether you’re legal to carry that gun,” indicating that Walker could not leave. Learning that Walker was 24 and only had a misdemeanor conviction, Donahoe returned Walker’s identification papers and told him that he was free to go. The encounter lasted less than nine minutes.The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Donahoe in Walker’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was reasonable suspicion supporting Donahoe’s investigatory detention of Walker. Lawful conduct can contribute to reasonable suspicion; the circumstances of Walker’s firearm possession were unusual and alarming enough to engender reasonable suspicion. View "Walker v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

Khoury lives near the school’s baseball field and complained about parking, noise, lights, and the influx of people. Khoury took photos of cars that she believed were illegally parked. Khoury and a parent had a verbal confrontation. Williams, a Miami-Dade Public School police officer, told Khoury the cars were not illegally parked and told the parents there was nothing he could do about Khoury filming. Other residents told Williams that Khoury took photos of their children and that they were “afraid of her.” Khoury claims Williams “charged” her because she was recording him and twisted her arm behind her back. Williams and the parent claim that Khoury “pushed” Williams, then threw herself on the ground,” yelling “false arrest.” After handcuffing Khoury, Williams detained her under the Baker Act for mental health observation and took her to a hospital for treatment of her dislocated elbow. She was transferred to Miami Behavioral Health Center, which found no evidence of "psychosis.” Khoury was released two days later and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the School Board had an unwritten policy of improperly detaining people under the Baker Act to reduce crime statistics.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, noting the lack of evidence establishing a pervasive practice. The court reversed as to Williams, noting the many disputed facts. Williams concluded Khoury was “not mentally well” simply because she didn’t believe that the cars were parked legally; Khoury was not violating the law or harming anyone by filming, and other eyewitnesses testified that Khoury was not a threat—her response was simply irrational. That alone does not form a basis under which a reasonable officer would conclude that Khoury was a danger to herself or others View "Khoury v. Miami-Dade County School Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and commitment of the district court following Defendant's felony convictions of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error by answering a question posed by the jury without consulting the parties.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the Court should exercise plain error review regarding his claims about expert testimony undermining his presumption of innocence; and (3) the district court erred by answering a jury question during deliberation without consulting the parties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to consider Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal; (2) this Court declines to exercise plain error review regarding Defendant's claims about expert witness testimony; and (3) the district court did not commit reversible error by answering the jury's question without consulting the parties. View "State v. Sinz" on Justia Law

In March 2020, the District of Columbia's mayor declared a public health emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Corrections responded by instituting policies intended to protect its employees and inmates from the coronavirus. On March 30, inmates at D.C. correctional facilities filed a class action, asserting claims under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The district court appointed amici to investigate conditions at D.C. correctional facilities; based on their report the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on April 19, generally requiring Corrections to address identified problems. Although COVID cases in the facilities decreased, significant problems remained. In June 2020, the district court entered a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to ensure inmates receive medical attention within 24 hours after reporting medical problems, to contract for COVID-19 cleaning services, ensure quarantine isolation units are nonpunitive and provide access to confidential legal calls. Corrections took steps to comply. One month later, Corrections moved to vacate the preliminary injunction due to changed circumstances. Amici reported substantial improvement but imperfect compliance with the preliminary injunction.The district court denied the motion. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(2), the preliminary injunction has expired; the cases are now moot. View "Banks v. Booth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a traffic ordinance in St. Louis. Plaintiff's claims arose from her attendance at an event called the Women's March in 2017 where she was arrested for failing to move to the sidewalk. An officer arrested her for violating section 17.16.275 of the Revised Code of St. Louis, which prohibits obstructing traffic. After the charges were dismissed, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The court concluded that the St. Louis ordinance does not forbid all expressive activities on streets and sidewalks. Instead, it merely forbids a person to position herself in a way that obstructs the reasonable flow of traffic. Therefore, plaintiff has not established that the ordinance unduly restricts free speech in light of the City's legitimate interest in regulating traffic. The court also concluded that the ordinance is not void for vagueness and thus is not unconstitutional on its face. The court further concluded that the ordinance is not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff where the record does not support a conclusion that police invidiously discriminated against plaintiff based on her speech by selectively enforcing the traffic ordinance. The court remanded with directions to enter judgment for the City. View "Langford v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging Louisiana law that forces lawyers to join and pay annual dues to the Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA). Plaintiff contends that compelling dues and membership violates his First Amendment rights, and that LSBA's failure to ensure that his dues are not used to fund the Bar's political and ideological activities also violates his First Amendment rights.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), foreclose plaintiff's challenge to mandatory membership in LSBA. In this case, plaintiff's claim presents the (previously) open free association question from Keller (which the court closed today in this circuit with the court's concurrently issued opinion in McDonald v. Longley, No. 20-50448, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. 2021)). The court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act does not preclude federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge to mandatory dues. The court explained that the bar dues are a fee, not a tax, and thus dismissal under the Act was improper. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claim that LSBA does not employ adequate procedures to safeguard his dues. The court found that plaintiff has pleaded an injury-in-fact by alleging that LSBA does not regularly provide notice of its expenditures with sufficient specificity. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Boudreaux v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Texas attorneys, filed suit against officers and directors of the State Bar of Texas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Bar is engaged in political and ideological activities that are not germane to its interests in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. Plaintiffs therefore allege that compelling them to join the Bar and subsidize those activities violates their First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Bar.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not strip the district court of jurisdiction where neither membership fees and legal services fees are taxes. On the merits, the court vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and in its application of Keller's germaneness test on the Bar's activities. The court explained that Lathrop held that lawyers may constitutionally be mandated to join a bar association that solely regulates the legal profession and improves the quality of legal services; Keller identified that Lathrop did not decide whether lawyers may be constitutionally mandated to join a bar association that engages in other, nongermane activities; but Keller did not resolve that question. To determine whether compelling plaintiffs to join a bar that engages in non-germane activities violates their freedom of association, the court must decide (1) whether compelling plaintiffs to join burdens their rights and, (2) if so, whether it is nevertheless justified by a sufficient state interest.The court explained that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their freedom-of-association claim if the Bar is in fact engaged in non-germane activities. In this case, the Bar's legislative program is neither entirely germane nor wholly non-germane; the Bar's various diversity initiatives through OMA, though highly ideologically charged, are germane to the purposes identified in Keller; most, but not quite all, of the Bar's activities aimed at aiding the needy are germane; and miscellaneous activities—hosting an annual convention, running CLE programs, and publishing the Texas Bar Journal—are all germane. In sum, the Bar is engaged in non-germane activities, so compelling plaintiffs to join it violates their First Amendment rights. Furthermore, there are multiple other constitutional options. Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs can be required to join the Bar, compelling them to subsidize the Bar's non-germane activities violates their freedom of speech. The court also concluded that the Bar's procedures for separating chargeable from non-chargeable expenses is constitutionally inadequate under Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).Accordingly, the court rendered partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded to the district court to determine the full scope of relief to which plaintiffs are entitled. The court additionally reversed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the Bar from requiring plaintiffs to join or pay dues pending completion of the remedies phase. View "McDonald v. Longley" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to three officers employed by the Coleman County Jail in an action alleging claims regarding Derrek Monroe's death by suicide that occurred at the jail.The court concluded that Defendant Laws's decision to wait for backup before entering the cell after he saw Monroe strangling himself with a phone cord did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. The court explained that it was not sufficiently clear at the time that every reasonable official would have understood that waiting for a backup officer to arrive in accordance with prison policy violates a pretrial detainee's right. Therefore, Laws is entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate indifference claim. Furthermore, it was not clearly established at the time that Laws should have immediately called 911, where he did call another jailer who called 911. The court also concluded that Defendants Brixey and Cogdill were not deliberately indifferent where holding Monroe in a cell containing a phone cord did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Finally, Brixey and Cogdill's decision to staff only one weekend jailer did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. The court rendered judgment in defendants' favor. View "Cope v. Cogdill" on Justia Law