Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Yu, a Chinese international student, enrolled in ISU's Doctoral Program in Clinical Psychology in 2008. He completed the requisite four years of instruction and successfully defended his dissertation but failed to complete a mandatory professional internship consisting of 2,000 clinical hours. Several of Yu’s supervisors commented on his limited English language fluency and that Yu had trouble “form[ing] alliances” with clients and patients, and possessed limited “ability to adjust treatment.” Dr. Landers, Yu's supervisor, dismissed Yu, later testifying that Yu was never able “to grasp the communication nuances that are required” and noting the vulnerability of the patients, who were particularly high risk. After Yu was dismissed from the internship, ISU dismissed Yu from the Program.Yu filed suit, alleging that ISU violated Title VI because it intentionally discriminated against him based on his race or national origin. Yu presented the expert testimony of Dr. Zorwick that Yu was a victim of “aversive racism,” comparable to “unconscious” or “implicit” bias. The district court ruled in favor of ISU. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Evidence of unconscious bias against a protected class in an appropriate case may be probative of whether an entity has intentionally discriminated in a Title VI case but the question is factual, and here the court permissibly found that ISU did not intentionally discriminate. View "Yu v. Idaho State University" on Justia Law

Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs (FLFNB), a nonprofit unincorporated association, advocates the message “that food is a human right, not a privilege.” FLFNB’s efforts include its weekly food sharing events in Fort Lauderdale’s downtown Stranahan Park, a location where the homeless tend to congregate. FLFNB does not serve food as a charity, but to communicate its message that "society can end hunger and poverty if we redirect our collective resources from the military and war.’ The Eleventh Circuit previously held FLFNB’s food-sharing to be expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and remanded the issue of whether the city’s regulations violated the First Amendment. Fort Lauderdale Park Rules require city permission for social service food-sharing events in all Fort Lauderdale parks,The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The Rule commits the regulation of FLFNB’s protected expression to the standardless discretion of city permitting officials. It provides no guidance nor explanation of when, how, or why the city will agree. As applied to FLFNB’s protected expression, it violates the First Amendment. It is neither narrowly drawn to further a substantial government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, nor, as applied, does it amount to a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation on expression in a public forum. View "Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the GDC and ASMP officials. The district court found that plaintiff did not properly exhaust the available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The court rejected plaintiff's contention that there were no available administrative remedies under the GDC policy. Rather, the court concluded that the GDC's grievance policy is distinct from the policy at issue in Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57 (2016), and is not a "dead end." Furthermore, inmates need not wait for the Internal Investigations Unit investigation to conclude before filing a civil suit. The court explained that, under the GDC procedure, an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies once he properly submits a grievance alleging excessive force because that act automatically ends the grievance process. Finally, regardless of whether an inmate's mental illness may render an administrative remedy unavailable in some other case, it did not do so here. Because plaintiff did not file a timely grievance and because GDC did not waive the procedural defects in the untimely grievances that he did file, the court concluded that he failed to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. View "Varner v. Shepard" on Justia Law

Schutt, her children, and her boyfriend were driving into her Fort Wayne apartment complex when the car was hit with bullets; one grazed her boyfriend's scalp. Schutt saw her ex-boyfriend, Parker, shooting, wearing a red hooded sweatshirt. Other witnesses agreed about the hoodie and seeing a long gun. The police found ammunition and a spent shell casing. A Ford Fusion in the parking lot had a red hoodie lying inside. Parker appeared with the keys to the Ford, which contained Parker’s debit card and paperwork and a rifle in the trunk with ammunition in the chamber.Parker was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The owner of the Ford testified that on the day of the shooting she loaned the car to Parker, among others; the keys in Parker's possession were the only keys to the vehicle. She had never before seen the gun. Parker’s counsel asked the crime scene investigator if he collected DNA samples from the gun. The district court prohibited the question under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, noting that Parker was not challenging the reliability of any specific investigative steps but was impermissibly arguing generally that the investigation was shoddy because it did not attempt DNA testing. The police department’s latent fingerprint examiner testified that he found no prints of value on the gun or magazine.After his conviction, the court sentenced Parker to 114 months in prison. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected a Confrontation Clause argument. It is beyond reasonable doubt that any exclusion of cross-examination about the DNA evidence did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The evidence of Parker’s guilt was overwhelming. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gibbs (then 16) and Henderson, robbed a Flint, Michigan store. Henderson struck the owner in the head with a gun, severing part of his ear. Gibbs was not armed but took property. Before jury selection began, the trial judge commented in open court, "get the jury to come upstairs now and so we’re going to have an order of sequestration for witnesses only. And if any spectators would like to come in they’re welcome but they do have to sit over here by the law clerk, not in the middle of the pool." Three of Gibbs’s relatives supplied sworn affidavits that they and others were prevented from entering the courtroom during jury selection. Gibbs did not object to the closure of the courtroom during voir dire. He represents that he did not learn that his family was excluded from voir dire until after trial.The Michigan Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing; the trial court did not hold such a hearing but denied any relief. The Michigan Court of Appeals then found the claim defaulted because Gibbs did not contemporaneously object to the courtroom closure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of his petition for federal habeas relief. The application of the ordinarily adequate contemporaneous-objection rule would, in these unique circumstances, be an inadequate bar to federal review. View "Gibbs v. Huss" on Justia Law

In 1992, Hunter, a 23-year-old hitman for a Detroit drug enterprise, escaped from a parole camp and killed 23-year-old Johnson, to prevent her from testifying. Hunter was convicted of intentionally killing Johnson in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A), and using or carrying a firearm in relation to that killing, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Hunter, acquitted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, four other intentional killings, and three related firearm counts, was sentenced to life in prison plus five years, the minimum under the Sentencing Guidelines then in existence. Hunter unsuccessfully sought to vacate his conviction in federal habeas proceedings and unsuccessfully sought to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based upon retroactive Guidelines changes. After serving 21 years in prison, Hunter sought “compassionate release,” citing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court found that the risk from COVID-19 and Hunter’s asserted health conditions were not “extraordinary and compelling” because Hunter refused the vaccine but concluded that other factors together amounted to “extraordinary and compelling circumstances”: Hunter was sentenced before the Guidelines changed from mandatory to advisory; Hunter’s “relative youth”; sentencing disparities between Hunter and co-defendants who cooperated; and Hunter’s rehabilitation. The district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, noting Hunter’s “difficult childhood,” and letters submitted by Hunter’s family and friends, and discounted Hunter’s prison discipline record. The court reduced Hunter’s sentence to time served. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal and reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Porretti, a 62-year-old prisoner, has suffered from serious mental illnesses—Tourette’s syndrome, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, personality disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia— throughout his life. Porretti’s mental illnesses have caused him to attempt suicide and to suffer psychotic symptoms, including compulsive ingestion of metal objects like razor blades, paranoid delusions, hallucinations, and verbal tics. Porretti received Wellbutrin and Seroquel for his mental illnesses before he was incarcerated in Nevada and after he entered into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). In 2017, without the recommendation of a healthcare provider, NDOC stopped providing his medication because of a new administrative policy.The Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide Porretti’s Wellbutrin and Seroquel. The district court carefully applied the preliminary-injunction factors and rendered highly detailed factual findings that rejected opinions from NDOC’s experts for reasons grounded in the record evidence; Porrettif’s Eighth Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits and he would suffer irreparable harm in the form of “very serious or extreme damage to his mental health” if injunctive relief were not granted. Porretti’s severe and persistent psychotic symptoms overwhelmingly outweighed NDOC’s financial or logistical burdens in providing Wellbutrin and Seroquel. An injunction was in the public’s interest because prisons must comply with the standard of care mandated by the Eighth Amendment. View "Porretti v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

During a criminal investigation into money laundering and wire fraud, the FBI obtained a search warrant to be executed at the Miami offices of entities that comprise the Optima Companies, which were located in a business suite. The warrant identified the items to be seized, including records of and concerning two Ukrainian nationals and several American citizens who allegedly own, control, or manage more than 30 entities that fall under the name “Optima” and have offices in the Miami offices. Among the materials seized were items from the office of an in-house attorney. Optima and affiliated individuals asserting attorney-client and work-product privilege, moved under Rule 41(g), Fed. R. Crim. P., to prohibit the government’s filter team (attorneys and staff who were not involved in the criminal investigation) from reviewing any potentially privileged documents unless either they agreed or the court, after conducting its own privilege review, ordered disclosure.The district court imposed a modified filter protocol but denied the request to prohibit anyone from the government from reviewing potentially privileged documents without consent or court order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that government filter teams per se violate privilege holders’ rights. The modified filter-team protocol allows the Optima parties to conduct the initial privilege review and requires their permission or court order for any purportedly privileged documents to be released. The filter team cannot inadvertently provide the investigation team with any privileged materials. View "United States v. Korf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeals the district court's judgment challenging the dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and the denial of the right to a fair trial against Defendants New York City Police Department Detective Rudy Anzalone and Lieutenant John Ryan, as well as his state law malicious prosecution claims against the City of New York, Detective Anzalone, and Lieutenant Ryan. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his arrest for violations of state drug laws and the subsequent dismissal of his charges based on speedy trial grounds.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's false arrest claim because probable cause existed for his arrest on the charge of loitering for the purpose of gambling. In regard to the federal malicious prosecution claim, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the dismissal of plaintiff's underlying narcotics charges on speedy trial grounds could not satisfy the "favorable termination" element for that claim. The court also found that the record evidence raises disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on the issue of probable cause for the federal and state malicious prosecution claims, and that the district court's dismissal of these claims on summary judgment against the City and Detective Anzalone was unwarranted. Likewise, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment on the fair trial claim based upon allegedly fabricated evidence conveyed to the prosecutors. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claims against Detective Anzalone and the City and the fair trial claim against Detective Anzalone and Lieutenant Ryan; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in all other respects; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kee v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that Defendants had violated their federal constitutional substantive due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine, holding that remand was required.In 2012, Alivia Welch, Susan Johnson, and Derrick Thompson called the Biddeford Maine Police Department and reported that their landlord, James Bak, had made death threats to them. Police Office Edward Dexter responded to the call. Officer Dexter left without ascertaining whether Bak indeed had a gun. Four minutes later, Bak shot and killed Welch and Thompson and injured Johnson. Plaintiffs - Johnson and the estates representing Welch and Thompson - filed suit. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit remanded the case in light of this opinion, holding that remand was required to determine whether Officer Dexter was entitled to qualified immunity before addressing whether Officer Dexter violated Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights under the state-created danger doctrine. View "Welch v. City of Biddeford Police Department" on Justia Law