Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

To control the spread of COVID-19, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) required that all persons five years of age and older wear a mask in indoor public settings, including while attending public and private K–12 schools. A Lansing Catholic elementary school and parents with children enrolled at the school, challenged the mask requirement as a violation of their free exercise of religion, equal protection, and substantive due process rights. Since they filed suit, MDHHS has rescinded almost all COVID-19 pandemic emergency orders, including the challenged mask requirement.The Sixth Circuit held that the challenge to the mask requirement is not moot, and affirmed the denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the merits. Given the very real possibility that MDHHS may be faced again with escalating COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths, Defendants have not met their “heavy burden” of showing that it is “absolutely clear” that they will not reimpose impose a mask requirement, including for children in grades K–5 receiving in-person instruction. Because the requirement to wear a facial covering applied to students in grades K–5 at both religious and non-religious schools, it was neutral and of general applicability. The MDHHS Orders satisfy rational-basis review. View "Resurrection School v. Hertel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court overruling Appellant's objection to the State's peremptory strike of a prospective juror, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the State's race-neutral reason for the strike was a pretext for racial discrimination.Appellant was convicted of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Defendant challenged the State's peremptory strike of the only nonwhite person from the jury venire. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor's explanations for striking the venire-person were race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Appellant's Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of the juror. View "State v. Lufkins" on Justia Law

Ohlson was a forensic scientist with the Arizona Department of Public Safety and analyzed blood samples for alcohol content, reported the findings, and testified about those findings in court proceedings. Ohlson advocated for changes in how the lab disclosed batched test results and, contrary to his superiors’ orders, communicated his opinions within the Department, with defense attorneys, and in court hearings. He was disciplined and eventually forced to retire.The district court rejected Ohlson’s allegations of First Amendment retaliation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ohlson’s advocacy in the course of his employment duties could conceivably have adversely affected confidence in the accuracy of the Department’s test results, as well as in the Department. The defendants did not violate any clearly established law; where, as in this case, an employee, in the course of doing the job, has expressed views the employer regards as contrary to its interests, controlling legal principles remain particularly uncertain, so the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Ohlson v. Brady" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by a certified class of individuals with disabilities, together with six disability-rights organizations, alleging that the failure to adequately maintain subway-station elevators violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).As a preliminary matter, the court rejected the MTA's argument that this case is nonjusticiable, and the MTA's argument that the court must consider the accessibility of the transit system as a single unit that includes subways, buses and paratransit. The court concluded that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether frequent and inconvenient elevator outages deprive at least some passengers with disabilities of adequate access to the subway. However, the court explained that summary judgment would nonetheless be proper if it can be determined as a matter of law that reasonable accommodations are provided during those outages. Because the district court did not reach the issue of reasonable accommodations and did not sufficiently consider the NYCHRL claim, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

McNeill was convicted in 1995 and sentenced to death in Ohio state court for aggravated murder. Seeking federal habeas relief, McNeil argued that the prosecution failed to turn over material under Brady v. Maryland and created a false impression in violation of Napue v. Illinois. The alleged Brady material included two police reports, one summarizing an interview with the prosecution’s primary witness, Rushinsky, who initially failed to—but ultimately did—identify McNeill as the killer, and the other detailing a potential suspect who was quickly dismissed as a suspect. It also included three audio recordings, one of the same Rushinsky interview addressed in the report, a second Rushinsky interview, and an interview with a potential alibi witness.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. None of the evidence was material under Brady. The only favorable, undisclosed evidence was the Rushinsky report, which would have given McNeill more material with which to impeach Rushinsky. The wealth of other evidence on which the jury could have relied, plus the fact that Rushinsky did actually identify a photo of McNeill before trial, indicates that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of McNeill’s trial would have been different if the prosecution had turned over the report. The prosecution did not create a false impression by playing the audio recording of Rushinsky identifying McNeill without clarifying that Rushinsky initially failed to identify McNeill. View "McNeill v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. In 2018, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard. The Supreme Court vacated.On remand, the panel again granted Hill relief on his “Atkins” claim, but, following en banc review, affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. the state court decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Ohio court considered evidence of Hill’s past abilities including Hill’s medical history, public school records, and prior standardized test results, and evaluated criteria mentioned in Atkins such as intellectual functioning, adaptive skills, and the onset age of disability. In light of the evidence presented, it was not unreasonable for the Ohio court to rely on the reasoned judgment of two experts over another. Hill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on its merits. View "Hill v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Doe, a student at a public school in Virginia, had recently undergone a gender transition. Vlaming, Doe’s French teacher, refused to use male pronouns to refer to Doe. Vlaming argued that using male pronouns to refer to someone who was born a female violated his religious beliefs. Eventually, the superintendent placed Vlaming on administrative leave and recommended his dismissal. After a hearing, the School Board dismissed Vlaming for failure to comply with his superiors’ directives and violations of policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment. Vlaming sued, alleging statutory and constitutional violations and breach of contract. The Board removed the case to federal court, arguing the district court had removal jurisdiction because it had federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1441(c), over whether Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The Board also argued that because Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, was a “law providing for equal rights,” section 1443(2), the civil rights removal statute, authorized removal.The district court granted Vlaming’s motion for remand. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Because none of Vlaming’s state law claims necessarily raises a federal issue, federal question jurisdiction is lacking, and section 1441(c) does not provide a basis for removal. The Supreme Court has limited the meaning of a “law providing for equal rights” in section 1443 to only those concerning racial equality. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

After Jeffrey West died shortly after he was released from the prison where he was being held as a pre-trial detainee, West's estate filed suit under federal and Alabama law against Escambia County and the Escambia County Sheriff, as well as multiple fictitious defendants, initially identified only as prison guards, medical professionals, doctors, and nurses. In this case, West had a staph infection, and after inconsistent medical attention that did not address his underlying symptoms, he died from complications related to the infection. The district court ultimately entered an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and dismissed all claims with prejudice. After the Estate moved to reopen and the district court agreed, the district court found that it had jurisdiction over the Estate's claims because it could reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) but granted summary judgment to defendants because the Estate's claims were time-barred.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order purporting to reopen the case because the parties' filing of the stipulation of dismissal left the district court without jurisdiction over the Estate's claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Furthermore, the district court could not reopen the case under Rule 60(a). View "Estate of Jeffrey West v. DeFrancisco" on Justia Law

Bartley was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), based on his 2011 commitment to an Idaho state hospital after he was found incompetent to stand trial. Section 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Bartley’s motion to dismiss.The court rejected Bartley’s contentions that the 2011 state proceedings to determine his competency to face criminal charges lacked due process and that because the state court did not find that he was both mentally ill and dangerous, the 2011 proceedings did not constitute an adjudication or commitment within the meaning of section 922(g)(4). Neither section 922(g)(4) nor 27 C.F.R. 478.11 requires a finding that the committed person was both mentally ill and dangerous nor a separate finding under Idaho law that Bartley was a person to whom section 922(g)(4) applies. Assuming without deciding that the application of section 922(g)(4) to Bartley burdened Second Amendment rights, the court applied intermediate scrutiny and found the government’s statutory objective to be “significant, substantial, or important,” and a “reasonable fit” between the challenged law and that objective. View "United States v. Bartley" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters passed Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution by granting eligibility for early parole consideration to state prison inmates convicted of nonviolent felonies who had completed the full term for their primary offense. Section 32 authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to adopt implementing regulations. CDCR adopted regulations, which excluded from early parole consideration nonviolent felony offenders sentenced to indeterminate sentences under California’s Three Strikes Law. In 2018, the California Court of Appeal found that the Regulations’ exclusion of these offenders was inconsistent with Section 32. CDCR amended the Regulations to include, for early parole consideration, state prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for nonviolent third-strike offenses and set a deadline of December 31, 2021, by which to schedule parole consideration hearings for previously-excluded offenders.The previously-excluded offenders filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, The CDCR defendants acted within the legislative sphere when they participated in the adoption of the Regulations. That the Regulations were later found to violate the California Constitution did not diminish their authority to adopt the Regulations in the first place. They were performing a legislative function when they adopted the Regulations and are entitled to legislative immunity. View "Jones v. Allison" on Justia Law