Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Property owners filed suit after the Town of Redington Beach passed an ordinance that granted the public certain access to the dry sand beaches. After the lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff Fields was asked to resign from her position on the Board of Adjustment (which reviews requests for variances from the Town's zoning code), because she had filed this suit against the Town.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment to the property owners on their claims that the ordinance violated Florida law and constituted an unlawful taking. The court concluded that the district court erred in declaring the ordinance void under Florida Statute 163.035; the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the property owners on the Town's customary use defense; and the district court erred in finding a facial and an as-applied taking. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff Fields on the First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Buending v. Town of Redington Beach" on Justia Law

The Texas legislature enacted a "sexually oriented business" fee (SOBF) in 2007, imposing a $5-per-customer charge on businesses that serve alcohol in the presence of "nude" entertainment. The Comptroller promulgated a rule eight years later that clarified the definition of "nude" under the SOBF statute to apply to dancers who wear opaque latex over their breasts (the Clothing Rule).TEA filed suit against the Comptroller, challenging the Clothing Rule on First Amendment, due process, and equal protection grounds. The district court granted partial summary judgment to TEA on its First Amendment freedom of expression claim and its claim that the Clothing Rule violated due process. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Clothing Rule was not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, but that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that TEA had associational standing to challenge the Clothing Rule and dismissal of the Comptroller's other jurisdictional claims. On the merits, the court concluded that the Clothing Rule fails strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. In this case, the Clothing Rule is directed at the essential expressive nature of the latex clubs' business, and thus is a content based restriction subject to strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the Comptroller does not present an argument that the Clothing Rule satisfies this high burden. The court also concluded that the retroactive imposition of the SOBF upon the latex clubs via the Clothing Rule constitutes a violation of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the court concluded that TEA's equal protection claim lacks merit because none of the examples proffered by TEA or employed by the district court are "in all relevant respects alike" to the latex clubs at issue. Therefore, TEA failed to prove that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to its jurisdictional, First Amendment, and due process rulings. The court reversed with respect to the district court's equal protection ruling and rendered judgment in favor of the Comptroller as to TEA's equal protection claim. View "Texas Entertainment Ass'n, Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on his state-law disability-discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as his claims for retaliation and interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Plaintiff's claim stemmed from his termination after taking time off of work for open-heart surgery.The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code where there simply is no medical evidence in the record except for plaintiff's own statements that he was qualified to return to work at any point, let alone before his FMLA leave expired; plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for either of two positions at work; and there was no other request for accommodations outside of the ability to attend dialysis treatments nor any reasonable explanation to account for the contradictory statements about plaintiff's physical capabilities made in the application for social security benefits. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to support that he engaged in any protected activity under state law that led to retaliation by his employer.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not show the prejudice necessary to prevail on an FMLA interference claim. However, in regard to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim, the adverse employment action occurred approximately one month after plaintiff's FMLA leave expired. The court concluded that a month is close enough in time to create a causal connection. Therefore, the burden shifts to the employer to offer legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse reaction. Although the employer offered three reasons, the court concluded that they have been adequately rebutted for purposes of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed on all claims except for the FMLA retaliation claim, which it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Gloria called 911 seeking medical care for her husband, Steven (age 61), who was experiencing a diabetic emergency at their Milford, Illinois home. Officer Garrett responded and restrained Steven in a prone position, face down on his bed, for several minutes. Steven vomited and lost consciousness. He did not regain consciousness before he died at a hospital 10 days later. Steven had been released from the hospital one week before the 911 call, having suffered a heart attack. Garrett had previously volunteered as an EMT for another city and had earned his certification as a paramedic. Garrett prevented Steven’s niece from giving him orange juice for his blood sugar and used a hold that inflicted pain in an effort to restrain Steven, despite the pleas of family members and Steven’s statement that he could not breathe. Garrett later testified that he believed that Steven was a danger to himself and was acting aggressively and that he did not know Steven had vomited or lost consciousness before EMTs arrived. Steven’s relatives and his treating physician explained that hypoglycemic patients may act confused, “tired[,] sluggish, lethargic,” and possibly “rowdy defensively because they don’t understand what’s going on.”In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Garrett at the summary judgment stage. View "Taylor v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

Stokes’s South childhood included extreme abuse and neglect. When Stokes was 13, his mother died, leaving Stokes parentless. Stokes repeated the eighth grade three times. Stokes, at age 15, became involved with Smith, a friend of his mother’s. They married. In 1988, Stokes was convicted of assaulting Smith with a knife. The couple reunited. In 1991, Stokes assaulted Smith again. After his release from prison, Stokes participated in the rape and murder of his cellmate’s ex-wife. Stokes penned a detailed confession. The jury also heard about the subsequent murder of Ferguson, who had been aware of the murder plot. Stokes pleaded guilty to Ferguson’s murder.Sims’s appointed attorneys for the 1998 trial conducted a mitigation investigation. For the penalty phase, they planned to argue that Stokes’s HIV-positive status made him suitable for a life sentence. On the eve of sentencing, Stokes withdrew his consent, refusing to allow his counsel to mention his HIV status. Counsel did not present any personal evidence, believing that “an Orangeburg County jury” at that time would not be receptive to evidence about his childhood and “white jurors might react especially to Stokes, a Black man, raping Snipes, a white woman. They presented a single mitigation witness, a retired prison warden, who refused to meet Stokes, or interview anyone who knew Stokes. His testimony was counter-productive. The prosecution presented robust aggravating evidence. Evidence of Stokes’s 1991 assault of Smith was especially relevant; Stokes’s lead trial counsel had personally prosecuted that case against Stokes. Stokes was sentenced to death.The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Post-conviction counsel were ineffective, providing good cause for Stokes’s procedural default of his claim. The failure to adequately investigate and present personal evidence was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial. View "Stokes v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court denying habeas corpus relief after concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Petitioner from litigating the issue of whether he was prejudiced he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument at his criminal trial, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice.Petitioner, who was convicted of murder, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by, among other things, failing to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks during closing argument. The court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he had suffered prejudice. The appellate court affirmed on the grounds that Petitioner was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply; and (2) Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's performance. View "Ross v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Four men robbed a liquor store. Hours later, three of them also robbed a gas station. Surveillance video captured these robberies. Five days later, three of the perpetrators (Cooper, Holliman, and Williams) committed another robbery. Holliman and Williams died from a car crash during a high-speed pursuit. Cooper spoke to officers from his hospital bed and signed a statement identifying Flint as the fourth man from the liquor store robbery.At Flint’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement described the testimony that Cooper would provide. Flint’s counsel described Flint's interview, stating: “My client, thinking that he’s being cooperative, talks to them, says, yes, I know Kenneth Cooper; he and I have been childhood friends. The prosecutor moved for a mistrial, citing inadmissible hearsay. Flint’s counsel contended that a mistrial was inappropriate because multiple witnesses would testify about the friendship between the men. The judge granted a mistrial. During preparations for Flint’s second trial, a different judge raised the issue of double jeopardy but, after looking at a transcript, found that the statement "sufficient to cause a mistrial. A jury found Flint guilty. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the manifest necessity standard to find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to move for dismissal based on double jeopardy.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254. Expressing some reservations about whether a mistrial should have been declared, the court cited deference to the discretion of a trial judge. View "Flint v. Carr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court revoking Defendant's probation and sentencing him to a two-year term of imprisonment, holding that the trial court did not improperly deny Defendant's motion to dismiss the violation of probation charge.On appeal, Defendant argued that the condition of probation upon which the violation of probation charged was predicated violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection as well as the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal failed. View "State v. Imperiale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of the sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl and his sentence of thirty-three years, holding that the trial court's enhancement of Defendant's sentence was not fundamentally unfair.On appeal, Defendant argued that, at sentencing, the trial court violated his due process right by penalizing him for refusing to apologize for his criminal misconduct. Specifically, Defendant argued that his sentence contravened his constitutional right against self-incrimination because an apology would necessarily have required him to admit guilt. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that there was no evidentiary support for Defendant's contention that the trial court had increased his sentence because of his unwillingness to apologize to the victims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court did not penalize Defendant for maintaining his innocence at sentencing. View "State v. Angel M." on Justia Law

After Cameron Leftwich committed suicide in jail, his father filed suit alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against defendants for failure to provide adequate medical care and failure to train, as well as wrongful death claims under Minnesota law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, concluding that plaintiff failed to show that any of the individual defendants (or any other relevant official) was deliberately indifferent to and subjectively aware of the risk of suicide. Therefore, there was no underlying constitutional violation and the individual defendants, as well as the city and the county, are entitled to summary judgment on the section 1983 claims. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in determining Defendants Wegner and Swanson had public official immunity for plaintiff's Minnesota wrongful death claims because they were performing discretionary duties. Furthermore, the county is entitled to vicarious official immunity. The court further concluded that the county is entitled to public entity or statutory immunity because the county's decision to have a mental health exam performed within 72 hours of incarceration is a policy making and not an operational government decision. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion by denying plaintiff's motions to amend the scheduling order and file an amended complaint after the deadlines had passed. View "Leftwich v. County of Dakota" on Justia Law