Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief as procedurally defaulted. In this case, petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was first procedurally defaulted on appeal, not at the initial-review collateral proceeding, which makes the Martinez exception inapplicable to petitioner's case. Therefore, with no excuse for the procedural default, federal habeas review of the claim is barred. View "Hartman v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that there was no reason to order a new trial, reduce the verdict, or grant any other relief.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial judge did not erred in allowing a Boston police detective to testify about the contents of a certain record of the United States Customs and Border Protection agency that he saw on a computer screen at Logan Airport, but the error was not prejudicial; (3) the trial judge's instruction to the jury in response to Defendant's closing argument was not prejudicial; and (4) the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not rise to the level of prejudicial error. View "Commonwealth v. Brea" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff's former employer, a restaurant chain, and to his former manager. The court concluded that, although plaintiff presented a prima facie case that the restaurant discriminated and retaliated against him, he failed to offer persuasive evidence that the restaurant's proffered, permissible reasons for his termination were a pretext for unlawful action. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his employer's reasons for firing him—lying and preparing a dish incorrectly—constitute pretextual reasons to cover over racial discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of bad faith or malice to support his tortious interference claim. View "Jones v. Gulf Coast Restaurant Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner claims that the victim's parents were opposed to him receiving the death penalty and conveyed that opposition to the prosecutors prior to trial. Nevertheless, despite knowing this, the prosecutors stated during closing argument at the punishment phase of trial that all of the victim's family and everyone that loved him believed that the death penalty was appropriate. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought habeas relief in state court and subsequently in federal court.The Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioner is required to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court's dismissal of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion; the court declined to issue a COA; and the court declined to grant petitioner's motion invoking the All Writs Act. The court explained that petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion is ultimately an effort to advance "a new ground for relief" that was not contained in his initial federal habeas petition rather than an effort to redress a procedural defect in his initial federal habeas proceedings. Furthermore, the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner's motion invoking the All Writs Act should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because 28 U.S.C. 2254 is the proper avenue for him to seek relief. The court affirmed the district court's order transferring petitioner's new section 2254 petition to this court as a second or successive petition within the meaning of section 2244(b) and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's order denying compensation to petitioner's counsel for their work on his successive state habeas proceedings. View "Storey v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the hospital because plaintiff failed to show that the hospital intentionally discriminated against him based on his deafness. The court explained that the summary-judgment evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that the hospital should have known that plaintiff needed an on-site interpreter. However, fatal to plaintiff's claims, the evidence is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that the hospital had actual knowledge of plaintiff's need for an on-site interpreter. In this case, plaintiff made no attempt to argue in this appeal or in district court that his nominal-damage claims, if any exist, are not subject to the same intentional-discrimination standard. Furthermore, plaintiff expressly abandoned his claims for injunctive relief and has not pressed his claim for a declaratory judgment on appeal. View "Francois v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's pretrial motion to strike down Minn. Stat. 624.714, subd. 1a, the permit-to-carry statute, and convicting Defendant of violating the statute, holding that the permit-to-carry statute does not violate the Second Amendment.Minn. Stat. 624.714, subd. 1a requires individuals to obtain a permit to carry a handgun in public. Defendant was charged with carrying a pistol in a public place without a permit in violation of the statute. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to strike down the permit-to-carry statute, arguing that the requirement that an individual obtain a permit to carry a firearm violates the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the permit-to-carry statute withstands strict scrutiny and does not violate the Second Amendment. View "State v. Hatch" on Justia Law

DHS Agent Goehring obtained a warrant for Calligan's girlfriend's Fort Wayne house. His supporting affidavit reported that, 10 days earlier, customs agents had intercepted a package containing one kilogram of a synthetic cannabinoid controlled substance (5F‐ADB), addressed to that house, with Calligan as the addressee. Calligan had received more than 50 international shipments there. Calligan had Indiana convictions for attempted murder, criminal recklessness, and unlawfully resisting police, and a pending gun possession charge. Although police delivered the package, agents had replaced the controlled substance with sugar. After Calligan accepted the package, the officers executed the warrant and found money, a gun, and a notebook that contained the package’s tracking number and a recipe for making 5F‐ADB into a consumable product. In the warrant return, Goehring inaccurately reported that police had also recovered 5F‐ADB, the package’s original contents.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Calligan’s convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon, importing a controlled substance, and attempting to distribute a controlled substance. The court rejected arguments that because the warrant application said police would deliver actual drugs, the agent’s replacement of the drugs with sugar took the search outside the warrant’s scope and that Goehring’s warrant application relied on materially false representations that police would deliver drugs to the home before the search. The warrant was supported by probable cause and had no triggering condition and, in any event, police relied on it in good faith. View "United States v. Calligan" on Justia Law

Herrera, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against three correctional officers of the Cook County Jail for failing to protect him from assault and denying him prompt medical care. In his timely filed original complaint, Herrera named each of the defendants “John Doe” as a nominal placeholder until he could ascertain the proper identities of the officers. Herrera then twice amended his complaint to include their actual names—but did so outside of the two-year limitations period set by Illinois law.The district court denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning that suing “John Doe” defendants constituted a “mistake” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), so that Herrera’s amended complaint “related back” to his original complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Knowingly suing a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). Whether Herrer satisfies the factual test for equitable tolling is beyond the scope of an interlocutory appeal and should be considered on remand. View "Herrera v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Mark Janny was released from jail on parole in early 2015. His parole officer, John Gamez, directed Janny to establish his residence of record at the Rescue Mission in Fort Collins, Colorado, and to abide by its “house rules.” After arriving at the Mission, Janny learned he had been enrolled in “Steps to Success,” a Christian transitional program involving mandatory prayer, bible study, and church attendance. When Janny objected, citing his atheist beliefs, he alleged both Officer Gamez and Jim Carmack, the Mission’s director, repeatedly told him he could choose between participating in the Christian programming or returning to jail. Less than a week later, Carmack expelled Janny from the Mission for skipping worship services, leading to Janny’s arrest on a parole violation and the revocation of his parole. Janny brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Gamez, Carmack, and the Mission’s assistant director, Tom Konstanty, alleging violations of his First Amendment religious freedom rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The district court granted summary judgment to all three defendants, finding Janny had failed to: (1) adduce evidence of an Establishment Clause violation by Gamez; (2) show Gamez violated any clearly established right under the Free Exercise Clause; or (3) raise a triable issue regarding whether Carmack and Konstanty were state actors, as required to establish their liability under either clause. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order as to Gamez and Carmack, and affirmed as to Konstanty. The Court found the evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his claims under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. "And because the basic right to be free from state-sponsored religious coercion was clearly established under both clauses at the time of the events, Officer Gamez is not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim." Furthermore, the Court held the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Carmack was a state actor, as required to impose section 1983 liability on private parties. However, because no facts linked Konstanty to Gamez, the evidence was legally insufficient for a jury finding that Konstanty acted under color of state law. View "Janny v. Gamez, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants James Hald, Monterial Wesley, and Walter Sands appealed the denials of their district-court motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). They were among many prisoners who sought to be released from prison confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each claimed that his underlying health conditions and mounting infections at his correctional facility satisfied the statute’s “extraordinary and compelling reasons” requirement for early release. Before granting a sentence reduction, the district court had to consider whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) supported the reduction. The Tenth Circuit found each of the Defendants was denied relief by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas based on the court’s discretionary analysis of the section 3553(a) factors. The principal issue for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether, as argued by Hald and Sands, a district court was permitted to deny relief based on its assessment of the 3553(a) factors without first making a determination on the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” To this, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, holding that district courts were free to deny relief on the basis of any one of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements without considering the others. The Court also rejected the other arguments raised by Sands and Wesley. Accordingly, the denial of all three motions for compassionate release was affirmed. View "United States v. Hald, et al." on Justia Law