Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1994, Hall murdered his estranged wife by attacking her in her home, dragging her to the backyard swimming pool while at least one of her children looked on, and drowning her. A Tennessee state court jury convicted Hall of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death, finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to cause death. State courts affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hall unsuccessfully pursued state post-conviction relief, then sought federal habeas relief.The district court denied Hall any relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” claim concerning prison records about the mental illness of a fellow inmate (Dutton) who testified against Hall. Dutton’s prison records were records of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, which was not acting under the prosecutor’s control, so the prosecutor did not know about them, actually or constructively. Brady does not impose an unlimited duty to pursue such an inquiry. Given the initial determination of competence, the opinions of mental health professionals that evaluated Hall throughout his state court proceedings, and no question of mental incompetence being raised during that time, counsel’s performance was not unreasonable in failing to establish that Hall was incompetent to stand trial. The court also rejected an ineffective assistance claim concerning evidence of Hall’s family and social history View "Hall v. Mays" on Justia Law

Gaskins served almost eight years of a 22-year sentence on a narcotics conspiracy charge before the D.C. Circuit reversed his conviction for insufficient evidence in 2012. At his trial, Gaskins had invoked his constitutional right not to testify. After the reversal of his conviction, he sought limited discovery and a chance to testify in support of his motion for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513, a prerequisite to a claim against the government for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The district court denied the certificate of innocence without acting on Gaskins’ motion for discovery.The D.C. Circuit vacated. A failure to prove criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt requires acquittal but does not necessarily establish innocence. On a motion for a certificate of innocence, the burden is on the claimant to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court erred by denying Gaskins’ motion for a certificate of innocence without addressing his procedural motion. The key issue bearing on whether Gaskins is entitled to the certificate concerns his state of mind--whether he agreed to work with co-conspirators with the specific intent to distribute drugs. His actions, as established by the trial evidence, do not add up to the charged offenses unless he agreed to join the conspiracy. The court declined to reassign the case. View "United States v. Gaskins" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's discriminatory discharge and failure to accommodate claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) against his former employer.In regard to plaintiff's disability-discrimination claim, the court concluded that the employer articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for his termination and plaintiff failed to establish a factual dispute as to pretext where the record is replete with evidence concerning his deficient performance, none of which was related to his disability or his period of leave. In regard to plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim, the court concluded that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff's performance issues were linked to his disability, and the record simply does not support that an accommodation would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his position. View "Vinh v. Express Scripts Services Co." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in her employment discrimination action. Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. DHS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After plaintiff did not file a response, the district court granted DHS's motion.The court concluded that plaintiff's arguments unrelated to the grounds on which her claims were dismissed are waived. The court also concluded that plaintiff cannot proceed with a Rehabilitation Act claim as it is precluded by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA); the district court properly determined that plaintiff's section 1983 claim is preempted by Title VII; and, because plaintiff failed to name the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant, the district court had no alternative but to dismiss the case for lack of a proper party defendant. View "Kaswatuka v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, the Sheriff of Broward County, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Sheriff retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by suspending him with pay pending an investigation into his conduct.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered an adverse employment action. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff only five days after he was suspended with pay in accordance with the governing collective bargaining agreement. The court agreed with the district court that a five-day suspension with pay does not constitute adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court explained that such a temporally-limited suspension pending an investigation into alleged misconduct would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. View "Bell v. Sheriff of Broward County" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit concluded that Planned Parenthood has not shown that an Indiana statute that requires medical providers to report complications "arising from" abortions to the state is unconstitutionally vague on its face in this pre-enforcement challenge. The court reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood, vacated the district court's permanent injunction, and remanded for further proceedings.The Complications Statute, Indiana Code 16-34-2-4.7, required physicians to report to the state "any adverse physical or psychological condition arising from the induction or performance of an abortion." The Statute then listed 26 conditions that the state considered reportable conditions. In 2019, the Statute was amended to eliminate the "including" language that had previously indicated that the list was illustrative, rather than exhaustive. The Inspection Statute, Indiana Code 16-21-2-2.6, required annual inspection of abortion providers' facilities, even though other kinds of healthcare facilities are inspected less frequently.The court concluded that Indiana's Complications Statute provides few guideposts to inform practitioners of the conduct that is expected from them, especially when compared with similar statutes in other states. Despite the uncertainties that exist in the Complications Statute, the court is mindful of the context of this litigation: a facial, pre-enforcement challenge to a statute that defendants acknowledge a state agency will interpret and apply. However, at this time, the state agency has yet to issue guidance on the application and enforcement of the law and no state court has attempted to interpret it. The court noted that principles of federalism require it to tread especially carefully when reviewing a state law where the state courts have not had an opportunity to give the law a construction that will produce adequate clarity.In this case, the court cannot conclude that the Complications Statute has no discernable core. The court explained that the complications that a reasonable doctor would find to have arisen from an abortion constitute a core of the Complications Statute. This "core" of the Complications Statute satisfies the void-for-vagueness test: It is understandable by persons of ordinary intelligence and not subject to arbitrary enforcement. The court noted that it is not holding that the Complications Statute is constitutional merely because there may be some complications that clearly arise from an abortion. Rather, the court is only holding that these clear-cut cases constitute a core of the Complications Statute that renders the Statute immune from this pre-enforcement facial challenge. Therefore, the Statute must survive Planned Parenthood's pre-enforcement, facial attack. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Marion County Prosecutor" on Justia Law

Starting next semester, Indiana University students must be vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they are exempt for medical or religious reasons. Exempted students must wear masks and be tested for the disease twice a week. The district court rejected a due process challenge to those rules.The Seventh Circuit denied an injunction pending appeal. The court noted that vaccinations and other public health requirements are common, that the University has allowed for exemptions, and that the students could choose to attend a school that has no vaccination requirement. View "Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University" on Justia Law

In 1995, Rosado shot and killed Nguyen. Rosado was almost eighteen and a half years old. He pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania state court to first-degree murder and was sentenced to mandatory life without parole. He collaterally attacked his conviction in state and federal court, unsuccessfully claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court subsequently decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment bars mandatory life-without-parole sentences for criminals who were under eighteen when they committed their crimes. Four years later, the Court held that Miller’s rule applies retroactively.Rosado brought another state habeas petition arguing that Miller’s rule applies to his case. State courts dismissed his petition as time-barred and then affirmed that dismissal. In 2018, he sought permission to file a second federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Though the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act normally bars second petitions, Rosado claimed to fall within an exception because he relied on Miller’s new, retroactive rule. The Third Circuit denied relief. Rosado waited more than six years after Miller to bring his challenge, past AEDPA’s one-year deadline for asserting newly recognized rights. Miller is limited to prisoners who were under 18 when they committed their crime, so his claim does not rely on Miller’s new rule. View "In re: Rosado" on Justia Law

The previous opinion is withdrawn and replaced by the following opinion concurrently filed with this order. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's bench trial judgment upholding Alaska's political party-to-party candidate limit; (2) reversed the district court's judgment as to the individual-to-candidate limit, the individual-to-group limit, and the nonresident aggregate limit; and (3) remanded.In this case, at issue are Alaska's limits on contributions made by individuals to candidates, individuals to election-related groups, and political parties to candidates, and also its limit on the total funds a candidate may receive from out-of-state residents. On remand, the court's resolution of the challenges to the political party-to-candidate and nonresident limits remains the same, affirming the district court's decision upholding the former but reversing the decision upholding the latter. However, the panel reversed the district court's decision upholding the individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group limits, applying the five-factor Randall test and concluding that Alaska failed to meet its burden of showing that its individual contribution limit was closely drawn to meet its objectives. The panel explained that, on top of its danger signs, the limit significantly restricts the amount of funds available to challengers to run competitively against incumbents, and the already-low limit is not indexed for inflation. Furthermore, Alaska has not established a special justification for such a low limit. The panel also concluded that, similarly, Alaska has not met its burden of showing that the $500 individual-to-group limit is closely drawn to restrict contributors from circumventing the individual-to-candidate limit. View "Thompson v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

Texas state prisoner Haverkamp, a biological male at birth who identifies as a transgender woman, sued, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause by denying Haverkamp medically necessary sex-reassignment surgery and by failing to provide certain female commissary items and a long-hair pass. Texas’s Correctional Managed Healthcare Committee has a policy concerning the treatment of gender disorders. Based on the state’s advisory, the district court ordered service of Haverkamp’s operative complaint on Dr. Murray, whom the state identified as the proper defendant if Haverkamp were seeking sex-reassignment surgery, and the nine Committee members who had not yet been named as parties. The district court subsequently denied motions to dismiss, concluding that the state was not entitled to sovereign immunity.The Fifth Circuit vacated. Haverkamp’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity because the Committee members are not proper defendants under Ex Parte Young; Haverkamp fails to allege they have the requisite connection to enforcing the policies Haverkamp challenges. In light of the state’s representations to the district court that these defendants are the proper state officials to sue, the court did not dismiss them from the case. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law