Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the University, alleging a claim for retaliation, as well as age and gender discrimination. The trial court granted the University's motion for summary judgment but erroneously excluded evidence that a University employee rejected a job candidate because she "wanted someone younger."The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the University and concluded that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence. The court stated that Reid v. Google, Inc., (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535–545, explained that such remarks can be relevant in age discrimination suits. The court examined the record as a whole to see if the previous comment changes the propriety of summary judgment under governing law. Applying the three-part burden-shifting Bechtel test, the court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case where three factors show that the remark changed the pretext analysis: first, the remark evidence is relatively strong; second, the dean created a pay differential between male and female Associate Deans hired concurrently; and sources unrelated to plaintiff criticized the Dean's management. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Jorgensen v. Loyola Marymount University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit principally seeking an injunction against the Texas court system to prevent any Texas court from entertaining suits under Senate Bill 8, which authorizes private civil actions against persons who abort an unborn child with a detectable fetal heartbeat. The motions at issue arise out of defendants' appeal of the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds.The Fifth Circuit previously denied plaintiffs' emergency motion for injunction pending appeal, which was premised on plaintiffs' argument that the district court's Eleventh Amendment immunity ruling was correct, and now explained the grounds for its actions. The court concluded that SB 8 emphatically precludes enforcement by any state, local, or agency officials, and thus defendant officials lack any "enforcement connection" to SB 8 and are not amenable to suit under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).In regard to Mark Lee Dickson's appeal, the court concluded that jurisdictional issues presented in the proceedings against Dickson are related to the issues presented in the state officials' collateral-order appeal. Therefore, the notice of appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction over Dickson as well as the officials. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Dickson's appeal; granted Dickson's motion to stay the district court proceedings pending appeal; and expedited the appeal to the next available oral argument panel. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss for lack of standing an action brought by plaintiff, a professional musician and accordionist, challenging three City ordinances which restrict busking in Houston. Plaintiff alleges that the ordinances violate his First Amendment right to free expression.The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court adopted an erroneously restrictive pleading standard for his First Amendment claim. The court concluded that, in pre-enforcement cases alleging a violation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that chilled speech or self-censorship is an injury sufficient to confer standing. The court explained that a plaintiff bringing such a challenge need not have experienced "an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action" to establish standing. In this case, the complaint alleged that plaintiff intends to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest; plaintiff's desired conduct is arguably proscribed by the ordinances; and he previously received a busking permit from the City—indicating recent enforcement of the permitting provision—which bolsters his entitlement to the substantial-threat-of-enforcement presumption. Therefore, plaintiff has adequately pleaded a justiciable injury and has standing to maintain his lawsuit at this stage. The court remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the district court's order denying his motion for reconsideration or leave to amend as moot. View "Barilla v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment in an excessive force case where the district court held that a jury could conclude that an officer shot a citizen four times without warning while the citizen was turning away and empty-handed. The court explained that, because genuine disputes exist on three material facts—whether the officer warned before shooting, whether the citizen had turned away from the officer, and whether the officer could see that the citizen was unarmed—the district court properly denied a summary judgment motion invoking qualified immunity. The court agreed with the district court that there was a violation of clearly established law if the jury resolves the factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. View "Poole v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's first degree murder conviction and death sentence. The panel concluded that the California Supreme Court's conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar further prosecution of petitioner was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).The panel also concluded that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination were not violated by the admission at trial of a videotaped conditional examination of the victim's boyfriend was not an unreasonable determination of facts within the meaning of section 2254(d)(2). The panel further concluded that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated by testimony at trial regarding certain out-of-court statements was not an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; the state court's conclusion that petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court's exclusion of his videotaped confession at the penalty phase does not warrant relief under section 2254(d); the state court's conclusion that petitioner was not denied his constitutional right to a fundamentally fair sentencing hearing was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; the state court concluded that petitioner's rights to due process, a fair penalty trial, and a reliable sentence were not violated by the admission of evidence concerning his prior incidents of violence; the state court's rejection of petitioner's challenge to the instructions given to the jury in his case was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; the state court's rejection of petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his attorney's concession that petitioner intentionally killed the victim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's request for evidentiary development, discovery, and an evidentiary hearing. View "Jurado v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment denying petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction and death sentence. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019), which summarized the factors courts should consider when evaluating a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the panel remanded so the district court can apply in the first instance the Supreme Court's guidance in Flowers. The panel resolved remaining issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Ervin v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging two sections of House Bill 2263: Section 216 criminalizes the performance of pre-viability abortions at cascading intervals of two to three weeks, beginning with the detection of a "fetal heartbeat" and continuing through a gestational age of 24 weeks; and Section 217 criminalizes the performance of an abortion if the physician "knows" the reason for the abortion is "because of" the race, sex, or a Down syndrome diagnosis of the fetus. Both sections contain an affirmative defense provision when the abortion was performed because, "in the physician's good faith, reasonable medical judgment," the abortion was necessary to avoid a medical emergency.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that the district court properly issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of Sections 216 and 217 of H.B. 2263 because the provisions are constitutionally unsound. The court stated that it is still clear that when burdens are substantial enough, a law restricting access to pre-viability abortions is unconstitutional. Because the court found that all provisions of Section 216 pose a substantial burden to a person seeking an abortion at the relevant time LMP, it is unnecessary for the court to fully address the State's interests. Even if the court were to consider the State's interests, there are questions about whether its declared reasons for the law are, in fact, genuine. The court stated that the Supreme Court has been clear that laws that have the purpose or effect of placing an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking abortion "cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends." The court explained that this legislative history indicates a likelihood that the justifications offered in court have been mere pretext and that the bill was passed with knowledge that it was unconstitutional. Therefore, it is likely that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits in demonstrating that Section 216 is unconstitutional because it is in direct violation of the principles established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).In regard to Section 217, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their void-for-vagueness challenge. Declining to address whether Section 217 violates principles of substantive due process, the court concluded that the district court should resolve this issue in the first instance and, in doing so, should analyze the ban on abortions for Down syndrome separately from bans on abortions for reasons of race or sex.The court noted that it is unnecessary to decide whether the medical-emergency affirmative defense is constitutional because the injunction on other grounds moots the issue. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the other relevant factors weighed in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. Finally, the court stated that, although this circuit's recent—and alarming—decisions have broadened the extent to which the government may impede a person's constitutional right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term, the law remains clear that if a regulation is a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, it is invalid. View "Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner on his claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase and that he was denied a fair trial because of jury tampering. The court concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling that petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel's ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by neither investigating nor presenting mitigating evidence was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and was not so obviously wrong as to be beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to provide credible testimony of jury tampering. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner defaulted on his juror bias claim. View "Hodge v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and other crimes, holding that neither the structure nor the content of the prosecutor's closing argument deprived Defendant of his constitutional rights.On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor deprived him of his constitutional rights to present a closing argument and to a fair trial by reserving her analysis of certain evidence for the rebuttal portion of closing argument and by mischaracterizing other evidence during rebuttal. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's claims of prosecutorial impropriety failed. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction for assault in the first degree and remanded this case to the circuit court, holding that the trial court erred in conditioning the admission of evidence on expert testimony.Defendant killed his cousin, Santhony Albert, but claimed he had acted in self-defense. Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree, and intermediate court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in preventing him from advancing evidence of Albert's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level unless he called an expert to explain its meaning. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the trial court erred in conditioning the BAC evidence on expert testimony and violated Defendant's constitutional right to present any and all competent evidence to support his defense. View "State v. David" on Justia Law