Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a cheerleader at Kennesaw State University, filed suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3) after she and her teammates kneeled during the pre-game national anthem at one of the university's football games to protest police brutality against African Americans and to advance the cause of racial justice. Plaintiff claimed that there was a public and private conspiracy to deprive her and her teammates of their First Amendment rights. At issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's section 1985(3) claim against the sheriff.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claim against the sheriff, agreeing with the district court that plaintiff failed to surmount section 1985(3)'s class-based animus bar under the standard established by Supreme Court precedent. The court concluded that plaintiff's direct race-based theory cannot succeed because she failed to plead sufficient facts supporting it; plaintiff's indirect race-based claim failed to allege animus under Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); and plaintiff's political class-based theory is also precluded by Bray. View "Dean v. Warren" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted of six counts of aggravated murder (with capital specifications), three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of kidnapping, and one count of felonious assault, and sentenced to death. His first federal habeas corpus petition was denied in 2012. In 2020, Jackson filed the current federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that: the prosecution withheld material and exculpatory evidence in violation of "Brady," the prosecution presented false and coerced testimony in violation of "Napue," and Ohio’s postconviction scheme violates the Supremacy Clause. Jackson argued that his claims were not previously ripe for review and therefore not subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)’s requirements for permission to file a successive petition.The Sixth Circuit denied Jackson’s motion for remand to the district court but granted permission to file a successive petition. It is unclear precisely how Jackson obtained the witness statements that he claims were suppressed under Brady, which bears on the question of whether “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” However, Jackson’s proposed petition also explains that “the exculpatory evidence was first disclosed by the State in Clemency-related Public Records Act litigation,” which presumably would not have been available until Jackson’s date of execution approached. Jackson has also shown that “but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty.” View "In re Kareem Jackson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting the City of Los Angeles from discarding homeless individuals' "Bulky Items" that are stored in public areas, as authorized by a provision of its municipal code.The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that this provision, on its face, violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. The panel found Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012), which upheld a preliminary injunction that prohibited Los Angeles from summarily destroying homeless individuals' publicly stored personal property, persuasive. The panel also concluded that the clauses authorizing the discarding of those items are not severable from the remainder of the provision. The panel emphasized that its holding imposes no new constraints on the City: its prior caselaw states clearly that the government may not summarily destroy the unabandoned personal property of homeless individuals that is kept in public areas. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court appropriately concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors tipped in plaintiffs' favor. View "Garcia v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging excessive force and municipal liability claims. Plaintiff claims that an officer stopped in front of his car, began shooting at him, and thus caused him to accelerate to drive away, and in doing so he hit another officer with his car.In regard to the excessive force claim, the court concluded that, although the officers violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they shot him, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has not demonstrated that his rights were clearly established at the time. In regard to the municipal liability claim, the court concluded that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the City failed to train the officers. Finally, the court concluded that there was no error in the district court's finding that the officers were entitled to immunity under Alabama law. View "Underwood v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to specify the deputies' "training and experience" in detecting the odor of raw marijuana, holding that the trial court did not err.Defendant was charged with dealing in marijuana and possession of marijuana. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search violated his constitutional rights because the affidavit failed to specify the deputies' training and experience in detecting a specific smell. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, as an issue of first impression, that trained and experienced law enforcement officers who affirm that they detect the odor of raw marijuana based on their training and experience may establish probable cause without providing further details on their qualifications to recognize this specific odor. View "Bunnell v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Bloomington, the Hennepin County Attorney, and two Bloomington police officers, seeking a declaration that a state harassment statute and a city ordinance are unconstitutional under the First Amendment, injunctive relief against enforcement of those laws, and nominal damages. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her desire to produce photographs and video recordings of activities in a public park, where the images captured would include children.The Eighth Circuit dismissed as moot plaintiff's challenge to the harassment statute, which has been superseded by the state legislature; affirmed as to plaintiff's claims for damages against the police officers and the City based on alleged enforcement of the former harassment statute; and reversed and directed entry of judgment for plaintiff on her claim that the city ordinance forbidding photography and video recording in the public park is unconstitutional under the First Amendment as applied to her activity on which the claim is based. The court explained that, because the ordinance is significantly over-inclusive with respect to the City's asserted interest, it is not narrowly tailored and fails strict scrutiny as applied to plaintiff's proposed conduct. View "Ness v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

In 1994, Evans was convicted of Class 2 felony manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and Class X felony manufacture or delivery of more than 15 grams of cocaine. In 2018, Evans applied to the Illinois State Police for a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. The Police denied the request, explaining that in Illinois, felons are prohibited from owning firearms under section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code. The circuit court rejected Evans’s petition to have his firearm rights restored under section 10(c) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, reasoning that federal law, the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), barred Evans from obtaining a FOID card and that Evans had not established that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. The Appellate Court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. If a convicted felon can establish the requirements of section 10(c)(1)-(3), he has his civil rights restored and may be granted relief that is not contrary to federal law, which includes a “civil rights restored” exception. Evans failed to meet his burden of establishing that granting him relief would not be contrary to the public interest. The court noted that nothing in the statute precludes Evans from filing another petition to remove his firearm disability. Evans now knows why his previous submissions were found lacking and can bolster his submissions. View "Evans v. Cook County State's Attorney" on Justia Law

Vega, a Hispanic woman, sued the Park District based on its investigation and termination of her employment for allegedly falsifying her timesheets, citing national origin discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title VII. A jury returned a verdict for Vega on the discrimination claims, but not the retaliation claims, and awarded $750,000. The judge reduced the award to Title VII’s statutory maximum of $300,000, ordered the District to reinstate Vega, pay backpay, provide her with the cash value of lost benefits, and pay prejudgment interest and a tax component. The Seventh Circuit affirmed except for the tax-component award,Vega submitted a fee petition totaling $1,073,901.25, with a 200-page document listing details. Vega’s counsel submitted evidence to support her current hourly rate of $425 for general tasks and $450 for in-court work. The district court granted Vega’s petition in the amount of $1,006,592, noting the District’s “scorched-earth litigation approach.” Vega filed a second fee petition totaling $254,635.69 for work following the first petition. The district court awarded $218,221.69 and granted Vega a tax-component award of $49,224.30. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the award was “rather high for the type of litigation and monetary and equitable relief that Vega achieved,” but that the district court’s analysis and reasoning demonstrate an appropriate exercise of its discretion. View "Vega v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law

Mahran, an Egyptian Muslim, sued Advocate Christ Medical Center, alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Mahran, a pharmacist, alleged that Advocate failed to accommodate his need for prayer breaks; disciplined and later fired him based on his race, religion, and national origin; retaliated against him for reporting racial and religious discrimination; and subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race, religion, and national origin. The district judge rejected all of the claims on summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge wrongly required Mahran to show that Advocate’s failure to accommodate his prayer breaks resulted in an adverse employment action and that the judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence in evaluating his hostile-workplace claim. Mahran expressly agreed at trial that an adverse employment action is an element of a prima facie Title VII claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s religious practice. He cannot take the opposite position. While the judge should have considered all the evidence Mahran adduced in support of his hostile workplace claim, there was not enough evidence for a jury to find that Advocate subjected him to a hostile work environment. View "Mahran v. Advocate Christ Medical Center" on Justia Law

In 2012, DeCrane became the director of training at Cleveland's Fire Training Academy and applied to be the chief. The mayor chose McGinnis to be the next chief. DeCrane said he was surprised because McGinnis had fallen behind in his required continuing education hours. When confronted, McGinnis lied. Someone tipped off the media. McGinnis resigned. The ensuing media coverage reflected poorly on the city. DeCrane did not leak the tip about McGinnis’s deficient training, which was an open secret in the department. According to DeCrane, Eckart mistakenly believed that he was the leak’s source. DeCrane contends that Eckart (among others) subjected him to three years of retaliation. DeCrane was not disciplined or demoted but he received no promotions, allegedly faced unfounded misconduct charges, had his Training Academy work undermined, and suffered a retirement-related slight. DeCrane sued Eckart, Cleveland, and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the individuals retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the other individuals and the city but denied Eckart summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Eckart’s claim of qualified immunity. While the First Amendment does not protect speech made as part of an employee’s government job, DeCrane would have tipped off the media as a private citizen rather than a public employee. View "DeCrane v. Eckart" on Justia Law