Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Arrington claims he stopped engaging in drug activity after he was released from prison on parole in 2007. The government contends Arrington became a Pennsylvania drug supplier. In 2009, the police arrested Arrington’s co-conspirators. Arrington helped them attempt to escape apprehension. He abandoned his parole appointments and fled the state. Arrington was subsequently charged with possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to do the same, and traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to facilitate unlawful activity. His co-conspirators testified against him. Arrington claims he told his attorney, Kress, that he wanted to testify to explain that he absconded from parole not because of his involvement in drug trafficking; Kress did not honor this request because doing so would open Arrington to cross-examination, which might enable the government to introduce evidence of his prior convictions. Kress allegedly never sought Arrington's consent to waive his right to testify or explained that the decision was his to make. However, during his closing argument, Kress covered some of the material to which Arrington claims he would have testified.Arrington moved to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that Kress was ineffective for unilaterally waiving his right to testify. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The bar for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a section 2255 motion is low but Arrington does not meet it, because his claim conclusively fails Strickland’s prejudice prong. View "United States v. Arrington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's judgments of conviction of first-degree murder and sentences of death, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for his role in a 2016 triple homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) certain prosecutorial comments challenged by Defendant did not constitute fundamental error; (2) the trial court did not err in permitting the use of a map as a demonstrative aid; (3) there was no error in the State's presentation of victim impact evidence; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "Alcegaire v. State" on Justia Law

Grainger, the victim of cyberattacks against its computer systems, isolated the source of the intrusions to a single internet protocol (IP) address, coming from a high-rise apartment building where disgruntled former employee Soybel lived. Grainger reported the attacks to the FBI, which obtained a court order under the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. 3121, authorizing the installation of pen registers and “trap and trace” devices to monitor internet traffic in and out of the building generally and Soybel’s unit specifically. The pen registers were instrumental in confirming that Soybel unlawfully accessed Grainger’s system. The district court denied Soybel’s motion to suppress the pen-register evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Soybel’s convictions under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The use of a pen register to identify IP addresses visited by a criminal suspect is not a Fourth Amendment “search” that requires a warrant. IP pen registers are analogous in all material respects to the telephone pen registers that the Supreme Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in 1979. The connection between Soybel’s IP address and external IP addresses was routed through a third party, an internet service provider. Soybel has no expectation of privacy in the captured routing information. The court distinguished historical cell-site location information, which implicates unique privacy interests that are absent here. The IP pen register had no ability to track Soybel’s past movements. View "United States v. Soybel" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when, as a condition of his supervised release and while his appeal of his conviction was pending, he was required to complete a sex offender treatment program, and then was discharged from the program and given a limited jail sanction for refusing to admit to the conduct underlying his conviction, a required part of his treatment.The panel held that it was bound by the rule adopted by six justices in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion), as enunciated in this court's precedent, and consistent with the rule adopted by sister circuits—that the Fifth Amendment is not violated unless and until allegedly coerced statements are used against a suspect in a criminal case. The panel concluded that because plaintiff did not make a statement that was used in a criminal proceeding, he may not bring a civil action against the government under section 1983 for a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The panel also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims alleging that the government officials involved in this incident violated plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his First Amendment right to bring a civil lawsuit against the government. View "Chavez v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After child abuse investigators removed seven minor children from their home, plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims against the Governor, DHS, Garland County, and numerous employees of the State and Garland County in their official and individual capacities. The district court dismissed the official capacity claims and granted qualified immunity on all individual capacity claims but one. The district court subsequently granted Defendant Finnegan and Garland County's motions for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded that the district court properly applied the Heartland test and found that the existence of exigent circumstances justified the taking of the children. Moreover, the removal was ordered in executing a warrant issued by a magistrate who was advised removal was intended. Even if the Fourth Amendment applies in this situation, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established in the Eighth Circuit when the children were removed from their home. In regard to post removal proceedings, the court concluded that Finnegan was entitled to qualified immunity where plaintiffs introduced no evidence that Finnegan's find true determination and testimony in administrative and judicial proceedings were "fabricated" or came anywhere near this level of conscience-shocking behavior. View "Stanley v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, female truck drivers, filed suit against CRST alleging Title VII claims of retaliation and hostile work environment on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as well as individual constructive discharge claims on behalf of themselves. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CRST on the class and individual retaliation claims, as well as on the individual hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims.The Eighth Circuit concluded that CRST's removal policy does not constitute per se retaliation. With respect to the pre-2015 members of the class, the court concluded that the removal policy led to a net decrease in the women's pay; the removal policy was materially adverse; but there was no direct evidence that CRST had any motivative discriminatory bias. With respect to the post-2015 members of the class, the court concluded that these members were subject to adverse employment and the district court should address in the first instance the question whether direct or circumstantial evidence establishes that CRST took this adverse employment action in retaliation for the post-2015 class members' Title VII-protected activity.In regard to plaintiffs' individual hostile work environment claims, the court concluded that Plaintiff Fortune has not created a genuine factual dispute whether CRST's response was actionably deficient; plaintiffs have not established the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact whether CRST knew or should have known about ongoing coworker-on-coworker harassment and thereafter failed to take prompt remedial action that was reasonably calculated to end it; and plaintiffs have failed to show such discrimination on the part of CRST itself and therefore have failed to show that the employer created intolerable working conditions or took otherwise discriminatory action. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenosha officers McDonough and Kinzer responded to a 911 call from an apartment building’s manager who reported that there was a woman inside Ferguson’s apartment who was “causing problems” and did not live there. McDonough spoke with Rupp-Kent who was alone inside Ferguson’s apartment and who reported that Ferguson had been violent with her. McDonough observed bruises on Rupp-Kent’s leg and neck and saw the knife Ferguson purportedly pointed at her. McDonough learned that Ferguson was on probation for robbery, had his driving privileges revoked, and drove a Chrysler. He reviewed Ferguson’s booking photo. McDonough, in his squad completing the paperwork, saw Ferguson drive past and followed. The parties dispute the events that occurred as McDonough attempted to arrest Ferguson. McDonough ultimately deployed his taser for five seconds.Ferguson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. McDonough moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained for a jury to decide. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. McDonough and Ferguson offered competing accounts and the dashcam video of the incident did not conclusively support either party’s account. Under one version of the events, Ferguson was not resisting and a reasonable officer would have known that an officer’s substantial escalation of force in response to an individual’s passive resistance violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force. View "Ferguson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because the motion was time-barred by the one-year limitations period in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The court concluded that defendant is not entitled to equitable tolling or recharacterization on his pro se filings. The court found United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002), controlling where the record showed that defendant's counsel erroneously told defendant that he had not missed the deadline. Furthermore, even if defendant were entitled to have his pro se Johnson motion recharacterized as a section 2255 motion, his current arguments alleging prosecutorial conflict of interest do not relate back to his Johnson filing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). View "United States v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

After Christian Redwine led officers from the Columbus Police Department on a high-speed chase across state lines before crashing into bushes on the side of a road, the driver of the police vehicle stopped behind and to the right of Redwine's car. Seconds after the officer stepped out to make an arrest, the car's reverse lights turned on, and the car started backing up. The officer fired 11 shots as the car passed near him, then he changed magazines and fired another 10 shots. The officer killed Redwine and injured two passengers. The district court granted the officer's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the first round of shots but denied it as to the second.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the officer acted reasonably in firing both rounds of shots. The court concluded that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the officer is entitled to state-law immunity and the police chief and the county are entitled to summary judgment for all claims against them as well. View "Tillis v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the habeas court denying Petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument at Petitioner's criminal trial.Petitioner was convicted of murder. On appeal, the appellate court concluded that at least one of the prosecutor's comments during closing argument violated Petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial but that Petitioner had not been prejudiced by the improper remarks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to Petitioner's criminal trial counsel to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks did not undermine the Court's confidence in the verdict. View "Ross v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law