Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit granted Judge Mack's motion for a stay pending appeal after the district court held that the judge violated the Establishment Clause, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, by allowing volunteer chaplains to perform brief, optional, and interfaith opening ceremonies before court sessions.The court concluded that Judge Mack is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims that the district court erred, because the district court's adjudication of FFRF's official-capacity claim was manifestly erroneous and also because FFRF's individual-capacity claim is likely to fail. The court explained that, even assuming Judge Mack could be considered a state official, rather than a county official, FFRF's official-capacity claim must be dismissed because the Supreme Court's Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), decision squarely prohibits official-capacity claims against state officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In regard to the individual-capacity claim, the court explained that the Supreme Court has held that our Nation's history and tradition allow legislatures to use tax dollars to pay for chaplains who perform sectarian prayers before sessions. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The court noted that Judge Mack's chaplaincy program raises fewer questions under the Establishment Clause because it uses zero tax dollars and operates on a volunteer basis. The court rejected FFRF's arguments that the evidence of courtroom prayers at the Founding was spotty; that the Supreme Court's invocation does not solicit the participation of the attending public, but that Judge Mack's opening ceremony is "coercive;" that Justice Kagan's hypothetical prayer in the dissent of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014), supported FFRF's position; and that Judge Mack's practices runs afoul of the Lemon test. The court also concluded that Judge Mack will be irreparably harmed in the absence of a stay pending appeal; any injury to FFRF is outweighed by Judge Mack's strong likelihood of success on the merits; and the public interest warrants a stay. View "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of assault and battery and strangulation, holding that admitting the victim's statements did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The victim did not testify at trial. Instead, a recording of the victim's 911 call and the responding officers' recounting of the victim's statements were admitted. The Appeals Court reversed Defendant's convictions on the grounds that his confrontation rights were violated. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) because most of the admitted statements were not made with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony they were non testimonial and did not violate Defendant's confrontation rights; and (2) to the extent that the victim's statements were testimonial, the only such statement was duplicative of other evidence, and its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Rand" on Justia Law

In 2012, Demkovich was hired as the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic Church. Demkovich is gay, overweight, and suffers from diabetes and metabolic syndrome. Demkovich claims Reverend Dada subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation and his disabilities. After Demkovich married his partner, Reverend Dada demanded Demkovich’s resignation because his marriage violated Church teachings. Demkovich refused. Reverend Dada fired him. Demkovich filed hostile environment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.The Seventh Circuit initially declined to extend the constitutional "ministerial" exemption to categorically bar all hostile environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees where there is no challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing. On rehearing, the court ordered the dismissal of all of Demkovich’s claims. The First Amendment ministerial exception protects a religious organization’s employment relationship with its ministers, from hiring to firing and the supervising in between. Adjudicating a minister’s hostile work environment claims based on the interaction between ministers would undermine this constitutionally protected relationship. It would also result in civil intrusion upon, and excessive entanglement with, the religious realm. View "Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish," on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of murder and attempted murder, holding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda and that the circuit court correctly determined that a jury instruction on duress was unwarranted.Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress his confession to a law enforcement officer. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Miranda had been complied with and that Defendant's confession was voluntary. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, his confession was voluntary, and his circumstances did not render his waiver of rights involuntary; and (2) the circuit court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on duress because the instruction was unwarranted. View "Madrid v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to two counts of felony first-degree murder, holding that Defendant failed to prove manifest injustice in the circumstances of entering his guilty plea.Defendant pled guilty two two counts of felony first-degree murder, and the court sentenced him to two consecutive hard twenty-five life sentences. Defendant then filed his pro se motion seeking relief on a wide variety of grounds. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any failures on the part of counsel to inform Defendant that compulsion is a defense to felony murder did not rise to the level of manifest injustice that would require a court to give him leave to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Hutto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of criminal attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by allowing testimony about the results of a DNA identification analysis without requiring testimony from the individual who generated the DNA profiles; (2) Defendant's claim that his due process rights were violated by the introduction of DNA identification evidence that was allegedly unreliable failed under the third prong of State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1989); and (3) there was sufficient evidence to establish Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Plaintiff's petition for relief after she was suspended without pay from her position as an assistant clerk-magistrate in the superior court following her indictment on felony charges, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of relief.In her petition, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the executive office of the trial court exceeded its authority by acting pursuant to a provision of its personnel manual mandating suspension without pay of employees charged with felonies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's suspension without pay upon the issuance of a federal felony indictment was consistent with and mandated by the terms of the personnel manual, the promulgation of which constituted a permissible exercise of the Court Administrator's authority; (2) the single justice did not err in finding that the trial court's procedures satisfied due process; and (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her equal protection claims. View "Moore v. Executive Office of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a deadly shootout that occurred at a restaurant in Waco where hundreds of motorcyclists gathered, including gang members. Plaintiffs filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions against Waco public officials based on their arrests and detentions following the rampage, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. Defendants appealed after the district court denied their motions for qualified immunity in part.The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered as to Defendants Stroman and Lanning; affirmed in part and reversed in part as to Defendants Reyna, Chavez, and Rogers; and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that District Attorney Reyna's immunity is limited to that of a law enforcement officer. In this case, his conduct exceeded his prosecutorial function, and some of his actions were more akin to those of a law enforcement officer conducting an investigation. In regard to Franks liability, the court concluded that the issues raised by plaintiffs concern both the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit by Detective Chavez and the extent to which non-signer defendants may be held responsible for any material false statements or omissions. The court concluded that Chavez is within the compass of potential Franks liability; the allegations are sufficient to tie Reyna to potential Franks liability; Detective Rogers may also be implicated in potential Franks liability; but Franks liability is not sufficiently alleged as to Asst. Police Chief Lanning or Chief Stroman. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' conspiracy and bystander claims failed and thus the district court erroneously allowed these claims to proceed. View "Terwilliger v. Reyna" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a)) alleged that Matthew had committed assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury; that Matthew had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim and had caused the victim to suffer great bodily injury resulting in paralysis and had personally used a deadly weapon, a knife. The juvenile court found true all of the allegations except for the paralysis enhancement; dismissed count two and the accompanying enhancement, at the request of the prosecutor; declared Matthew a ward of the court; and placed Matthew on probation with conditions.The court of appeal reversed, finding that Matthew’s pre-arrest statements to police were made during a custodial interrogation without the required Miranda warnings and that the admission of those statements was prejudicial. While Matthew was told at the start of the interrogation that he was not under arrest, and the police officers who were present did not handcuff him or unholster their weapons, the interview was initiated by police, who had just heard from another that Matthew had stabbed the victim. The entire interrogation was an attempt to get Matthew to admit that he stabbed the victim and to provide additional incriminating information. View "In re Matthew W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two counts each of sexual assault of a minor under fourteen years of age and lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen, holding that the cumulative effect of serious errors violated Defendant's due process right to a fair trial.During trial, the State presented no physical evidence to prove that Defendant committed the offenses. Still, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts, and he was sentenced to serve an aggregate prison term totaling thirty-five years to life. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) a comment made by the district court undermining the presumption of innocence constituted judicial misconduct; (2) a juror committed misconduct by goggling the term "common sense," and prejudice resulted; (3) certain statements made by the prosecutor during the State's closing argument constituted misconduct; and (4) cumulative error warranted reversal. View "Gunera-Pastrana v. State" on Justia Law