Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Beaman was convicted of the murder of his former girlfriend, a college student, and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment. After Beaman had served more than 13 years in prison, this court overturned his conviction because the trial was tainted by a Brady violation. The undisclosed evidence concerned, Murray, a drug dealer who had a sporadic sexual relationship with the victim, who failed to complete a polygraph examination, was charged with domestic battery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver prior to Beaman’s trial, physically abused his girlfriend on numerous occasions, and used steroids, which caused him to act erratically. The state declined to retry Beaman and dismissed the murder charge against him. Beaman subsequently sued Freesmeyer, Warner, and Zayas, former detectives of the Normal Police Department, asserting malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Beaman also requested damages from the municipality, under theories of respondeat superior and indemnification.On remand, the appellate court again affirmed the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment for defendants. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. While no court has ever deemed the evidence against Beaman insufficient to sustain his conviction, Beaman is entitled to have a jury determine whether the detectives acted with malice. Material issues of fact exist with respect to whether the defendants intentionally ignored, shaped, interpreted, or created evidence to support their conclusion that Beaman was guilty. View "Beaman v. Freesmeyer" on Justia Law

In 1996, Dorsey (age 14) kicked open a door to a Chicago takeout restaurant and began firing a gun at customers, killing a 16-year-old and severely injuring 13-year-old Williams and 16-year-old Sims. At the hospital, Williams told police that Dorsey, whom she knew from school, was the shooter. The juvenile court allowed Dorsey’s prosecution to proceed in adult criminal court. Dorsey was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. A presentence report detailed Dorsey’s troubled home life, gang involvement, and previous encounters with the law. While awaiting trial, Dorsey obtained an eleventh-grade education with “very good grades.” The court heard extensive evidence in aggravation and in mitigation then sentenced Dorsey to consecutive terms, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 76 years’ imprisonment.In 2014, Dorsey sought leave to file a successive petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his aggregate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Miller v. Alabama holding, which forbids “a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” He argued that, although his sentence is not technically a natural life sentence, such a lengthy sentence imposed on a juvenile is sufficient to trigger Miller-type protections.The Illinois Supreme Court held that good-conduct credit is relevant and that a sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory scheme that affords a juvenile an opportunity to be released from prison after serving 40 years or less of the term imposed does not constitute a de facto life sentence. View "People v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court denying both parties' summary judgment motions as to Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, holding that the circuit court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of the City of Sioux Falls.Plaintiff brought this action against certain officers of the Sioux Falls Police Department and the City of Sioux Falls. The police officers and the City filed a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court (1) concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity; (2) denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim against the City due to material issues of fact. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) erred in denying summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the officers' warrantless entry into her apartment violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) erred in denying the City's motion for summary judgment; and (3) properly concluded that material issues of fact were in dispute on the question of whether the officers used excessive force such that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on this section 1983 claim. View "Boggs v. Pearson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court following Defendant's conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.On appeal, Defendant argued that she was illegally detained, along with her codefendant, in a car in the parking lot of a multiunit apartment building because the police lacked either a warrant or a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's detention was not permissible under the exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement articulated in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, and Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013) because Defendant was not within the "immediate vicinity" of the apartment to be searched. View "State v. Espino" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court following Defendant's conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant sought to suppress evidence seized after his warrantless detention in the parking lot of a multiunit apartment building. The trial court denied the suppression motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was not an "occupant" within the "immediate vicinity" of the premises subject to a search warrant under the exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement set forth in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013). View "State v. Rolon" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coral Ridge's complaint alleging a defamation claim against SPLC and a religious discrimination claim against Amazon. Coral Ridge alleged that SPLC is an Alabama-based nonprofit organization that publishes a "Hate Map,"—a list of entities the organization has characterized as hate groups—on its website. After Coral Ridge applied to be an eligible charity for the AmazonSmile program, Amazon denied its application because Coral Ridge is listed on the Hate Map as being anti-LGBTQ.The court found that Coral Ridge has not adequately alleged a state law defamation claim and that its proposed interpretation of Title II would violate the First Amendment. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the defamation claim on the ground that Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead actual malice. The court explained that Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that SPLC actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of its hate group definition and that definition's application to Coral Ridge, or that SPLC was highly aware that the definition and its application was probably false. The court also concluded that the district court correctly found that Coral Ridge's interpretation of Title II would violate the First Amendment by essentially forcing Amazon to donate to organizations it does not support. In this case, Coral Ridge's proposed interpretation of Title II would infringe on Amazon's First Amendment right to engage in expressive conduct and would not further Title II's purpose. View "Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993, Millis and Creeden committed two armed robberies. State police stopped them and searched their vehicle, which contained ammunition, a pistol, and cash from the robberies. The traffic stop was found to be pretextual but Creeden had already implicated Millis as the getaway driver. Millis was convicted of aiding and abetting: an armed bank robbery, the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, a Hobbs Act robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Millis’s previous convictions, a 1992 Ohio conviction for aggravated assault and a 1991 Ohio conviction for selling marijuana, plus his federal armed bank robbery conviction qualified him as a career offender. The district judge sentenced him to a below-guidelings 410 months’ imprisonment, stating, “if I had discretion ... I would sentence him to about 25 years.”Millis repeatedly sought post-conviction relief. Attempting to benefit from intervening legal changes concerning career offender designation, Millis invoked the 28 U.S.C. 2255(e), “savings clause” to seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The savings clause is a narrow exception to the rule that federal sentences must be collaterally attacked under section 2255. Millis’s sentence on his guidelines counts fell within the range for a non-career offender, so his career offender designation did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as required for savings clause relief. View "Millis v. Segal" on Justia Law

The First Circuit confirmed the convictions of Carlos Velazquez-Fontanez and Jose D. Resto-Figueroa for various criminal offenses related to La Rompe ONU, a drug trafficking organization that operated in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and vacated the convictions of Ruben Cotto-Andino, holding that, as to Cotto-Andino, the court committed reversible error.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the evidence against all three defendants was sufficient to support their RICO conspiracy convictions, their 21 U.S.C. 846 convictions, and their 18 U.S.C. 36(b)(2) convictions; (2) the district court's limitation of Cotto-Andino's rebuttal of the government's uncharged murder evidence exceeded the bounds of the court's discretion, was not harmless, and required that Cotto-Andino's convictions be vacated; (3) the remainder of Cotto-Andino's challenges to the admission of evidence were unavailing; (4) an error in the transcript did not warrant reversal of the district court's denial of a mistrial in favor of Resto-Figueroa; and (5) there was no error in the jury instructions. View "United States v. Velazquez-Fontanez" on Justia Law

Marlowe supervised the jail where Kuntz was taken after leaving the scene of a minor accident with a high blood-alcohol level. Kuntz caused a disturbance, Marlowe beat Kuntz. Other officers slammed his head into the wall repeatedly. Officers observed Kuntz lying unconscious in his own vomit and tried to rouse him by pouring ice water over him. Six hours later, an ambulance was called. The EMTs believed they were responding to alcohol poisoning, so Kuntz was not airlifted to a trauma center. Kuntz had irreversible brain damage and died when he was removed from a ventilator. Doctors testified that such injuries are generally treatable if medical attention is sought in the first hours. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 242, Marlowe was sentenced to life imprisonment.In 2009, Marlowe sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective representation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief In 2017, Marlowe filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 “Burrage” decision, interpreting a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for drug offenses where death or serious bodily injury results as requiring a showing of but-for causation. The jury in Marlow's case was not asked to decide whether Kuntz would have lived but for Marlowe’s conduct.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Section 2241 is not available unless a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective,” meaning that when Marlowe was convicted, the settled law of the Supreme Court or the circuit in which he was convicted established the legality of his conviction. The law concerning 18 U.S.C. 242’s causation standard could hardly be “settled” if the Sixth Circuit never interpreted it. View "Marlowe v. Warden, FCI Hazelton" on Justia Law

The Prims attended a concert at the Pavilion after consuming wine and consumed more wine during the concert. After the concert, Janet, who suffers from MS, was “stumbling" and unstable. A Pavilion employee called for a wheelchair, escorted the Prims to the security office, and smelled alcohol on Eric’s breath. Deputy Stein, who was working traffic, noticed that Eric had difficulty standing and had slurred speech. Eric admitted that he had been drinking. Eric twice failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. A medic evaluated Janet and called Lieutenant Webb. The Prims insisted on walking home but they would have had to cross two busy intersections in the dark. The officers tried, unsuccessfully, to find the Prims a ride home. Stein arrested them for public intoxication. The charges were ultimately dismissed. The Prims brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, and tort claims.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed with respect to Eric’s assault claim but affirmed as to Janet’s assault claim and both false imprisonment claims. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims. Given their apparent intoxication and their route home, the officers reasonably concluded that the Prims posed a danger to themselves or others. With respect to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the court affirmed, noting the Pavilion is a private entity and does not receive federal financial assistance. Janet was not discriminated against based on her disability. View "Prim v. Deputy Stein" on Justia Law